Abstract
A standard objection to a market in political votes is that it will enable the rich politically to dominate the poor. If a market in votes was allowed then the poor would be the most likely sellers and the rich the most likely buyers. The rich would thus accumulate the votes of the poor, and so the candidates elected and the policies passed would represent only their interests and not those of the electorate as a whole. To ensure that the poor do not become de facto disenfranchised, then, markets in votes should be disallowed. This objection seems so straightforward and compelling that it has received almost no critical scrutiny. This is unfortunate, for close examination reveals that this argument is not as straightforward as it initially appears. Indeed, there are (at least) four different ways of understanding this objection. It could be understood as expressing: (1) the concern that markets in votes would enable candidates to win elections who would otherwise lose them; (2) the concern that they would enable the election of candidates opposed by the majority of the electorate; (3) the concern that they would lead to the poor having disproportionately low political influence; and (4) the concern that they would lead to the rich having disproportionately high political influence. I will argue in this paper that only (3) and (4) could plausibly ground objections to markets in votes. Moreover, these will only plausibly ground objections to unrestricted markets in votes; they will not ground objections to markets in votes per se. Thus, if we are to continue to object to markets in political votes we will have to do this on grounds other than that were they to be allowed the rich will politically dominate the poor.
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Notes
Here ‘domination’ is to be understood in terms of the views of one group of persons (e.g., the rich) being privileged over those of others; it is not to be understood in Pettit’s republican sense of domination, in which one group ‘dominates’ another if the former is able to interfere arbitrarily in their lives (Pettit 2001, pp. 280–281).
Richard Hasen terms this the ‘equality’ argument against vote markets (Hasen 2000, pp. 1329–1331). Saul Levmore claims that the concern that markets in votes would enable the rich politically to dominate the poor is the ‘paramount’ objection to them, for were they to be allowed ‘wealth will prevail where it should not’ (Levmore 1996, p. 609). Versions of this objection have been offered by Tobin (1970, pp. 276–277), Rose-Ackerman (1985, p. 963), Holzer (2008, pp. 219–220) and Satz (2010, p. 102). Buchanan and Tullock also offer a version of this objection, noting that if a market in votes were to lead to the formation of permanent coalitions (e.g., of the wealthy) such a market might be ethically objectionable (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, pp. 272–274).
Note that this democratic tenet does not require that all voters have equal political influence; see note 19.
This objection could not be leveled against a market in votes in a situation where inequalities of wealth were minor, for then the comparatively wealthy could not politically dominate the comparatively poor.
The first of these explanations for trade is that of standard economic textbooks; the third was suggested to Christopher Freiman by an anonymous reviewer (Freiman 2014, p. 761, n. 5).
Copp does not endorse this argument for a market for votes.
For a discussion of the ways in which the introduction of the secret ballot undermined vote buying in the nineteenth century, see Lessig (2011, pp. 261–262).
Those who do include Buchanan and Tullock, who defend markets in votes under perfect market conditions and when unanimity is required for a political decision to be made (Buchanan and Tullock 1965, pp. 276–277), and Philipson and Snyder, who defend an organized and centralized vote market on the grounds of economic efficiency (Philipson and Snyder 1996, pp. 245–265). Kochin and Kochin defend vote markets under conditions where the costs to the poor of forming coalitions to block their domination by the wealthy are low (Kochin and Kochin 1998, pp. 645–662). Unrestricted vote markets have been defended by Block (2007, pp. 127–128), while Brennan defends vote markets on the condition that the votes are cast for morally acceptable candidates (Brennan 2011, pp. 135–160).
Thompson offers a weaker account of corruption than outlined here, holding that an institution is corrupt if individuals or factions only seek to control ‘collective authority for their own purposes’ (Thompson 1995, p. 29). But such an account is too weak; a regime would not be considered corrupt if a faction sought to secure political power for its private interests but was thwarted in the attempt.
Note that it is not being claimed that a market in votes would necessarily lead to corruption in this way; it is possible that the purchasers of votes are acting not on private interests but for what they perceive to be the public good.
Such a view of voting was endorsed by John Stuart Mill, who held that ‘the voter is under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his private advantage…’ (Mill 2005, p. 128). It is for this reason that Mill opposed markets in votes.
Note that in invoking a requirement of fairness this liberal conception of democracy is not committed to the view that democracy is merely ‘a kind of regulated rivalry between economic classes and interest groups in which the outcome should properly depend on the ability and willingness of each to use its financial resources and skills, admittedly very unequal, to make its desires felt’ (Rawls 1993, p. 361). This rivalrous view of democracy is rejected by Thompson (2002, p. 108).
See the discussion, below, of vote selling as a multilateral Prisoners’ Dilemma game.
To be more specific, this view of institutional corruption can be readily used to ground an objection to markets in votes cast for political office. However, the arguments that follow can readily be amended so that they can be used as arguments against markets in votes cast for or against particular political policies. For an outline of the various ways in which Thompson’s arguments have been drawn on to discuss institutional corruption more broadly than his original focus on Congressional corruption see Marie E. Newhouse, ‘Institutional corruption: A Fiduciary theory’, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 25, October 3, 2013, and Gustavo H. Maultasch de Oliveira, ‘Institutional corruption as a problem of institutional design’, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers, No. 41, April 10, 2014.
This view was voiced to me in correspondence by Tom May. While this concern is implicit in many of the objections to allowing a market in votes it is more clearly expressed by Justice Brennan, when he wrote in Brown v. Hartlage that ‘[n]o body politic worthy of being called a democracy entrusts the selection of leaders to a process of auction or barter’. The implication here is that were it not for the ‘auction or barter’ some other, more democratically legitimate, leader would have been selected.
This view is attributed (without supporting citation) to Michael Walzer by Soule (2003, pp. 45–46).
Lest one think that this is an artificial result, note that Saari has proven that for any number k that satisfies 1 ≤ k N! − (N – 1)! a voter profile can be discovered where there are k strict positional election outcomes, with the different election rankings being dependent on the choice of the election procedure (Saari 1992, pp. 277–306). If one believes that to be legitimate an office holder’s electoral victory must be independent of the voting procedure used very few politicians will legitimately hold office.
Thompson notes that ‘… the expression of a majority will remains the central meaning of popular sovereignty’ (Thompson 2002, p. 11).
As David Copp notes, ‘Democracy does not require equalizing the power to influence outcomes of the political process… It does, however, require that no voter have greater power to influence the outcomes of political decision making than any other voter unless either her extra power is the result of her occupying an office in accord with prior political decisions or her extra power stems simply from the fact that other voters have autonomously come to agree with her views’ (Copp 2000, p. 86).
This discussion is parallel to Lawrence Lessig’s discussion of the corrupting influence of political funding in the United States. See ‘Institutional corruptions’, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers No. 1, March 15, 2013, pp. 9–14.
Thompson recognizes that this is ‘for many political scientists and political theorists the very definition of democracy’ (Thompson 2002, p. 6).
Although Radin does not state that persons should exercise their votes to express their own views, incorporating this requirement into this understanding of what a vote is for—and hence why they are market inalienable—is required to block an argument that one could fulfill one’s duty to vote simply by voting, even if one was paid to vote in a certain way. For an argument that construes vote selling as a paid performance of this kind, see Brennan (2011, pp. 137–139).
This is different from Radin’s view, which is compatible with voters adopting a narrowly self-interested stance.
I thank two anonymous referees for their exceptionally helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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Taylor, J.S. Markets in Votes and the Tyranny of Wealth. Res Publica 23, 313–328 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9327-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9327-0