Abstract
According to a long-standing school of thought, the improvement in equal opportunity is said to reduce the support for equality of outcomes. Yet, some scholars challenge this wisdom and maintain that equalizing opportunities introduces higher uncertainty about individuals’ future rank in their society, which, in turn, leads to more demand for equalizing incomes. Based on the 2013 survey of French residents (N = 4000), this paper argues that both claims are correct. Two pieces of evidence are provided. First, the relationship between perceived equality of opportunity and preference for equality of outcomes is asymmetrically U-shaped. Second, using split samples, this relationship proves to be decreasing among the poorest and increasing among the richest. The article provides some clues supporting the generalizability of such results, based on the analysis of the four waves of the International Social Survey Program in 27 countries.
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Notes
Social position is used here as a general concept that includes social class, status, income and accumulated wealth.
This prediction is formulated by Benabou and Ok (2001). In their paper, they assume that agents are not (too) risk averse. Without this strong assumption, they acknowledge that equal opportunity leads to more demand for equalizing resources.
For more information, visit http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/en/anr-funded-project/?tx_lwmsuivibilan_pi2%5BCODE%5D=ANR-11-INEG-0007.
The estimates are also run using probit estimates leading to similar results.
Generally, there are very few missing values (the upper limit is 4.2%) and they are removed from the analysis. The only exception is for left–right placement.
More information is available in the offical Web site http://w.issp.org/menu-top/home/.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Variable Definition
The following is the list of attitudinal variables used, with their wording
Variables names | Dynegal (survey of French residents) N = 4000 | ISSP social inequality N = 97,280 |
|---|---|---|
Support for equal outcomes | Dummy equal to 1 if respondent agrees with the statement “Income should be equal in France, there should be no difference” (33.8%) | Dummy equal to 1 if respondent agrees with the statement “Government should reduce income differences” (65.1%) |
Perceived equal opportunity | Category variable varying on a 10 point scale in which 1 means “social success is a foregone conclusion and depends only on the social background of people” and 10 means “people all have the same opportunities to succeed in life regardless of their social background” | Category variable varying on a 5 point scale in which 1 means “coming from a wealthy family is essential for getting ahead in life” and 5 means “coming from a wealthy family is not important at all for getting ahead in life.” The same question is asked for parent’s education and place, and respondents’ race and gender |
Current ranking in the social hierarchy | Category variable varying on a 10 point scale in which 1 means that people rank themselves at the bottom of the social ladder and 10 means they rank themselves at the top. Statistical description is in the text | Category variable varying on a 10 point scale in which 1 means that people rank themselves at the bottom of the social ladder and 10 means they rank themselves at the top |
Individual optimism | Category variable varying on a 5-point scale in which 1 means “being very pessimistic about their own future” and 5 means “being very optimistic about their own future.” The middle category (3) includes people who don’t know or don’t provide an answer | |
National optimism | Category variable varying on a 5-point scale in which 1 means “being very pessimistic about French society” and 5 means “being very optimistic about French society” | |
Left–right placement | Category variable varying on a 10-point scale in which 1 means that people place themselves at the far left and 10 means that they place themselves at the far right. The mean is 4, the median and the mode are 5 | Category variable varying on a 5-point scale in which 1 means that people place themselves at the far left and 5 means that they place themselves at the far right The original variable on party affiliation was measured differently across modules and countries. The cumulation tries to distinguish between (1) cases where party affiliation (left–right) was derived from a question on respondent’s affiliation to a certain party and (2) cases where this information was derived from direct questions on left–right placement |
No political orientation reported | Dummy equal to 1 if people refuse to place themselves on the left–right scale and 0 otherwise. 14% refused or don’t know | Dummy equal to 1 if people refuse to place themselves on the left–right scale and 0 otherwise. 14% refused or don’t know |
Perceived income gap | Category variable varying on a 10 -point scale in which 1 means that in France the income gap is not wide at all and 10 means that it is very wide | |
Years | 2013 | 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009 |
Countries | France | Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, USA |
Appendix 2: Robustess Checks and Split Samples
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Perceived equal opportunity | − 0.448*** (.009) | − 0.413*** (.057) | − 396*** (.058) | − 0.324*** (.075) | − 0.460*** (.096) | − 0.389*** (.080) | − 0.373*** (.088) |
Perceived equal opportunity2 | 0.041*** (.005) | 0.037*** (.005) | 0.038*** (0.005) | 0.030*** (.007) | 0.042*** (.008) | 0.038*** (.007) | 0.033*** (.008) |
Demographic controls | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Attitudinal controls | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Sample | All | All | All | Less than the median income | More than the median income | Experimented upward mobility | Not experimented upward mobility |
N | 3967 | 3967 | 3879 | 2000 | 1879 | 2245 | 1634 |
Pseudo-R2 | 0.014 | 0.037 | 0.040 | 0.042 | 0.059 | 0.054 | 0.056 |
Predicted cases | 66.1 | 67.2 | 67.9 | 63.8 | 74.2 | 69.8 | 66.3 |
.
Appendix 3: Complete Estimates ISSP for Support for Equal Outcomes
Variables | (1) | (2) |
|---|---|---|
Equality of opportunity I | − 0.524*** | |
(0.0361) | ||
Equality of opportunity I2 | 0.0667*** | |
(0.00559) | ||
Equality of opportunity II | − 0.172*** | |
(0.0205) | ||
Equality of opportunity II2 | 0.00605*** | |
(0.000824) | ||
Age | 0.00223*** | 0.00100 |
(0.000634) | (0.00111) | |
Gender (female) | 0.1662*** | 0.2053*** |
(0.0397) | (0.0229) | |
Left–right | − 0.415*** | − 0.488*** |
(0.0126) | (0.0216) | |
No political orientation reported | 0.0897*** | 0.162*** |
(0.0214) | (0.0460) | |
Part-time work (ref. full time) | 0.152*** | 0.155** |
(0.0290) | (0.0600) | |
Unemployed | 0.266*** | 0.440*** |
(0.0383) | (0.0769) | |
Student | − 0.0983*** | − 0.224*** |
(0.0381) | (0.0731) | |
Retired | 0.250*** | 0.340*** |
(0.0284) | (0.0555) | |
Withdrawn from labor force | 0.132*** | 0.190*** |
(0.0287) | (0.0537) | |
Constant | 2.524*** | 2.756*** |
(0.0949) | (0.173) | |
Country fixed effects | yes | yes |
Year fixed effects | yes | yes |
Pseudo-R2 | 11.40 | 11.06 |
Predicted cases | 71.76 | 68.42 |
Observations | 89,717 | 25,982 |
.
Appendix 4: Models per Country
AUT | BUL | CAN | CHI | CHY | CZE | FRA | GER | HUN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Perceived equal opportunity | − 0.482*** | − 0.422** | − 0.685** | − 0.255 | − 0.450** | − 0.437*** | − 1.092*** | − 0.533*** | − 0.359*** |
(0.173) | (0.195) | (0.276) | (0.193) | (0.202) | (0.166) | (0.242) | (0.134) | (0.133) | |
Perceived equal opportunity2 | 0.0572** | 0.0611* | 0.0909** | 0.0394 | 0.0581* | 0.0709*** | 0.139*** | 0.0717*** | 0.0627*** |
(0.0271) | (0.0340) | (0.0399) | (0.0306) | (0.0335) | (0.0263) | (0.0336) | (0.0207) | (0.0225) | |
Current ranking in the social hierarchy | − 0.245*** | − 0.211*** | − 0.166*** | − 0.0966*** | − 0.220*** | − 0.223*** | − 0.253*** | − 0.274*** | − 0.189*** |
(0.0287) | (0.0313) | (0.0302) | (0.0262) | (0.0374) | (0.0251) | (0.0232) | (0.0191) | (0.0223) | |
Gender | 0.172** | 0.331*** | 0.208* | 0.214** | 0.0552 | 0.188** | 0.260*** | 0.294*** | 0.220*** |
(0.0830) | (0.103) | (0.107) | (0.103) | (0.106) | (0.0778) | (0.0751) | (0.0594) | (0.0680) | |
Age | 0.00522 | 0.0137*** | 0.00639 | − 1.48e−06 | 0.00419 | 0.00730** | − 0.00457 | − 0.00446** | 0.0112*** |
(0.00349) | (0.00513) | (0.00456) | (0.00341) | (0.00463) | (0.00358) | (0.00378) | (0.00220) | (0.00269) | |
Left–right placement | − 0.142*** | − 0.661*** | − 0.00547 | − 0.0511 | − 0.479*** | − 0.336*** | − 0.0366 | ||
(0.0478) | (0.199) | (0.107) | (0.0732) | (0.0524) | (0.0316) | (0.0944) | |||
Part-time work (ref. full time) | 0.153 | − 0.0431 | 0.321** | − 0.146 | 0.376 | − 0.233 | 0.101 | 0.0359 | 0.315 |
(0.185) | (0.237) | (0.148) | (0.146) | (0.309) | (0.194) | (0.131) | (0.119) | (0.207) | |
Unemployed | 0.248 | 0.325* | 0.315 | 0.230 | − 0.0625 | 0.521** | 0.0176 | 0.614*** | 0.364** |
(0.239) | (0.171) | (0.248) | (0.193) | (0.427) | (0.218) | (0.197) | (0.145) | (0.184) | |
Student | 0.0189 | 0.313 | 0.192 | − 0.307 | − 0.187 | − 0.199 | 0.0830 | 0.125 | 0.185 |
(0.185) | (0.279) | (0.212) | (0.202) | (0.213) | (0.207) | (0.240) | (0.155) | (0.211) | |
Retired | 0.107 | 0.193 | 0.340* | − 0.0697 | 0.124 | 0.0587 | 0.161 | 0.355*** | 0.359*** |
(0.145) | (0.186) | (0.206) | (0.173) | (0.230) | (0.132) | (0.121) | (0.100) | (0.130) | |
Withdrawn from labor force | 0.434*** | − 0.156 | − 0.0227 | 0.0838 | − 0.172 | 0.149 | − 0.262 | 0.0450 | 0.680*** |
(0.159) | (0.247) | (0.212) | (0.138) | (0.183) | (0.136) | (0.165) | (0.104) | (0.197) | |
Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Constant | 3.466*** | 1.763*** | 3.169*** | 1.786*** | 2.096*** | 2.853*** | 3.766*** | 3.572*** | 1.111** |
(0.435) | (0.382) | (0.830) | (0.460) | (0.499) | (0.385) | (0.478) | (0.297) | (0.463) | |
Observations | 3688 | 2847 | 1734 | 2853 | 1803 | 3521 | 4387 | 6827 | 5813 |
ISR | ITA | JAP | LAT | NZ | NOR | PH | PL | PT | RU | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Perceived equal opportunity | − 0.879*** | − 0.659*** | − 0.422 | − 0.0267 | − 0.841*** | − 1.045*** | − 0.311** | − 1.070*** | − 0.513 | − 0.317** |
(0.236) | (0.254) | (0.271) | (0.271) | (0.231) | (0.241) | (0.150) | (0.196) | (0.351) | (0.150) | |
Perceived equal opportunity2 | 0.131*** | 0.0893** | 0.0470 | − 0.0405 | 0.0945*** | 0.147*** | 0.0383 | 0.156*** | 0.0733 | 0.0357 |
(0.0391) | (0.0392) | (0.0394) | (0.0425) | (0.0331) | (0.0344) | (0.0250) | (0.0324) | (0.0589) | (0.0250) | |
Current ranking in the social hierarchy | − 0.143*** | − 0.162*** | − 0.131*** | − 0.368*** | − 0.210*** | − 0.226*** | − 0.0369** | − 0.161*** | − 0.121*** | − 0.116*** |
(0.0285) | (0.0326) | (0.0270) | (0.0386) | (0.0243) | (0.0253) | (0.0181) | (0.0250) | (0.0427) | (0.0222) | |
Gender | 0.200* | 0.469*** | 0.270*** | 0.146 | 0.146* | 0.515*** | − 0.0557 | 0.161* | 0.170 | 0.267*** |
(0.110) | (0.109) | (0.103) | (0.126) | (0.0851) | (0.0715) | (0.0756) | (0.0879) | (0.164) | (0.0795) | |
Age | 0.00776* | 0.00435 | 0.00939*** | 0.0154*** | 0.00311 | 0.00793** | − 0.00170 | 0.00811** | 0.00984 | 0.0127*** |
(0.00417) | (0.00397) | (0.00344) | (0.00580) | (0.00312) | (0.00311) | (0.00249) | (0.00406) | (0.00650) | (0.00360) | |
Left–right placement | − 0.404*** | − 0.275 | − 0.523*** | − 0.574*** | − 0.286** | − 0.124 | ||||
(0.0863) | (0.192) | (0.0763) | (0.0434) | (0.126) | (0.145) | |||||
Part-time work (ref. full time) | 0.0447 | 0.0408 | 0.0203 | − 0.178 | 0.247** | 0.494*** | 0.0936 | 0.0690 | 0.428 | − 0.342** |
(0.152) | (0.208) | (0.136) | (0.192) | (0.111) | (0.157) | (0.0963) | (0.187) | (0.475) | (0.154) | |
Unemployed | 0.0638 | 0.464 | 0.419 | 0.00270 | 0.863*** | 0.198 | − 0.237** | 0.571*** | − 0.274 | − 0.0994 |
(0.226) | (0.306) | (0.332) | (0.271) | (0.196) | (0.234) | (0.117) | (0.179) | (0.325) | (0.192) | |
Student | − 0.00589 | − 0.390* | 0.0968 | 0.0144 | 0.0921 | 0.0999 | − 0.00974 | − 0.207 | − 0.214 | − 0.321** |
(0.233) | (0.219) | (0.188) | (0.249) | (0.228) | (0.128) | (0.172) | (0.191) | (0.367) | (0.156) | |
Retired | − 0.0130 | 0.309 | − 0.140 | − 0.0389 | 0.217 | 0.316** | 0.347* | 0.696*** | − 0.595** | 0.197 |
(0.214) | (0.209) | (0.178) | (0.260) | (0.149) | (0.134) | (0.205) | (0.153) | (0.277) | (0.151) | |
Withdrawn from labor force | − 0.183 | 0.229 | 0.195 | − 0.124 | 0.301** | 0.269* | − 0.0587 | 0.422** | − 0.350 | 0.244 |
(0.161) | (0.202) | (0.141) | (0.256) | (0.146) | (0.139) | (0.0992) | (0.188) | (0.257) | (0.154) | |
Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Constant | 2.935*** | 2.337*** | 2.129*** | 3.102*** | 4.273*** | 3.858*** | 1.115*** | 3.177*** | 3.317*** | 0.734** |
(0.426) | (0.511) | (0.569) | (0.801) | (0.547) | (0.477) | (0.271) | (0.546) | (0.728) | (0.294) | |
Observations | 2322 | 2,96 | 2206 | 2047 | 2933 | 3,91 | 3546 | 3649 | 2065 | 4502 |
SK | SI | ES | SE | CH | UK | US | AUS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Perceived equal opportunity | − 0.463** | − 0.939*** | − 0.802*** | − 1.399*** | − 0.358 | − 0.452** | − 0.798*** | − 0.717*** |
(0.192) | (0.300) | (0.265) | (0.302) | (0.258) | (0.215) | (0.157) | (0.152) | |
Perceived equal opportunity2 | 0.0513 | 0.143*** | 0.120*** | 0.188*** | 0.0452 | 0.0409 | 0.0881*** | 0.0751*** |
(0.0319) | (0.0452) | (0.0423) | (0.0441) | (0.0388) | (0.0311) | (0.0239) | (0.0230) | |
Current ranking in the social hierarchy | − 0.204*** | − 0.213*** | − 0.106*** | − 0.300*** | − 0.240*** | − 0.200*** | − 0.0886*** | − 0.213*** |
(0.0293) | (0.0375) | (0.0393) | (0.0344) | (0.0310) | (0.0228) | (0.0181) | (0.0197) | |
Gender | 0.290*** | 0.261** | 0.137 | 0.450*** | 0.194* | 0.178** | 0.115* | 0.0382 |
(0.0973) | (0.116) | (0.121) | (0.100) | (0.103) | (0.0782) | (0.0651) | (0.0610) | |
Age | 0.00565 | 0.000269 | − 0.00454 | − 0.00749* | − 0.00663* | 6.92e−06 | − 0.00639*** | 0.00220 |
(0.00479) | (0.00594) | (0.00458) | (0.00419) | (0.00347) | (0.00293) | (0.00229) | (0.00229) | |
Left–right placement | − 0.189 | 0.0209 | − 0.627*** | − 0.255*** | − 0.634*** | − 0.535*** | − 0.518*** | |
(0.151) | (0.133) | (0.0726) | (0.0669) | (0.0438) | (0.0436) | (0.0309) | ||
Part-time work (ref. full time) | − 0.378* | 0.923* | − 0.0410 | 0.443*** | 0.321* | − 0.00332 | 0.285** | 0.146 |
(0.230) | (0.475) | (0.259) | (0.155) | (0.173) | (0.148) | (0.114) | (0.0969) | |
Unemployed | 0.257 | 0.0833 | 0.302* | 0.163 | 0.245 | 0.0399 | 0.251 | 0.635*** |
(0.196) | (0.233) | (0.183) | (0.280) | (0.431) | (0.178) | (0.172) | (0.224) | |
Student | − 0.147 | − 0.741*** | − 0.217 | − 0.475** | 0.500 | 0.0754 | 0.0817 | − 0.0380 |
(0.218) | (0.208) | (0.233) | (0.192) | (0.393) | (0.349) | (0.201) | (0.187) | |
Retired | − 0.0196 | 0.434** | 0.139 | 0.254 | 0.0208 | 0.252* | 0.157 | 0.330*** |
(0.175) | (0.213) | (0.199) | (0.179) | (0.198) | (0.142) | (0.127) | (0.101) | |
Withdrawn from labor force | 0.0664 | 0.350 | 0.198 | 0.130 | 0.277 | 0.135 | 0.0779 | 0.273** |
(0.233) | (0.328) | (0.187) | (0.241) | (0.220) | (0.135) | (0.112) | (0.107) | |
Year fixed effects | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Constant | 3.029*** | 3.174*** | 3.036*** | 5.529*** | 2.285*** | 4.374*** | 2.974*** | 3.600*** |
(0.582) | (0.732) | (0.497) | (0.672) | (0.592) | (0.450) | (0.345) | (0.330) | |
Observations | 2498 | 2730 | 2268 | 2052 | 2049 | 3697 | 4963 | 5847 |
.
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Magni-Berton, R. Is Perceived Equal Opportunity Corrosive for Support for Equal Outcomes? Individual-Based Evidence. Soc Just Res 32, 403–430 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-019-00337-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-019-00337-5