Abstract
In this paper, we will defend a particular version of the timeless solution to the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. Our strategy is grounded on a particular temporal framework, which models the flow of time and a libertarian understanding of freedom. The propositions describing a certain act by an agent have an indeterminate truth value until the agent makes her choice; therefore, they become true or false when a decision is made. In order to account for this change of truth value, a multiple frame structure is introduced in which every frame presents a privileged time, with its past and the possible alternative futures, which are still open. God atemporally knows all the frames and the truth values of propositions with respect to each one. Since divine knowledge of what an agent decides in a certain temporal frame depends on the agent’s act itself, divine knowledge does not conflict with the agent’s free will.
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Notes
See, among others, Feinberg (1986).
For such a solution, see Hasker (1989).
See, among others, Plantinga (1986).
For instance, cf. Flint (1998).
This solution is advanced, for instance, by Zabzebski (1991).
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, V.3; Augustine, The City of God, 5.9; Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.10.1.
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, V.3.
This dependence needn’t be understood as causal dependence. On this topic, see note 28.
For a review, cf. Robinson (1995).
William Ockham, Treatise on Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, q. II, a. IV.
On this topic, see Freddoso (1988, pp. 57–58).
Cf. Frankfurt (1969).
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, IV, 6.
Plantinga (1986, pp. 239–240).
Zabzebski (1991, pp. 60–63).
As already stated, this dependence need not be understood as causal dependence. On this, cf. note 28.
Rogers (2007, p. 41).
For a comparable temporal structure, cf. McCall (1976).
More specifically, the formal features of the structure are the following: (1) (\(\exists u\in \,\hbox {W}\))(\(\forall v\in \,\hbox {W}\))(\(\exists n\))(\(\hbox {{ {u}}}R^{n}v\)): the world-state \(u\) is the world-state generating the structure. Every world-state is connected to \(u\) by the accessibility relation in \(n\) steps. (2) \(\lnot \exists u\lnot \exists v(uRv\) & \(vRu\)): the relation of accessibility is not symmetric. (3) \(\forall u\forall v \,(\lnot uRv\) & \(\lnot vRu \rightarrow \lnot \exists z\) (\(uRz\) & \(vRz\))): the relation is anticonvergent; there are no cases of reuniting branches. (4) \(\forall u\forall v\forall z\,(uRv\) & \(vRz \rightarrow \lnot uRz\)): the relation is intransitive. (5) \(\forall u\) (\(\lnot uRu\)): The relation is irreflexive; no world-state is accessible from itself. (6) \(\forall u\exists v(u Rv)\): the relation is serial; given a world-state, there exists a world-state connected to it. Conditions (5) and (6), taken together, characterize the structure as open.
We assume a classical \(\hbox {T}\times \,\hbox {W}\) (\(\hbox {time} \times \hbox {world}\)) structure. It seems to us that this structure can easily account for sentences such as “tomorrow it might rain or not rain,” where a single temporal interval (tomorrow) is involved, but where it is said that more than one possibility can take place in that interval. A structure in which every possible world-state is associated with a different time would be in trouble with such sentences. Likewise, if we make some hypothesis about what might happen on 2 May 2020, it seems that the temporal expression refers to a single time interval and not to millions of different time intervals as the possibilities which might come true that day are. However, the assumption of a \(\hbox {T}\times \hbox {W}\) framework is not really essential to our thesis. For instance, Thomason (1970) might be used, in which every world-state is assigned to a different time. In spite of this, the truth values assigned to propositions in Thomason’s framework and in our framework are the same. So, we could rephrase our thesis using Thomason’s framework: It would be more complicated and less intuitive, in our opinion, but the result would be exactly the same. For more details on these logical matters, see Thomason (2002).
The supervaluation theory allows us to save the validity of logical laws: For instance, the absolute valuation of \(p\) & \(\lnot p\) with respect to \(t\) will always be super-false since \(p\) & \(\lnot p\) is false in every history that cuts off \(t\). Analogously, \(p \vee \lnot p\) will be super-true. The underlying idea is that it could be undetermined whether the agent will do \(p\) in the future but is not undetermined that he will do \(p\) or \(\lnot p\) and \(p\) and \(\lnot p\); indeed, it is true that she will do \(p\) or \(\lnot p\) but evidently false that she will perform both actions.
Actually, \(I_{t1}^{h}(Pp) \equiv I_{t1}(Pp)\) since, as previously observed, there is just one history in the past.
More precisely, we should say that an agent is free regarding the action described by proposition \(p\), but for convenience’s sake, we use more concise terminology.
The objective nature of time flow was highlighted by McCall (1976).
The question of the relationship between timeless knowledge and temporal fact is addressed by Timpe (2007). Timpe’s problem is explaining how timeless knowledge can depend on temporal facts. Timpe’s strategy for dealing with this problem is to find a kind of dependence relation that, unlike causal relations, is not temporal. A good candidate is the truth-making relation; truth-making is a logical relation that connects a proposition to its truth-maker (in this case, an event) and that is free of temporal connotations.
Here is the argument:
[1] Yesterday (=1 May) prophets believed that \(q\) is true with respect to now(3 May)
[2] If an event \(e\) occurred in the past, then it is accidentally necessary that \(e\) occurred then
[3] It is accidentally necessary that yesterday prophets believed that \(q\) is true with respect to now(3 May)
[4] Necessarily, if prophets believe that \(p\) because God transmitted it, \(p\) is true
[5] If \(s\) is accidentally necessary and if \(\Box (s \rightarrow t)\), then \(t\) is accidentally necessary
[6] It is accidentally necessary that \(q\) is true with respect to now(3 May)
[7] If \(p\) is accidentally necessary, then an agent \(a\) cannot do otherwise than \(p\)
[8] John cannot do otherwise than \(q\) on now(3 May)
[9] If, when she acts, an agent cannot do otherwise, then she does not act freely
[10] On now(3 May) John is not free with respect to \(q\) (=(23)).
For an introduction to the problem of A-series and B-series, see the entry “Time” of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/) and the references suggested within.
It may be objected that the proposition expressed by “Now it is 3 p.m., 2 May” when uttered at 3 p.m., 2 May is no more true on 3 May; so a temporal omniscient God does not need to know it on 3 May. However, a temporal omniscient God must know not only what is true at the present, but also what was true in the past and what will be true in the future. Since the proposition in question was true in the past, God should know it.
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Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Sergio Galvan, Georg Gasser, and an anonymous referee of IJPR for very helpful comments to earlier versions of this article. This paper was presented at Gargnano Philosophy of Time Conference (Gargnano, 11–14 May 2014) and at The Problem of Evil in the Contemporary Debate Workshop (Innsbruck, 20–21 May 2014); the authors would like to thank the participants for feedbacks, criticisms, and comments. This publication was made possible through the support of the John Templeton Foundation, grant #15571 (“Analytic Theology”). The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Templeton Foundation.
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De Florio, C., Frigerio, A. In defense of the timeless solution to the problem of human free will and divine foreknowledge. Int J Philos Relig 78, 5–28 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9471-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9471-4