Abstract
Classical theism is often said to suffer from the problem of modal collapse: if God is necessary and simple then all of his effects (creatures) are also necessary. Many classical theists have turned to extrinsic predication in response: God’s simple and necessary act is compatible with any number of possible effects or no effects, and is only said to be an act of creating in virtue of the existence of the universe itself. Leftow and Schmid criticize this solution for leading to “providential collapse”: God would not have control over which creation obtains if all his intrinsic features are compatible with any possible universe. Thomistic classical theism avoids both modal collapse and providential collapse by utilizing the metaphysics of relations. With no differences within his simple essence/act, God can relate himself differently to his possible effects, willing some and not willing others. These relations determine whether or not the effects will exist. Thomistic classical theism’s version of divine simplicity is not incompatible with God having a multiplicity of relations, for the three divine persons are distinct relations within God. Divine simplicity is only incompatible with a multiplicity of absolute items within God. Furthermore, not all differences of relation are grounded in the different absolute characteristics of their relata. Rather, sometimes differences of relation themselves ground differences in the absolute characteristics of their relata. God’s divine act is thus said to be an act of willing this creation rather than that in virtue of his chosen, contingent relation to possible creatures, rather than in virtue of the creatures themselves.
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Notes
I will avoid the use of the terminology of “possible worlds” when speaking about possibility and necessity. I think such language is potentially misleading and does not accurately reflect the structure of reality. For a criticism of such language see Oderberg (2007, p. 1–6).
If one uses David Lewis’ criterion for determining what is intrinsic vs. extrinsic, as Schmid and others in the conversation have done (Schmid, 2022a, p. 4, b, p. 1414, Pawl and Grant, 2023, p. 144, Grant, 2012, p. 254), then God’s choice of this particular universe is indeed extrinsic. For Lewis (1986, p. 61) states that “we distinguish intrinsic properties, which things have in virtue of the way they themselves are, from extrinsic properties, which they have in virtue of their relations or lack of relations to other things” (emphasis added). I hold that predications such as “God wills this universe to exist” are true in virtue of God’s relations to creatures. But these relations are not extrinsic to God in the sense that their character is determined by creatures outside God. Rather, God determines his relations to possible creatures, and thereby determines the creatures themselves.
On the Thomistic view that I defend there is a difference here between the predications “God creates this universe” and “God chooses (or wills) to create this universe”. The former names an external action of God’s (a “transeunt” action in Thomistic terminology) while the latter names an internal action of his (an “immanent” action) (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (hereafter ST) I, q. 14, prol). The former is indeed a case of extrinsic predication in the sense proposed by Tomaszewski, Pruss, Grant, and others: it is true in virtue of both God and the universe. Such predications, even though their subject is an immutable God, can become true at a certain time (Aquinas, ST I, q. 13, a. 7). The latter predication is not extrinsic in that sense: it is true in virtue of God and his relation to creatures; it is not true in virtue of the creatures themselves.
Perhaps one should say that the desire as an act of will, rather than a relation, causes me to make the sandwich. However, the act of desire is an intentional act in the sense that its very existence involves being directed towards/related to the not yet existent sandwich (Cp. Schmid, 2022b, p. 1430). An intentional act such as knowing or willing something is intrinsically related to external objects; I do not characteristically know my knowledge but know things by means of my knowledge. My knowledge is the knowledge of X and my will-act is the willing of Y. It seems that such a relationship is at least partly constitutive of the desire-act and of its causing of the sandwich.
Precisely: by my relationship of willing-the-sandwich, a relation that exists when the sandwich does not.
By “accident” Thomists and Aristotelians in general mean any attribute that a concrete thing (a “substance”) really has but that is not its essence or part of it. Some accidents are essential in that they flow from but are not part of a thing’s essence. These kinds of accidents are called “properties” in Thomistic vocabulary. Other accidents are accidental in that they are neither part of nor flow from a thing’s essence.
This does not mean that the will-faculty wills the will-act first and then wills the external object, except perhaps in unusual circumstances. This would multiply will-acts ad infinitum. Rather, the will-faculty wills the external object just by causing (“eliciting”) one will-act.
Is the will-faculty’s relation to its internal will-act a real accident inhering in the will, and thus incompatible with simplicity? Only if this relation constitutes a goodness of the will distinct from the will’s essence and the will’s act (see above, the section titled “Providential Relations”). This is certainly not the case with God’s relation of will towards external creatures.
Or rather, I-minus-will-act-X can so relate myself without difference. Will-act-X is obviously different in the two cases and is a difference in me. But will-act X cannot be included in the cause of will-act X, because nothing causes itself. So the cause of will-act X is I-minus-will-act-X. And I-minus-will-act-X is entirely identical whether I relate myself to will-act X as its cause or as not its cause.
Schmid argues in this context that “surely God himself (under DDS) does not point towards and is not of himself directed towards or referred to something ad extra”. In a footnote to this statement he explains that “Aquinas, for instance, explicitly denies that the divine substance can be essentially referred to other things—cf. Summa Contra Gentiles II, ch. 12 and De Potentia Q7, A8” (Schmid, 2022b, p. 1430). These are texts in which Aquinas denies that God has real relations to creatures, claiming only that he has relations of reason to them. But as I have shown above, Schmid misunderstands Aquinas: some of these relations are relations of God’s reason. They are not relations that are only generated by our minds.
I thank Michael Bolin and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments. This paper is much improved because of them.
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Shields, D. Simply providential: a Thomistic response to Schmid’s providential collapse argument against classical theism. Int J Philos Relig 95, 77–91 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09892-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09892-z