Abstract
The enactive approach conceives of cognition as acts of sense-making. A requirement of sense-making is adaptivity, i.e., the agent’s capacity to actively monitor and regulate its own trajectories with respect to its viability constraints. However, there are examples of sense-making, known as ultrafast cognition, that occur faster than the time physiologically required for the organism to centrally monitor and regulate movements, for example, via long-range neural feedback mechanisms. These examples open a clarificatory challenge for the enactive approach with respect to how to operationalize monitoring and regulation, and with respect to the temporal scale of sense-making, which has traditionally been limited to the here-and-now in accordance with the axiom of structural determinism. We explore possible responses to this challenge and suggest that this axiom should be explicitly rejected, in particular, we suggest that adaptivity is a property of organism–environment interactions over a time span that includes both present and past conditions. Ultrafast performances are thus no longer a challenge for the enactive approach, because the constitutive basis of their normativity is spatiotemporally extensive. This is in agreement with recent developments in different varieties of enactivism, which all converge toward assigning a constitutive role to an agent’s history of interactions.
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Acknowledgements
Laura Mojica acknowledges support by a scholarship granted by the Mexican Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACyT). Both authors thank the 4E Cognition Group for all the helpful discussions. We thank our anonymous reviewers for patiently helping us to improve this paper.
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Mojica, L., Froese, T. On the spatiotemporal extensiveness of sense-making: ultrafast cognition and the historicity of normativity. Synthese 198 (Suppl 1), 447–460 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02240-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02240-7