Abstract
The aim of this article is to offer a method for determining the ontological commitments of a formalized theory. The second section shows that determining the consequence relation of a language model-theoretically entails that the ontology of a theory is tied very closely to the variables that feature in that theory. The third section develops an alternative way of determining the ontological commitments of a theory given a proof-theoretic account of the consequence relation for the language that theory is in. It is shown that the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment does not entail that the ontological commitments of a theory depend on the variables of that theory. The last section of the article discusses how this account of ontological commitment can be used in other philosophical projects such as Wright’s (Frege’s conception of numbers as objects, Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen, 1983) abstractionism. The article concludes with a discussion of the upshots of adopting the proof-theoretic account of ontological commitment for ontology generally.
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Notes
The non-standard set-set consequence relation is adopted for ease in dealing with the proof-theory presented in Sect. 3.
One upshot of the view offered here is that this is not necessarily the only intelligible question that can be asked. This is not to suggest that Quine (1948) or any other philosopher is committed to the claim that the only ontological question is ‘what is there?’. As is discussed in Sect. 4.3, there may be other potentially interesting ontological questions that have not been fully considered in the literature. For intance, the framework being developed gestures towards ‘What is Smith?’, an answer to which is ’Smith is a person’, as a question that may be ontologically significant. The sentence ‘Smith is something’ then may be a way of committing oneself to universals such as personhood.
In this paragraph K is used as a schema which can be filled in by a kind-term of English, e.g. ‘tiger’ and ‘dragon’ but not ‘gold’ and ‘water’.
Each theorem mentioned is proved in the appendix to this article. A variable x is free for K when x does not occur in K.
The notion of substitution, which has so far only been defined for terms, can straightforwardly be generalized.
This is so even if Quine would not recognize the legitimacy of that language.
This article therefore can offer an inferentialist explanation of the role of quantification in ontology and the groundwork for an inferentialist picture of ontological commitment in general. Lance (1996) also proposes an inferentialist account of ontological commitment. Lance’s methodology is to hold Quine’s dictum fixed and to offer an inferentialist explanation of the content of existential sentences. This article offers an alternative to Quine’s dictum along inferentialist lines and makes no commitment as to the particular content of existential sentences other than what can be determined from their assertion and denial conditions.
Footnote 4 of van Inwagen’s (1981) article makes clear that the argument of that article is not directed at the account being offered here.
See Macfarlane (MS) for a discussion of such accounts of commitment.
For more development of this account of commitment see Ripley (MS).
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for offering an explanation of the arguments of this paper in this succinct form.
This account of ontological commitment shows formally a way of accomplishing what Sellars (1979) was hoping to accomplish. He argues that the ontological commitments of a quantified sentence (one that he says ‘refers indeterminately’) ultimately must rest on the non-quantified instances of that sentence (sentences that he says ‘refer determinately’). In Sellars’s terminology this account of ontological commitment is an explanation of how ‘indirect reference’ can be explained in terms of ‘direct reference’.
Here ‘\(\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad \)’ is the position that asserts all of \(\Gamma \) and denies nothing.
For convenience only atomic predication is considered. A discussion of comprehension principles and quantification introduces unnecessary complication. For a proof-theoretic characterization of second-order quantification see Parisi (MS).
It should be noted that it only shows that second-order logic meets a necessary condition on a consequence relation being logical consequence.
Another concern is that the standard model-theory is ‘incomplete’ for any proof-system. Since proof is taken as primitive nothing is left out of the consequence relation. This also has no bearing on the success of Wright’s project since HP entails PA in a proof-theoretically definable logic.
For a helpful overview of free logics see Lehmann (2002).
This sentence is importantly distinct from the sentence ‘Aristotle is doing some thing’.
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Appendix
Appendix
Lemma 1
If \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown ( \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\), then \(\Gamma \subseteq \Delta \) and \(\Sigma \subseteq \Lambda \).
Proof
Let \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma , \Delta _1 \Rightarrow \Lambda _1, \ldots \) be an open branch in \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\). Since the root of this branch is \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma \), \(\Gamma \subseteq \Gamma \cup \bigcup _i \Delta _i\) and \(\Sigma \subseteq \Sigma \cup \bigcup _i \Lambda _i\). Since that branch was arbitrary this holds for every open branch in \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) and thus for every position in \(\triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\). \(\square \)
Theorem 1
Let \(\Gamma \) be a theory. \(\Gamma \) is committed to there being entities of which K is true iff for any model M if \(M \vDash \Gamma \) then for some \(\sigma \in \Sigma _M\) and x that is free for K.
Proof
For the left to right direction let \(\Gamma \) be committed to there being entities of which K is true. It follows that there is no model M such that \(M \vDash \Gamma \) and K is empty in M. Let M be a model of \(\Gamma \), i.e. \(M \vDash \Gamma \). Since K is not empty in M there is variable assignment \(\sigma \) and variable x such that x is free for K and .
For the right to left direction let it be that for any model M if \(M \vDash \Gamma \) then for some \(\sigma \in \Sigma _M\) and X that is free for K. Suppose that \(\Gamma \) is not committed to there being entities of which K is true. It follows that there is a model M such \(M \vDash \Gamma \) and K is empty in M. Since K is empty in M there is no variable assignment \(\sigma \in \Sigma _M\) and variable x that is free for K such that . But by the assumption there is such a \(\sigma \) and variable. \(\square \)
Theorem 2
The proof-theoretic and model-theoretic accounts of quantification agree, i.e. \(\Gamma \vDash \Sigma \) iff \(\vdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma \).
Proof
This is a familiar result for first-order classical logic. For a proof of this see Ebbinghaus et al. (1980). \(\square \)
Theorem 3
For any sentence \(\varphi \) that does not contain elements of W, it holds that \( \vdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi , \Sigma \) iff for every \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\), \(\varphi \in \Delta \).
Proof
For the left to right direction suppose that \( \vdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi , \Sigma \). Let \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) be such that \(\varphi \in \Lambda \) and \(\beta \) be the open branch of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) from which \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \) is generated. By Lemma 1\(\Gamma \subseteq \Delta \) and \(\Sigma \bigcup \{\varphi \} \subseteq \Lambda \). Since \(\varphi \in \Lambda \) there is an n such that \(\Delta ' \Rightarrow \Lambda '\) in \(\beta \) and \(\varphi \in \Lambda '\). Let \(\delta \vdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi , \Sigma \). The following deduction establishes that \(\vdash \Delta ' \Rightarrow \Lambda '\) and thus that \(\beta \) is not an open branch in \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) contradicting the assumption that it was.
For the right to left direction suppose that \(\varphi \in \Delta \) for every \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) and for reductio that
- (H)
\(\nvdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi , \Sigma \)
Let \(\varphi \) be the nth sentence. Suppose that at stage n of the construction there is a branch \(\beta \in \tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) with an open leaf \(\Delta ' \Rightarrow \Lambda '\) such that \(\nvdash \Delta ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Lambda '\). At this stage \(\beta \) is at least extended to \(\beta '\) with open leaf \(\Delta ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Lambda '\). But in this case there is a branch \(\beta ''\) that passes through \(\beta '\) when the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) is completed such that the position \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \) is the maximal leaf of \(\beta ''\) and \(\varphi \in \Lambda \). Since \(\vdash \Delta ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Lambda '\)\(\varphi \not \in \Delta \), contradicting the assumption. This establishes
- (B)
There is no open leaf \(\Delta ' \Rightarrow \Lambda '\) at stage n such that \(\nvdash \Delta ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Lambda '\).
Claim 1
There is no stage i such that there is an open leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) in the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) where \( \nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) but at \(i+1\) there is no open leaf \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) such that \(\nvdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\).
Suppose that Claim 1 is true. It follows that for any stage i if there is an open leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) at a stage i such that \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi ,\Theta \) then there is an open leaf \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\)at \(i+1\) such that \(\nvdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\). By (H) at stage 0, there is an open leaf \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma \) such that \(\nvdash \Gamma \Rightarrow \varphi , \Sigma \). This contradicts (B).
This leaves only the proof of Claim 1. It is proved by reductio. Let i be a stage such that there is an open leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) in the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\) where \( \nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) but at \(i+1\) there is no open leaf \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) such that \(\nvdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\). To be specific let \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) be the position under consideration at \(i\cdot j\cdot k\). Either there is a step \(i\cdot j\cdot k+l\) with position \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) such that \(\vdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\) or not.
Case 1
(There is a step \(i\cdot j\cdot k+l\) with position \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) such that \(\vdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\)) In this case \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) is \(\Pi , \psi [w/x] \Rightarrow \Theta \). It follows that \(\exists x \psi _j \in \Pi \), w does not appear in \(\Pi \bigcup \Theta \), \(\nvdash \Pi , \exists x \psi _j \Rightarrow \Theta \). It was assumed that no witnesses occur in \(\varphi \) so w does not appear in \(\varphi \). By assumption \(\vdash \Pi , \exists x \psi _j, \psi [w/x] \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) and \(\nvdash \Pi , \exists x \psi _j \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \). However, L\(\exists \) read from bottom to top guarantees that if \(\nvdash \Pi , \exists x \psi _j \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) and w does not occur in \(\Pi \bigcup \Theta \bigcup \{\varphi \}\) then \(\nvdash \Pi , \exists x \psi _j, \psi [w/x] \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) contradicting the assumption.
Case 2
(There is no step \(i\cdot j\cdot k+l\) with position \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) such that \(\vdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\)) Without loss of generality let there be no existential steps between i and \(i+1\). If there are then there is a point at which Case 1 applies. There are then three sub-cases for how i is extended.
Case 2.1 (The branch with leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) is expanded according to (b) in the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\)) In this case \(\nvdash \Pi , \psi _i \Rightarrow \Theta \) and \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \psi _i, \Theta \). By assumption there are no open leaves \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) at this stage such that \(\vdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi ,\Theta '\), so there are deduction \(\delta \) and \(\delta '\) such that \(\delta \vdash \Pi , \psi _i \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \) and \( \delta ' \vdash \Pi \Rightarrow \psi _i, \varphi , \Theta \). It was also assumed that \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \). The following deduction contradicts this assumption.
Case 2.2 (The branch with leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) is expanded according to (c) in the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\)) In this case there is a \(\delta \) such that \(\delta \vdash \Pi , \psi _i \Rightarrow \Theta \) but \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \psi _i, \Theta \). By assumption there is no open leaf \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) at this stage such that \(\nvdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\). It follows that there is a \(\delta '\) such that \( \delta ' \vdash \Pi \Rightarrow \psi _i, \varphi , \Theta \). The following deduction contradicts the assumption that \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \).
Case 2.3 (The branch with leaf \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) is expanded according to (d) in the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \Sigma )\)) In this case there is a \(\delta \) such that \(\delta \vdash \Pi \Rightarrow \psi _i , \Theta \) but \(\nvdash \Pi , \psi _i \Rightarrow \Theta \). By assumption there is no open leaf \(\Pi ' \Rightarrow \Theta '\) at this stage such that \(\nvdash \Pi ' \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta '\). It follows that there is a \(\delta '\) such that \( \delta ' \vdash \Pi , \psi _i \Rightarrow \varphi \Rightarrow \Theta \). The following deduction contradicts the assumption that \(\nvdash \Pi \Rightarrow \varphi , \Theta \).
\(\square \)
Theorem 4
A set of sentences \(\Gamma \) has a model-theoretic ontological commitment to K iff the position \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad \) has a proof-theoretic commitment to K.
Proof
For the left to right direction suppose that \(\Gamma \) has a model-theoretic commitment to K. By Theorem 1 for any model M such that \(M \vDash \Gamma \) there is a \(\sigma \in \Sigma _M\) and variable x that is free for K such that . It follows that . Since this holds for any model M it follows that . By Theorem 2. It follows from Theorem 3 that for any \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad )\), . Let \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad )\) that is the maximal leaf of a branch \(\beta \). Since there is a node \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) in \(\beta \) such that was considered at stage n.j of the construction of \(\tau (\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad )\). Let be the kth sentence. At stage n.j.k a sentence the node directly above \(\Pi \Rightarrow \Theta \) is for a witness w. By Theorem 1. Since \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \) was selected arbitrarily it holds that for any \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad )\) there is a sentence of the form . It follows that \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad \) has a proof-theoretic commitment to K.
For the right to left direction suppose that \(\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad \) has a proof-theoretic commitment to K. It follows that for any \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \in \triangledown (\Gamma \Rightarrow \quad )\) there is a sentence of the form . The sentence is closed and contains no witnesses. Since . If it were then \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \) would not be coherent. Since \(\Delta \Rightarrow \Lambda \) is maximal . By Theorem 3. By Theorem 2. Let M be a model of \(\Gamma \). It follows that and that there is a \(\sigma \in \Sigma _M\) such that . So K is not empty in M. Since M was arbitrary it holds that there are no models of \(\Gamma \) for which K is empty. \(\Gamma \) has a model-theoretic commitment to K. \(\square \)
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Parisi, A. Atomic ontology. Synthese 197, 355–379 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1725-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1725-8