Abstract
Inductive arguments from evil claim that evil presents evidence against the existence of God. Skeptical theists hold that some such arguments from evil evince undue confidence in our familiarity with the sphere of possible goods and the entailments that obtain between that sphere and God’s permission of evil(s). I argue that the skeptical theist’s skepticism on this point is inconsistent with affirming the truth of a given theodicy. Since the skeptical theist’s skepticism is best understood dialogically, I’ll begin by sketching the kind of argument against which the skeptical theist’s skepticism is pitched. I will then define ‘skeptical theistic skepticism’, offer a precise definition of ‘theodicy’, and proceed with my argument.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
More precisely: No good that is known to us is such that we know that it would morally justify God in allowing E. And technically, this isn’t really a claim about evil. Rather, it’s a claim about our lacking a persuasive theistic explanation for God’s permission of evil. So the above is really an argument from the failure of theodicy. (For this observation I am indebted to Paul Draper.) But it’s simple and suitable for present purposes.
Some skeptical theists, e.g. Bergmann, say that ‘We have no good reason for thinking that known goods/entailments are representative of all goods/entailments’. Others, e.g. Howard-Snyder, say that ‘We should be in doubt about whether known goods/entailments are representative of all goods/entailments’. Both imply that we shouldn’t (epistemologically speaking) believe that known goods/entailments are representative of all those there are. That implication is the point of contact.
Cf. Inwagen (1998). The relationship between van Inwagen’s modal skepticism and the skeptical theist’s modal skepticism isn’t immediately obvious. (The former claims that conceivability isn’t a sure indication of metaphysical possibility; the latter pertains primarily to causal links between the realization of possible goods and God’s allowance of certain evils.) So note the connection. One motivation for The Inference might be the supposition that we can imagine a possible world in which E is prevented by God and some (aggregation of) good(s) that counterbalance(s) E is realized. The skeptical theist claims that, for all we know, there isn’t a possible world in which God prevents E and all of the counterbalancing goods that we enjoy (or will enjoy) in the actual world are realized—many of which, for all we know, aren’t even known to us (cp. Bergmann 2001, p. 286). For all we know, the argument goes, there are unknown entailment relations between those goods and God’s permission of E. Thanks to an anonymous referee for noting that clarification would be helpful here.
Though van Inwagen would doubtless claim that his general form of modal skepticism entails what we are calling modal skepticism, it’s obvious that the entailment doesn’t go the other way. So I do not assume that the skeptical theist’s modal skepticism entails a commitment to modal skepticism more generally (a la van Inwagen). That said, Bergmann cites van Inwagen’s modal skepticism as support for the skeptical theist’s modal skepticism (cf. Bergmann 2001, p. 286). So at least in Bergmann’s case, the distinction doesn’t seem to be of any real moment.
Bergmann (2001, p. 278). Others object to the title ‘skeptical theism’, on the grounds that one needn’t be a theist in order to endorse the skeptical theist’s skepticism or to be persuaded that said skepticism undermines some argument(s) from evil (cf. Howard-Snyder 2009, p. 20). Here, as I understand it, Howard-Snyder’s specific point is that (so-called) ‘skeptical theistic’ skepticism is equally reasonable for theists and non-theists alike.
What about privation accounts (e.g. Augustine or Boethius)? Insofar as such an account constitutes a theodicy (vis-à-vis a defense), it posits a reason in virtue of which God wouldn’t be morally blameworthy for permitting E.
In case it isn’t clear, I mean compatibilism as the claim that, “For some theodicy \(\Theta \), there’s no inconsistency inherent in endorsing SC while affirming (rather than refraining from affirming) that \(\Theta \) is veridical (with respect to \(\Theta \)’s claims about goods that would morally justify God in not preventing E).” Note, moreover, that on my account, God needn’t exist in order for \(\Theta \) to be veridical. In speaking of a good that would morally justify God’s permission of E, I refer to a good that would, in the event that God exists (i.e., whether or not God does in fact exist), morally justify God in permitting E.
Why this stipulation? In order to avoid objections of the form, “Of course we shouldn’t think that this theodicy tracks with reality: We shouldn’t think that G really exists!” That kind of objection is entirely beside my point here.
I don’t think that the weak theodicy, as I define it, really hangs on the existence of G (vis-à-vis the existence of G for all we know). In any case, that concern is peripheral to my argument. So, for the sake of simplicity, we’ll again stipulate that G exists and obtains in the actual world.
I don’t think that there’s a viable answer other than ‘Yes’, ‘No’ or ‘Maybe’. So any given theodicical account must be either a weak or a strong theodicy as I’ve defined them.
What if Strom were to simply withhold judgment about SC? To answer that question, read through the rest of this section and note the following. If Strom withholds judgment about SC then he should withhold judgment about whether he shouldn’t hold the belief that a good like G* doesn’t exist. So he cannot (with consistency) take hold of the belief that there is not such a good. It still follows that he cannot reject disjunction \(D\).
In order to avoid needless counterexamples from open theism, suppose further that G* would be known to the God of open theism—after all, if Strom doesn’t know of G*, he’d have no way of knowing whether it would be known to God, however we conceive of omniscience.
One commentator worries that (c) is superfluous. So note that (c) blocks moves like the following. “I have (natural theological) reasons for believing that God exists. Since God hasn’t prevented E, it follows that God had a morally satisfying reason to foreclose on the possibility of realizing any good that meets conditions (a) and (b). So if there is such a good, it must be that God knows that its realization would be unlikely in the event that God prevents E, and that’s why God chose to permit E and realize G instead Footnote 14 continued
of (achieving the remote possibility of) realizing a greater good. There’s no tension between SC and that complex of claims.” So note that the skeptical theist is in no position to deny that there is a good in existence that satisfies all of conditions (a) through (c), and that condition (c) plays an important role in upcoming concerns.
Note that if G\('\) is an aggregate good, its aggregation might include G. But it cannot be limited to G, since that would be tantamount to the claim that ‘G would morally justify God’s permission of E’—which, if a good like G* exists, would be untrue (cf. upcoming discussion of \(D\)). I assume, of course, that Strom’s G-based theodicy fails to be veridical if the realization of G is not sufficient (even if necessary) for God’s permission of E to be morally justified.
References
Bergmann, M. (2009). Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In T. P. Flint & M. C. Rea (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology (pp. 374–399). New York: Oxford University Press.
Bergmann, M. (2001). Skeptical theism and rowe’s new evidential argument from evil. NOUS, 35(2), 278–296.
Bergmann, M., & Rea, M. (2005). In defence of sceptical theism: A reply to almeida and oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83(2), 241–251.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel. (2009). Epistemic humility, arguments from evil, and moral skepticism. In Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Ed.), Oxford studies in philosophy of religion (Vol. 2, pp. 17–57). New York: Oxford University Press.
Van Inwagen, P. (1998). Modal epistemology. Philosophical Studies, 92, 67–84.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Paul Draper for helpful comments on my work. I would also like to thank the Purdue Research Foundation for a grant that funded much of my work on this paper.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Coley, S. Skeptical theism is incompatible with theodicy. Int J Philos Relig 77, 53–63 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9494-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9494-x