Abstract
In “The evolutionary argument against naturalism: a Wittgensteinian response,” DeVito and McNabb (Int J Philos Relig 92(2):91–98, 2022, 10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3) propose a Wittgensteinian argument against Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. In their paper, they seek to establish symmetry between a component of Plantinga’s premise and the premise of the radical skeptic. The first premise of Plantinga’s argument assumes the possibility of doubting the reliability of our cognitive abilities. The Radical skeptic doubts we have rational grounds to refute being brains in vats. DeVito and McNaab use hinge epistemology and Pritchard’s strategy against the radical skeptic to undermine Plantinga’s premise. This paper offers an alternative argument based on hinge epistemology against Plantinga’s argument. Relying on the various types of certainties Wittgenstein discussed, I argue that some scientific facts are among our certainties and hinges. Evolution (i.e., the theory of evolution by natural selection) is a well-established scientific fact and a hinge. As a result, in Plantinga’s first premise, we have two hinges: evolution and the reliability of our cognitive abilities. I will argue that given that hinges cannot trump one another, we can have these two hinges in place, and therefore, by endorsing hinge epistemology, there is another argument that shows why Plantinga’s argument cannot undermine naturalism if one accepts evolution.
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Notes
This certainty is partly rooted in our direct experience and partly in the culminating experience of humans, “I know, not just that the earth existed long before my birth, but also that it is a large body, that this has been established, that I and the rest of mankind have forebears, that there are books about all this, that such books don't lie, etc. etc. etc.” (OC, §288).
This certainty, which is not a certainty anymore, was also based on empirical grounds: “Suppose some adult had told a child that he had been on the moon. The child tells me the story, and I say it was only a joke; the man hadn't been on the moon; no one has ever been on the moon; the moon is a long way off, and it is impossible to climb up there or fly there”. (OC, §106).
Wittgenstein enumerates scientific and empirical certainties: "We know that the earth is round. We have definitively ascertained that it is round. We shall stick to this opinion unless our whole way of seeing nature changes. "How do you know that?"—I believe it. 292. Further experiments cannot give the lie to our earlier ones; at most, they may change our whole way of looking at things. 293. Similarly with the sentence "water boils at 100 C".” (OC, §291–293).
This certainty is also partly rooted in human experiences in which other human skulls were broken during wars or medical procedures and the like, “I, L.W., believe, am sure, that my friend hasn't sawdust in his body or in his head, even though I have no direct evidence of my senses to the contrary. I am sure, by reason of what has been said to me, of what I have read, and of my experience. To have doubts about it would seem to me madness—of course, this is also in agreement with other people, but I agree with them.” (OC, §281).
References
DeVito, M., & McNabb, T. (2022). The evolutionary argument against naturalism: A Wittgensteinian response. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 92(2), 91–98. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09832-3
Moyal-Sharrock, D. (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein’s on certainty. Palgrave.
Wittgenstein, L. (1972). On certainty (Trans. D Paul & Ge.E. M. Anscombe). Harper Torchbooks.
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Bagheri Noaparast, Z. Another Wittgensteinian response to the evolutionary argument against naturalism. Int J Philos Relig (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09904-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09904-6