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Cultures in Orbit, or Justi-fying Differences in Cosmic Space: On Categorization, Territorialization and Rights Recognition

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International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The many constraints of outer space experience challenge the human ability to coexist. Paradoxically, astronauts assert that on the international space station there are no conflicts or, at least, that they are able to manage their differences, behavioral as well as cognitive, in full respect of human rights and the imperatives of cooperative living. The question is: Why? Why in those difficult, a-terrestrial, and therefore almost unnatural conditions do human beings seem to be able to peacefully and collaboratively live together? What is there beyond terrestrial boundary conditions that allows for such a result? And what can we learn from the astronauts’ experience about the (lack of) effectiveness of human rights on Earth? My proposal is that the a-terrestrial dimension deeply alters the mind/body indexical framework and, in this way, disentangles the human inclination to semiosis from the cognitive and behavioral habits of categorization and territorialization inherent in the experience on Earth. If analyzed through the spectrum of an interdisciplinary approach involving anthropology, semiology, law, and human geography, I think that outer space enterprises can offer many insights into the cognitive and ethical/political hindrances to the effectiveness of human rights and their intercultural uses. Meanwhile the compulsive greed for a possessive territorialization of outer space and celestial bodies is growing by leaps and bounds. It haunts and imbues both astropolitics and space law. The astronauts’ semio-anthropological experience of human rights and cooperative coexistence seems to have been left in orbit. The future requires awareness and action by anthropologists, semioticians, cognitive scientists, geographers and lawyers, working all together in an interdisciplinary effort to move beyond approaching the experiential with a territorial mindset. The hope is that the “dark dream” of human exploitation/colonization of outer space will not turn from a political and legal speculation into a future reality.

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Notes

  1. The video of the complete conversation is freely available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p3nl1aeEXJk.

  2. The video of the complete conversation is freely available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lcT4-1x1wgs. But see also Obama’s conversation with astronauts at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oXzkdYVzlcc, and Putin’s one at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fLLfs1XtGEs. Even if these last two videos are less centered on the communicative and existential aspects of astronauts’ coexistence on the ISS.

  3. The impossibility of carrying out an ethnographical analysis of life on the Space Station goes without saying. For this essay, I have analyzed a significant number of recent videos and interviews with astronauts to inform my understanding of their living conditions, as well as leveraging the few relevant publications, for example astronaut Scott Kelly’s account of his year in space [91] or Paolo Nespoli’s book [124]. As for the anthropological analysis of human life in outer space and its perspectives see the Jaxa Research and Development Memorandum—Challenges of Space Anthropology 2014–2015, March 2015. Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, available at https://repository.exst.jaxa.jp/dspace/bitstream/a-is/546598/1/AA1530028000.pdf. See, ibidem, [127], and there for further bibliographical references; [161]. In any case, the reader can find a lot of interviews with astronauts on web: it is sufficient to input “videos with astronauts”, “astronauts diaries” and “astronauts journal” into all search engine. Especially, see https://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/astronauts/journals_astronauts.html. Se also the very important research carried out by [86, 165, 174]: especially chapter 3]. However, the psychological approach adopted in the last three books is very distant from my semio-cognitive reading of the relationships between cultural habits and (co-)existential space.

  4. A very interesting anthropological/semiotic analysis of how “up/down” perception and conceptualization transfigure across cultures according to the different signifying uses of bodily action, kinesthesia and “processes of agentic embodied meaning-making”, can be found in ([51]: spec. pp. 97–103). See, also, ([121]: p. 261 ff).

  5. Of course, when astronauts arrive on the space station, they have been already trained to face the absence of gravity on the Earth by means of specific technological apparatuses that allow the astronauts to get to be weightless. For example, since 2015, NASA employs a plane (G-Force One) appropriately modified for training the scientists-pilots to be selected for outer space travels and, specifically, the lack of gravity. Nonetheless, one thing is the preparatory practice but another the actual life on space station.

  6. About the right/left difference and its perceptibility by virtue of the asymmetry of human body, in a huge literature, see ([8]: p. 81 ff).

  7. It would be very interesting comparing the outer space spatial alienation with the relativity of space perception tied to the culturally different dynamic uses of bodies. As for this topic, see the semasiological approach to the signifying moving body proposed by [179, 180]. More in general, I want to stress here that below I will use the terminological couple space/territory rather than the more usual space/place. The reason lies in the semiotic interconnection between the perception/production of space and semantic dimension of experience. In non-terrestrial or absolutely a-territorial conditions what changes are, in a phenomenological/enactive sense (as to enactivism see below note) are both spatialization and semantization of experience. Consequentially the distinction between space and place—which I however I have already criticized elsewhere: see [155]—completely change its pre-conditions. In any case, in my view, the conflation between space and place has to do with the conception of space as a semantic function, not as a material/semantic void, so that place in a Locke’s fashion is to be intended as a momentarily, contingent modification of space. The interlocutory, web-related conception of place I assume, corresponds rather to the interlocutory emergence of meanings along the process of semiosis, which stems in any case from the co-transformative relationships between a plurality and teeming popping up of semantic purviews co-extensive with the unfolding of experience. See, however, on the space/place dialectics, [17].

  8. See [1, 167].

  9. As for the co-constructive relationships between self-reflexivity and environmental experience in the perception of space see ([21, 59, 62,63,64,65,66]: esp. p. 52 ff.), [69], [80] and [58]. On the most recent outcomes in neurological research in the perception of space and the way humans scale distance and the reachability of objects in space, see [57, 68, 137, 138].

  10. As for spatial re-embodiment, a comparison with the issues raised regarding the process of embodiment and re-embodiment in the use of prostheses could very insightful. See [27, 28, 42]. More generally, on the phenomenological approach to space perception, see [121]. For more on embodiment and the semiotic approach see [54, 181].

  11. In this essay, my use of the terms “territory” and “territorialization” is closely related to the condition of “a-terrestriality” experienced by astronauts. If territory and territorialization are considered with regard to the condition of “terrestriality” and “a-terrestriality,” the spatial dimension and the semantic dimension can be seen to—inherently and reciprocally—inter-penetrate in a semiotic continuum. Consequentially, I assume territory and territorialization as more than simply outcomes of the semantic/ideological/identitarian projection onto space. For a historical review of the theoretical-anthropological assumptions in the term “territory,” see [23, 173]. I, instead, offer the working hypothesis that they are a function of the semantization process that comes from swinging between the two poles of spatial variation and semantic/categorical variations included in human experience. However, the openness of this flow of semantization can be variously blocked on Earth. The absolute a-territoriality inherent in the astronauts’ floating in outer space, namely in a space of a-terrestriality, demonstrates how the tendency to territoriality changes in the absence of gravity, and the resulting transformations of mind/body conditions underlying the human activity of semantization/categorization. On Earth, human beings may be unable to rid themselves of their territorializing attitude precisely because of their inclination to maintain previously embodied schemas of semantization/spatialization, namely behavioral and categorical habits. Thus, I think that it makes little sense to define internet activities as absolutely de-territorialized until such time as human beings can actively apply (or are under the illusion of being able to apply) their categorical/spatial habits and behavioral patterns to their digital communicative interactions: see, also, ([17]: p. xiv). This is because territory is not the result of a “here in”/”out there” relationship, but rather the interlocutory outcome of a semiotic/embodied ecological activity, that of categories and their inherent spatial implications. See [6]; for an example of identitarian/ontological approach to reading the space/place relationship see [108].

  12. For more on this dis-compositional methodology and its implications with regard to intercultural translation, see [152].

  13. On the spatialization of categories and the inclusion of spatial experience in categorization, see [153] and therein for further bibliographical references.

  14. See [162] offers a very insightful analysis, using a Peircean approach, on the inclusion of objects populating space in human interpretive/pro-active schemas and habits, such that objects are taken as semiotic prostheses of bodily action.

  15. See [37]: p. 56 ff., [39]: pp. 148 ff., 221 ff., [7, 59, 111].

  16. See, for a similar understanding of space, which is achieved by conjoining Peirce’s semiosis and Lefebvre [96] pro-active approach to the productive spatial experience, see [104,105,106].

  17. [153, 154], see ibidem for further bibliographical references on this topic.

  18. I would point out that the semiotic continuity I am referring to in this essay has nothing to do with the Spinozian evocations proposed by [30,31,32], and other scholars committed to the study of human geography or spatial justice following these two philosophers: see in a vast array, for example, [94, 133]. My idea of semiotic continuity between language or other symbolic representations and space does not presuppose any ontological parallelism between ideas and matters/bodies. That parallelism, however much metaphorically interpreted and remolded, is based on the hypothesis of an all-encompassing God or Natural Order. My perspective has no need of such an absolute metaphor and, on the contrary, excludes any parallelism. Rather, I postulate a horizontal continuity, followed by the possibility of bi-directional communication between the linguistic semiotic domain and the spatial one. I do not assume the existence of an all-comprehensive bodily immanence, nor even a post-modern dismantling confutation of the meaningfulness of categories. To overcome the modern mind/world and word/thing dualisms, instead of such an immanence, I prefer to think of a dynamic coexistence between symbols and matters within a universe of material signs caught in their endless processes of signification, which dynamically interact, reciprocally transform, and translate one into another: for a similar view see [93] and, as early as the 9th century C.E., al-Jahiz: on which, see [157]. The postulation of this horizontality is clearly incompatible with the ontological Spinozian parallelism between ideas and bodies, which implies the impossibility of any connection or influence between these two domains of Being (or, in Spinoza’s terminology: Substance). On this regard and, more specifically, as concerns the “individuation problem” in Spinoza see ([33]: esp. p. 29 ff. and [13]: p. 121 ff).

  19. [148]: p. 52 ff.

  20. [84].

  21. [1].

  22. See [151, 153] and the related bibliography.

  23. [59, 80, 51].

  24. ([127]: p. 7 ff).

  25. ([44]: pp. 136–137).

  26. [59].

  27. ([129]: p. 80).

  28. Although from a different semiotic perspective than the one I assume here, some interesting suggestions about the affective/bodily relationship between language, categorization and spatialization can be found in [36], who re-articulate some theoretical assumptions from, respectively, [70, 132, 159, 166].

  29. Actually, on the space station astronauts do not live in the complete absence of gravity; they are still orbiting around the Earth. Although they float within the space station, they nonetheless experience a constant perception of falling, even if no one actually ever falls. Little by little, each astronaut gets used to this weird and not completely comfortable perception, and somehow neutralizes its effects on her/his conscience.

  30. Hereinafter the term “proprioception” will mean not only the self-perception of the wholeness of one’s psycho-physical unity, but also the idea that this unity is the result of a continuous process of embodiment of experience. This means that proprioception does not conflate with biographical consciousness. Rather it is ordered to emphasize that the general perception of the body is also in any case a synthesis of the relations on which the existence of the body depends. “Body,” actually, is only an abstraction, and it should not be reified or “cosified” within the material entity apparently bounded by skin-made contours. It is, rather, a relational process, notwithstanding, and indeed because of, its materiality.

  31. Although he uses the term “naturalization” or, alternatively, in a Peircean fashion, the formula “indexical use of icons”, [88, 89] forges a very similar description of the psycho-semiotic-cognitive process that leads humans to reify (naturalize) their previous categorizations. From a semio-structuralist view what Kean terms “semiotic ideology” is very near to the bundle of concepts of “marque”, “marquage” and “demarcation”: see, for a broad critical approach [177].

  32. In this sense, it could be beneficial to refer to the meaning of “icon” and “iconization” as related to the Byzantine iconological tradition, and the inner significance of sacred icons as a means of making the invisible manifest in the eyes of the observer/believer. About the creation of a sacred space interfacing visible and invisible, namely “chora,” see [97,98,99,100,101], Isar [81,82,83]. For further analysis and bibliographical references on chorology and semiotics, I refer to [151, 153]. Considering the dynamicity of Byzantine Icons and their interfacial function played between the invisible and the visible, the world of things and their cosmic indexical/semantic domain, could be instructive to a reconsideration of the Peircean “icon” and its role in the process of knowing. In this sense, icon and experience, icon and experimental verification, icon and object (of cognition) are not linked by a static morphological or isomorphic resemblance. On the contrary, all these pairs comprise terms that undergo—at least, potentially—a process of reciprocal, endless, determination. From this point of view, the Peircean icon and its use are to be taken as antithetical to the idolatrous iconicity pointed out in the title of this section.

  33. [84].

  34. On this topic, see the interesting analysis proposed by ([12]: pp. 7 ff.). For a useful bird’s eye view of the literature on “space appropriation,” see [130]. But see also, even if from different perspectives, [90, 103, 136: pp. 48, 52, 59].

  35. But the mercification of human beings is also a contemporary phenomenon. The trafficking of human beings largely fosters the economic incomes of international organizations, including terrorist ones. The videos on the sale of migrant people that ISIS militants orchestrate in Libyan camps are sadly only the most recent evidence of a widespread practice of our time.

  36. In this sense, with regard to Vitoria’s theory of sovereignty and his justification of Spanish colonial deeds see, in a massive literature, ([2]: p. 13 ff.); as for the Atlantic implications of Hobbes’ and Locke’s views on “Land” and “Sea,” see [95].

  37. See [109, 122, 123].

  38. See [9].

  39. See [22, 49].

  40. I think that any citation on this would be pointless because of the boundless vastness of the literature on the relationship (or the denial of it) between semantics and teleology, meanings and ends. Nonetheless, I would like suggest only two (re-)readings: [40, 41].

  41. See [19, 71, 163].

  42. From this perspective, there seems to be no need to resort to Weber’s distinction between goal-oriented rationality and value-oriented rationality to confute the ethical and pragmatic consistency of the Machiavellian motto: the end justifies the means. It is so because ends are the cumulative and dynamic combinations of means and their widespread reticular semiotic/teleological significance. On the other hand, it is worth observing that even Machiavelli, in his works, never proposed a self-alienating schema of efficiency-oriented action. On the contrary, the efficiency Machiavelli was thinking of is always intended in a critical and teleologically all-encompassing way. The justification of a particular, topically-oriented action is in any case only interlocutory, and has as its rational horizon an efficiency that must be read in a comprehensive vision of human ends.

  43. [22].

  44. [3]; see also Ricca [149]: p. 59 ff.; [150]: p. 123 ff.; [154].

  45. It is interesting to observe that the same de-categorizing strategy take places in human minds when they manage and justify the uneven relationships between human beings and animals. On this topic I refer to Ricca [156] and the related bibliographical references.

  46. As for the cognitive roots of such a behavior see [18, 59, 112, 135]. From a political point of view, see the analysis developed by [164], Druckman [43].

  47. See [152].

  48. Some examples of this kind of argumentative approach can be easily found in [50, 147]. This instrumental use of human and/or fundamental rights transmutes, in many cases, into alleged conflicts between different human rights provisions. The morphological reading of social subjects’ behaviors and the related claims for protection produce a sort of semantic blindness and an almost irreducible antagonism in the invocation of human rights, which is clearly recognizable, for example, in [14].

  49. This could be considered as the dark side of what Merry, Peggy [116,117,118,119] and Goodale [61] termed the “vernacularization” of Human Rights. Actually, vernacularization could be assumed as a culturally intensified aspect of the more general process of situating the significance of Human Rights. Nonetheless, precisely this process, strongly augmented by the national experience of judicial legislation review, could determine what I have elsewhere defined as the exclusionary use of human rights and their (supposed) universality [149]: p. 127 ff., [151]. Such a hermeneutical drift is a direct result of an interpretive conflation and interpenetration between human rights semantic potentialities and the legal categories of national legal systems. Such categories are culture-laden and encapsulate inside themselves the historical marks that tradition left on each local legal experience and mind-set. Merging human rights and national legal categories tends to give rise to specific interpretive patterns which are, in turn, assumed in a prototypical vein. Those patterns become, in this way, “the” interpretation, the objective—even if only situated—meaning of human rights: which is nothing but a metonymic substitution of those interpretations with the open and inclusive semantic potentialities of human rights provisions. Consequently, what is not in tune with these interpretations is considered contrary to human rights, as though it were a sign of in-humanity. Human rights thus transform from inclusive tools into a single exclusionary sledgehammer to be used against cultural differences. The situatedness and the vernacularization of human rights can be “good,” and to a certain extent are also inevitable and desirable occurrences; this does not mean, however, that they have no adverse side effects and are, therefore, to be “handled” with care.

  50. Some indications in this sense can be drawn from [164] and [43], with regard to the process of justifying political judgments.

  51. Such an adaptive attitude conjures up a non-representational activity of mind. In this regard, see [20, 112,113,114] and, earlier, [38]; moreover, specifically from a social point of view, [178]. But regarding the implication of this activity on a cognitively and socially extended conception of mind, see below.

  52. On the defective implications of the judicial accommodation, especially when it is applied to the relationships between different cultural subjects, I refer to [154] and the related bibliography.

  53. For an overview on indigenous rights see [168]. But see, also, on the dynamics and fluidity of “indigeneity” [10, 11, 76, 126, 169].

  54. [158], and there for further literature.

  55. See [158].

  56. For an interesting survey of the relationships between ecology and cultural patterns of space categorizations see [75]. See also [74]. About the multi-naturality and the cultural gist of any view or conception about Nature see [34, 35].

  57. On connotative discompositions in intercultural translation, see [152, 154].

  58. I think that the “outer space environment” and its cognitive/socio-political challenges could suggest a convergence point, at least for further analysis and theoretical insights, between Menary and Gallagher with regard to their dispute about the “extension” of the idea of an “extended mind.” See [56, 115]. On the relationship between “extended mind” theory and its social and cognitive projections see also, [139] and [55] about the cognitive/experiential projection of language. But see also, for some criticism of “extended mind” theory, [24], the author of which proposes, in the light of the “enactionism,” a horizontal processive model of interaction among cognitive/social actors. For a combination of “extended mind” theory and “enactionsm” see [116]. On “enactivism” see [112].

  59. This attitude recalls the idea of a “distributed cognition.” As for the relationship between distributed cognition (or mind) and creativity see [60] and, more broadly, [78].

  60. For an extended and analytical exposition of the legal intercultural methodology and its interdisciplinary articulation (astride law, anthropology, semiotics and translation studies) see [149, 150, 153,154,155]. Rule-based behavior, creative interpretation based on the translational/metaphorical function of values, and individual self-determination as an element of inter-subjective interaction can be joined together if we consider the co-constructive effort of giving meaning to legal rules as a semiotic inter-related activity. If we assume that this semiotic holistic inter-relatedness inevitably includes elements of unpredictability, we can avoid attributing an unavoidable functionalist significance to the idea of semiotic webs. Signs, in their inclination to produce meaning, hold a twofold “nature:” reticular and, at the same time, open to individual originality, partly due to the aleatory nature of their interconnectedness. The combination of semiosis (taken as distinct from structural semiotics) and the use of rules-as-tools to face experience intelligently, creates the possibility of overcoming the opposition that [24], albeit in a very interesting way, stresses between a “distributed mind” approach and an “enactive” one, when related to legal experience. I think that an intercultural use of law and legal chorology, if combined, could give useful insights in this direction, provided that the semiotic web enacted by the human brain is still treated as different from the information network and problem solving procedures employed by technology today (in this sense I deeply share De Jaegher’s concerns). A testing ground for assessing this difference is the creation/use of metaphors, so important in intercultural translation, and the difficulties of processing algorithms that are able to at least recognize the metaphoric expression in natural language: see [5, 125].

  61. Human beings are also inclined to territorialize the dream worlds they imagine. This is because territorialization and categorization are symbiotic functions of their minds. Such remarks, I think, could be very important in the analysis of the virtual lives people live online. However, the same attitude could be recognized also in non-human animals, especially when we analyze their tendency to transform their living environment and surrounding spaces into built-structures. On this topic see [172]. In any case, I want to emphasize that my view of territorialization has nothing to do with the idea of “territorial imperative” suggested by [4] or, although differently, [45, 46]. At the same time, “territorialization” is used in this essay in a consistently different way than is typical of the geographical and political- or psycho-geographical works that have dealt with the concept of territory: for example, [29, 52, 67, 107, 160, 171]: p. 70 ff., [47, 48]. These writings presuppose or imply that “territory” is a spatial dimension to be controlled or, at least, a spatial dimension, sited outside the human mind and/or body, which can be controlled by means of territorialization, even as a cultural device. Among geographers, my view of territory in light of the astronauts’ experience is closer, perhaps, to Raffestin’s multi-disciplinary proposal [140,141,142], even if in his view the “representation” of space and thereby, albeit to a very low degree, the exteriority of it still lingers. I have something similar to observe about the interesting works of [15, 16] on territory and territorialization from a socio-legal perspective. Although he develops a relational and interactionist conception of territory, he maintains that space is an “out there” dimension in which territory “takes place” by means of human activity: see Brighenti ([15]: pp. 56–57). Even the rendering of territory in terms of knots or moments within a relational network seems to fail to elude the “allusion” to some sort of underlying spatial exteriority: see, among others, but from different perspectives, [87, 110]. Some interesting indications could emerge from an analysis of the relationships between proxemics [72, 73] and the process of semantization, since the molding and re-molding of meaning consistently changes the perception and management of spatial distances. Although fully addressing this topic is beyond the scope of this essay, it is still closely inter-woven with the relationships between space, signification and human rights as intercultural transducers addressed in [152, 154].

  62. Here the idea of “distributed cognition” proposed by ([77,78,79]: especially p. 444 ff.) could be recalled. However, and with specific regard to [77, 78] it is to be observed that distributed cognition has to rely upon the ability of mind to connotatively discompose and renew the cultural and categorical/behavioral patterns previously acquired. Of course, the interaction with the new environment plays a pivotal role in the production of such an effort. This, undoubtedly, seems to attune the above observations with Hutchins’ “distributed cognition” approach. Nonetheless, it holds true only provided that practices, bodies, neural activities, words, material tools, space and time are intended as “semiotic devices.” This is because, in my view, the source of creativity lies in the attitude of the semiotic motor to function as a roundabout among unpredictable fluxes of signs. So, if I can agree with Hutchins that individual creativity is to be divested of its halo of mystery and dislodged from the hidden rooms of mental intimacies, I think that his “distributed cognition” approach and the related way of explaining change and innovation (in short: creativity) should be semiotically engaged. In this sense, testing the “extended mind” and “distributed mind” theories with the outer space experience could be very useful. The individual factors of mind, even if “distributed” or extended, are brimming not only with “cultural practices” but also with manifold productive dispositions to produce and renew culture. I think that this is implicit in Hutchins approach, as well as in enactivism, even if the insistence on the social and cultural connotation of individual knowledge and behavior could be misunderstood. It should be noted, on the other hand, that this harping on the social and interactional connotation of “distributed, “extended”, “enacted” mind is, at least in part, a reaction to the criticism made of cognitive science for its exclusive focus on a fictive individual brain.

  63. But see also, in this regard, [131] where it is possible to find some seminal cues regarding the chorological continuity between mind and matter, category and space. See, for a free download of Peirce’s essay: https://isidore.co/misc/Res%20pro%20Deo/Peirce/The%20Monist%20papers/4.%20Man%27s%20Glassy%20Essence%20(1893).pdf. Moreover, for an analysis of mind–body relationship conceptions and their consequences for cognition in Shakespearean theatre, see Johnson [85]: p. 218 ff.

  64. The possibility of reaching a condition of trans-individual cognitive and behavioral transparency is beautifully demonstrated by Paolo Nespoli’s words during another conversation with the Italian Prime Minister (available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTqclhi4jJI: see, in particular, from min. 10:25 to 15:48.) During this conversation, Nespoli was describing to the Italian Prime Minister how difficult it is to combine and control the body movements of each astronaut in a space as limited as the Space Station and, moreover, in the absence of gravity. The task requires a great deal of patience, and the ability to learn one from another, because no one is completely aware of her/his own body’s movements and positioning in the available space inside the Station. More precisely, what Nespoli actually said is “Something very important we always do is to give each other feedback. The moment someone starts acting strangely or differently, before he even realizes it himself, we try to let him know, because it's always so much easier when you catch problems at the beginning, rather than trying to resolve them later. In fact, I tell the others, please, let me know right away if I am acting strange, because I want to know! I can't change what I don't understand, or don't know about”.

  65. With regard to the astronauts’ outer space experience, it would be very interesting to test the proposal of a combination between interactionist and enactivist sociological approaches to human relationships/coexistence in the conditions of precariousness proffered by [25]. The radical upheaval determined by the absence of gravity would allow a new light to be cast on the creative co-construction of meaning and the pre-existing structures of interaction included in social systems, as well as in individual brains.

  66. This condition, if considered from a cognitive point of view, evokes and amplifies the title of the book by Hutchins [77]. For a comparison see especially the 4th chapter of this book.

  67. This is the thesis proposed by [102, 145, 146]: esp. p. 143 ff. But for a critical response to Rediker’s interpretation, see [176]. These criticisms have to do, in particular, with the anti-capitalistic bent that Rediker ascribes to pirates and their rules on board. I do not wish to discuss the motivational sources or the overall conditions that actually led some pirates to state their rules and (at least, apparently) the egalitarian sound of their contents. But, for a different and trans-epochal perspective on the category “pirate” as an emblem of the ‘outlaws’, see also [134]. What is important, from my point of view, is that the “pirates’ articles” were however produced, even if the men producing them were not exactly “sinless.” On the democracy of pirates, see the skeptical interpretation offered in [53]: this text includes a useful appendix which includes a collection of “pirates’ articles.” In any case, no one could claim that pirates are ethically comparable to contemporary astronauts. Precariousness and the adaptive responses to it may reveal, at least from a cognitive/interactional point of view, something in common.

  68. See [143]. A similar action has been carried out since 1 August 2017 in Luxembourg by means of its “Law on the exploration and use of Space resources.” See [26]. For more about the exploitation of celestial bodies resources in general, see [128, 170, 175]: esp. p. 42 ff., [92, 120].

  69. Very much to this point are the remarks of American astronaut Scott Kelly, in a recent interview (November, 09.2017) available at https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/scott-kelly-astronaut-exit-interview-space-station-nasa: “"The Earth, despite the pollution in some places, generally looks really beautiful and inviting, but when you hear the news it’s not that beautiful and that inviting. I remember there were days in the summer, when I first got up there, when we had some beautiful weather over the Mediterranean. It was just incredibly blue, and the contrast with the desert was amazing. Then you sit down and watch the news in the evening, and you see that, on those same shores, these little kids are washing up on the beaches dead. And you think, ‘You know, why can’t somebody do something about that?’” On the other hand, a mere glance at the primary journals on space, law, and politics is enough to reveal a legal-cultural landscape completely saturated by issues that exclusively consider rights of exploitation, territorialization, ownership and possession of celestial bodies or space travel. See, for example, the most recent essays published in “Astropolitics,” “Air & Space Law,” “The Journal of Space Law,” “Annals of Air and Space Law:” see also “Air and Space Law Commons”, etc.

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    Mario Ricca

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Ricca, M. Cultures in Orbit, or Justi-fying Differences in Cosmic Space: On Categorization, Territorialization and Rights Recognition. Int J Semiot Law 31, 829–875 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-018-9578-5

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