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Divine hiddenness and the opiate of the people

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Abstract

The problem of divine hiddenness has become one of the most prominent arguments for atheism in the current philosophy of religion literature. Schellenberg (Divine hiddenness and human reason 1993), one of the problem’s prominent advocates, holds that the only way to prevent completely the occurrence of nonresistant nonbelief would be for God to have granted all of us a constant awareness of Him (or at least a constant availability of such awareness) from the moment we achieved the age of reason. Now, if that were the case, we might be faced with a difficult obstacle to the development of a proper, meaningful relationship with God: namely, since the experience of God would be so unutterably wonderful (at least for some), we could be at risk of coming to commune with God not from love of Him but for the amazing experience that that communion involves. In other words, given that mystical union with infinite perfection is, qua experience, inconceivably better than that of any drug, we might come to treat God as something analogous to a powerful narcotic, seeking the experience for the pleasure of the experience more than from any devotion. Since God wants to foster genuinely meaningful relationship with Him, He rightly delays granting us such awareness of Himself, even though that leaves open the risk that nonresistant nonbelief could arise.

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Notes

  1. See for instance (St. Athanasius (1892), chaps. 11–15), St. Augustine (1993, pp. 106–118), (St. John Chrysostom (1889), homilies 2 and 4–8), (St. Gregory Nazianzus (1894), oration 28, chap. 12), and (Origen (1885), book 3, chap. 1).

  2. See for instance Hick (1981), Mesle (1988), McKim (1990), Penelhum (1983), O’Hear (1984), and Morris (1992).

  3. It is worth noting that while Keller rejects traditional theism, he is open to alternative models of God (specifically, process theology) and employs the problem of divine hiddenness more in support of that alternative model rather than atheism per se.

  4. We see here an analogue with the problem of evil, where Schellenberg’s formulation is akin to the logical problem of evil, and the others to the evidential problem.

  5. See Aijaz and Weidler (2007), Azadegan (2013a, b), Azadegan (Forthcoming), Cullison (2010), Cuneo (2013), Dumsday (2010a, b, 2012a, b, 2013), Dumsday (Forthcoming), Evans (2006, 2010), Henry (2001, 2008), Howard-Snyder (1996), King (2008, 2013), Marsh (2008), McBrayer and Swenson (2012), McCreary (2010), McKim (2001), Moser (2007, 2008)), Murray (2002), Oakes (2008), O’Connell (2013), Poston and Dougherty (2007), Rea (2009), Swinburne (1998, 2004), van Inwagen (2002, 2006), Tucker (2008), and Weidler and Aijaz (2013).

  6. Significant contributions include Cordry (2008), Lovering (2004), Maitzen (2008), Trakakis (2007), and Schellenberg (1996, 2005a, b, c, 2007a, b, 2008a, b, 2010, 2013).

  7. King (2008, 2013) reply to the hiddenness argument involves a critical examination of the claim (supported by Schellenberg (2007a, p. 206)), that an infinite God could without difficulty reveal Himself precisely as God to finite creatures, and that in a rationally indubitable fashion. King’s is an important line of response; however, for for the sake of argument I will here assume it is unsound, that God is able so to reveal Himself to us.

  8. See for instance Ware (1984, p. 266): “Hell is not so much a place where God imprisons man, as a place where man, by misusing his free will, chooses to imprison himself. And even in Hell the wicked are not deprived of the love of God, but by their own choice they experience as suffering what the saints experience as joy. ‘The love of God will be an intolerable torment for those who have not acquired it within themselves’.” The quote Ware employs is from Lossky (1957, p. 234).

  9. The recognition of something like this point seems to be present in one of Hinduism’s principal scriptures, the Bhagavad-Gita. There, when Arjuna asks Krishna (who at the time of the request was in his human form) to reveal himself to him (Arjuna) in his divine glory, Krishna complies with the request. Arjuna is so overwhelmed and terrified that he soon begs Krishna to return to his human form (Johnson translation, 1994, p. 53): “I rejoice that I have seen what has never before been seen, but my mind is unhinged with fear. O god, show me that other form again. Be merciful, lord of gods, home of the world”. And this is a reaction undergone by a righteous person, Arjuna—imagine if a wicked individual had seen Krishna in all his glory? My thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this example.

  10. Though that idea in turn gives rise to worries concerning moral autonomy. Could one continue freely to choose between good and while constantly aware of an Almighty Judge looking over one’s shoulder (or even while having such awareness always available at a moment’s notice)? This sort of concern is raised by Kant (1956, p. 152, 1978, p. 123), and developed further by Swinburne (1998, pp. 203–210, 2004, pp. 267–272) and Murray (2002). For some replies see Lovering (2004) and Schellenberg (1993, chap. 5, 2005b, pp. 292–296; 2007a, pp. 210–218).

  11. I refer here to the standard division employed in discussions of the problem of evil between defences (the provision of reasons why God might conceivably allow some state of affairs) vs. theodicies (the provision of reasons why God actually allows some state of affairs). The burden of proof is lighter on the former.

  12. Or one might argue that anything less than the ineffably ecstatic experiences of the great mystics could not possibly be an experience of God Himself, but must instead be merely a wonderful experience caused by God. In other words, one might claim that there is a metaphysical impossibility involved in the notion of God’s ‘moderating’ an actual direct encounter with Him. I won’t pursue this option here.

  13. This general idea is of course familiar from Hick’s (1981) soul-making theodicy in the context of the problem of evil.

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Acknowledgments

My sincere thanks to an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments.

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    Travis Dumsday

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Dumsday, T. Divine hiddenness and the opiate of the people. Int J Philos Relig 76, 193–207 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9457-2

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