Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Why pan-dispositionalism is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism

  • Article
  • Published:
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Pan-dispositionalism is one of the major theories in current analytic metaphysics concerning dispositional properties (i.e., causal powers / capacities / abilities) and how they relate to categorical properties (i.e., non-dispositional properties, paradigm cases of which include shape, size, structure etc.). According to pan-dispositionalists, all fundamental properties are dispositional in nature, such that any supposed categorical properties are either unreal or reducible in some way to the dispositional. I argue that if pan-dispositionalism is true then metaphysical naturalism (roughly the view that the only objects in existence are physical objects) is false. To the extent that one finds pan-dispositionalism a plausible theory, one ought to question the truth of metaphysical naturalism. On the other hand, if one is a committed metaphysical naturalist, one ought to question the truth of pan-dispositionalism. Either way we get a significant result, of interest both to those working in metaphysics and to those working in philosophy of religion.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. That is a fairly standard formulation; see especially Mumford (1998) for details.

  2. Note that I will take ‘properties’ here as neutral between universals and tropes.

  3. See for instance Ellis (2001, 2002, 2009), Lowe (2001, 2006), Oderberg (2007), and Schroer (2010).

  4. See for example Bird (2007, 2009), Bostock (2008), and Coleman (2010).

  5. See for instance Armstrong (1968), Mackie (1977), McMullin (1978), O’Shaughnessy (1970), Prior et al. (1982), and Quine (1966, 1974).

  6. See Armstrong (1983, 1997), Dretske (1977), Psillos (2006, 2009), and Tooley (1977).

  7. See Lange (2004, 2009a, b) and Whittle (2009).

  8. I should also note the presence in the literature of Humean categoricalists, who deny that disposition-ascriptions have truthmakers insofar as they deny the reality of causation altogether (and often the very meaningfulness of causal concepts).

  9. See Fales (1990), Heil (2003, 2005), Ingthorsson (2013), Jacobs (2010, 2011), and Martin and Heil (1999).

  10. Consult Mumford (1998, ch. 8).

  11. Rea (2002) remains one of the most exhaustive discussions of the nature of metaphysical (and other forms of) naturalism. See also Goetz and Taliaferro (2008).

  12. Though that possibility is (rightly) disputed by Moreland (2001) and others.

  13. See for instance Crook and Gillett (2001), Montero (1999), and Montero and Papineau (2005).

  14. See for instance Vicente (2011).

  15. Consult for instance Dowell (2006).

  16. See Wilson (2006) and Brown and Ladyman (2009).

  17. And as I’ll argue presently, such a state of affairs would be inconsistent with the truth of physicalism.

  18. Aristotle (1941) On Generation and Corruption, bk. 1, ch. 2, 316b5-7.

  19. Here an anonymous referee points to the work of Adolf Grunbaum in favour of the mathematical consistency of a particulate conception of space (specifically one in which there is an infinity of spatial points making up the spatial manifold). Here I would argue that even admitting mathematical consistency, this is still not a workable ontology of space - perhaps this is an instance where mathematical modelling and metaphysical possibility come apart. For further discussion of Grunbaum and the ontology of space consult Zimmerman (1996).

  20. I could go with a weaker premise here, namely: “If any physical objects are not essentially physical, then metaphysical naturalism is false.”

  21. In fact I think that such a view would better be characterized as a form of mixed-view dispositionalism, but I’ll set this aside for present purposes.

  22. These sorts of paradoxes have been much-discussed in the history of philosophy - for some of that history see Holden (2004, pp. 36–50). One example: if the world were gunky then we could take a footlong hot dog and break it down into its infinite actual component parts. Now rearrange those infinite actual parts into a 500-foot long hotdog, or, if truly hungry, an infinitely long hotdog. Or, if hungry and in a crowd, one could produce out of the original footlong an infinite number of infinitely long hotdogs. This scenario is utterly bizarre, yet its real metaphysical possibility is implied by the admission of actual infinites to the material world, which is exactly what gunk would admit.

  23. Here I echo an observation by Armstrong (1973, pp. 13–14) concerning the implications of the infinite decomposability of matter for dispositionalism.

  24. It is also worth noting that old-style categoricalism is immune from Bird’s (2007, ch. 4) anti-categoricalist arguments, which are directed against the categorical-property-as-causally-impotent-quiddity.

References

  • Aristotle, (1941). On generation and corruption, trans. H.H. Joachim. In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. (1968). A materialist theory of mind. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. (1973). Belief, truth, and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. (1983). What is a law of nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Armstrong, D. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bird, A. (2007). Nature’s metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bird, D. (2009). Structural properties revisited. In T. Handfield (Ed.), Dispositions and causes (pp. 215–241). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bostock, S. (2008). A defence of pan-dispositionalism. Metaphysica, 9, 139–157.

  • Brown, R., & Ladyman, J. (2009). Philosophical quarterly. Physicalism Supervenience and the Fundamental Level, 59, 20–38.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coleman, M. (2010). Could there be a power world? American Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 161–170.

    Google Scholar 

  • Crook, S., & Gillett, C. (2001). Why physics alone cannot define the ‘Physical’: Materialism, metaphysics, and the formulation of physicalism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31, 333–360.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dowell, J. L. (2006). The physical: Empirical not metaphysical. Philosophical Studies, 131, 25–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dretske, F. (1977). Laws of nature. Philosophy of Science, 44, 248–268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, B. (2002). The philosophy of nature: A guide to the new essentialism. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ellis, B. (2009). The metaphysics of scientific realism. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fales, E. (1990). Causation and universals. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goetz, S., & Taliaferro, C. (2008). Naturalism. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heil, J. (2003). From an ontological point of view. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Heil, J. (2005). Dispositions. Synthese, 144, 343–356.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holden, T. (2004). The architecture of matter: Galileo to Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ingthorsson, R. D. (2013). Properties: Qualities, powers, or both? Dialectica, 67, 55–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, J. (2010). A powers theory of modality: Or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds. Philosophical Studies, 151, 227–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jacobs, J. (2011). Powerful qualities, not pure powers. Monist, 94, 81–102.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lange, M. (2004). A note on scientific essentialism, laws of nature, and counterfactual conditionals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82, 227–241.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lange, M. (2009a). Why do the laws explain why? In T. Handfield (Ed.), Dispositions and causes (pp. 286–321). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lange, M. (2009b). Laws and lawmakers: Science, metaphysics, and the laws of nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2001). Dispositions and laws. Metaphysica, 2, 5–23.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe, E. J. (2006). The four-category ontology: A metaphysical foundation for natural science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, J. (1977). Dispositions, grounds, and causes. Synthese, 34, 361–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markosian, N. (1998). Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 213–226.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markosian, N. (2000). What are physical objects? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61, 375–396.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Markosian, N. (2004). Simples, stuff, and simple people. Monist, 87, 405–428.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Martin, C. B., & Heil, J. (1999). The ontological turn. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 34–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMullin, E. (1978). Structural explanation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 139–147.

    Google Scholar 

  • Montero, B. (1999). The body problem. Nous, 33, 183–200.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montero, B., & Papineau, D. (2005). A defence of the via negativa argument for physicalism. Analysis, 65, 233–237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (2001). Universals. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mumford, (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oderberg, D. (2007). Real essentialism. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • O’Shaughnessy, B. (1970). The powerlessness of dispositions. Analysis, 31, 1–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prior, E., Pargetter, R., & Jackson, F. (1982). Three theses about dispositions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 19, 251–257.

    Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (2006). What do powers do when they are not manifested? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72, 137–156.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Psillos, S. (2009). Knowing the structure of nature: Essays on realism and explanation. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1966). The ways of paradox and other essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. V. O. (1974). Roots of reference. La Salle: Open Court.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rea, M. (2002). World without design: The ontological consequences of naturalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Schroer, R. (2010). Is there more than one categorical property? Philosophical Quarterly, 60, 831–850.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tooley, M. (1977). The nature of laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 667–698.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vicente, A. (2011). Current physics and ‘the physical. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 62, 393–416.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whittle, A. (2009). Causal nominalism. In T. Handfield (Ed.), Dispositions and causes (pp. 242–285). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson, J. (2006). On characterizing the physical. Philosophical Studies, 131, 61–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimmerman, D. (1996). Indivisible parts and extended objects: Some philosophical episodes from topology’s prehistory. Monist, 79, 148–180.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks to an anonymous referee for the IJPR for helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies, Concordia University College of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada

    Travis Dumsday

Authors
  1. Travis Dumsday
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Travis Dumsday.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dumsday, T. Why pan-dispositionalism is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism. Int J Philos Relig 78, 107–122 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9485-y

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9485-y

Keywords

Search

Navigation