Abstract
A notable feature of recent philosophical work on climate ethics is that it makes practically no reference to ‘traditional’ environmental philosophy (of the sort that has dominated the curriculum on environmental ethics for decades). There is some irony in this, since environmental ethics arose as part of a broader movement within philosophy, starting in the 1960s, aimed at developing different fields of applied philosophy, in order to show how everyday practice could be enriched through philosophical reflection and analysis. The major goal of this paper is to explain why this branch of practical ethics has, for the most part, failed the test of practicability when it comes to formulating a response to global climate change. The central problem is that debates in environmental philosophy became absorbed by a set of metaphysical questions about the nature of value. The result has been a field dominated by views that provide unsuitable foundations for the development of public policy.
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Notes
Underlying this is the enormous influence of Martin Heidegger's ‘Question Concerning Technology’ (1977). For discussion, see Bhar Paul (2017), Zimmerman (1983). See also White Jr. (1967).
For another variant on this argument, see Steven Vogel (2015) pp. 160–161.
The example of such a confusion that he cites is from Worster (1985).
The phrase was coined by Jan Narveson (1977). For discussion see Tanner (2009).
Williston describes the difference between the latter two in the following way: ‘Biocentrism draws the moral circle around living or biotic things. Ecocentrism goes a step further to draw it around systems that contain both biotic and abiotic elements. Soil and water, although they contain many living things, are not themselves alive. So the primary objects of potential moral concern on this view are ecosystems’ (2016, p. 85).
Paul W. Taylor, for instance, interprets the ‘circle’ as involving a judgment of superiority and inferiority (with those inside the circle being superior to those outside it) (P. Taylor, 1981, p. 211). This allows him to draw a strict analogy between supporters of previous, discredited form of hierarchy and those who resist moral expansionism. The claim about superiority is introduced, however, out of the blue, and it is quite unclear why anyone might feel obliged to characterize moral ‘considerability’ as following from some form of superiority. As a result, although the argument is invalid, it reveals a great deal about the way that Taylor frames his understanding of the issues.
Their central response to the concern is to offer assurances that certain canonical cases, such as dogs, horses and monkeys, fall within the circle (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, p. 31). But this is precisely the move that is being denied to the speciesist as a response to the argument from marginal cases. After all, it is easy to point to fully rational, autonomous adult humans as the canonical instance of a moral agent.
If one follows Daniel Dennett (1987) in thinking that the concept of interest-seeking is an ascribed property, then one will be inclined to think that there is no fact of the matter as to which natural systems possess them.
Children raised in U.S. urban areas, for instance, exhibit a pronounced anthropocentric bias in their folkbiological ideas, the result of ‘insufficient cultural input and a lack of exposure to the natural world’ (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010, p. 67). ‘Since such urban environments are highly “unnatural” from the perspective of human evolutionary history, any conclusions drawn from subjects reared in such informationally impoverished environments must remain rather tentative’ (p. 67). This caution must be extended to include whatever ‘moral intuitions’ these subjects may report about animals and the natural world.
The planet has in fact been ice-free for most of the past half-billion years, with the past 25 million being a rather prominent exception. See Dessler (2016, p. 118), and on the PETM (pp. 119–120).
As Nicole Hassoun puts it, ‘The problem for inclusive environmental ethics just stems from the fact that they are radically incomplete; although they can provide some reasons in favor of particular climate change policies, they also provide reasons not to implement those policies. They do not tell us where the weight of reason lies’ (Hassoun 2011, pp. 240–241).
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Heath, J. The Failure of Traditional Environmental Philosophy. Res Publica 28, 1–16 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09520-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-021-09520-5