Skip to main content
Log in

Under the Lender’s Looking Glass

  • Published:
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of bank monitoring on the risk of US equity REITs. Using a unique, hand-collected data sample of mortgage balances, I show that bank screening and monitoring of REIT assets via utilizing secured mortgage financing (vs unsecured, public debt) lowers the overall company risk of a REIT. At the asset level, screening results in retail and office assets with higher acquisition values and located in primary markets, i.e., more transparent assets, being pledged as collateral. Further, I find evidence consistent with the role of lender monitoring for secured mortgage loans and show that properties located in closer proximity to a REIT’s headquarters are more likely to be pledged as collateral for a mortgage.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See Chan and Kanatas (1985), Chan and Thakor (1987),Besanko and Thakor (1987), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Agarwal et al. (2015) among others

  2. Jimnez et al. (2006), Rauh and Sufi (2010), Colla et al. (2013)

  3. Additional property characteristics that a bank would consider such as Lease Terms and Net Operating Income are not observed in the data sample.

  4. The look back period used by Kenneth French for the Momentum factor is 12 months. A portfolio is formed at the end of month t-1

References

  • Agarwal, S., & Hauswald, R. (2010). Distance and private information in lending. Review of Financial Studies, 23(7), 2757–2788.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agarwal, S., Green, R. K., Rosenblatt, E., & Yao, V. (2015). Collateral pledge, sunk-cost fallacy and mortgage default. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 24(4), 636–652.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Allen, L. and Letdin, M. (2015). Decomposition of debt and the road to reit returns. Working P.

  • Ambrose, B. W., & Nourse, H. O. (1993). Factors influencing capitalization rates. Journal of Real Estate Research, 8(2), 221.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, M., & Wurgler, J. (2002). Market timing and capital structure. Journal of Finance, 57(1), 1–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bali, T. G., & Cakici, N. (2008). Idiosyncratic volatility and the cross section of expected returns. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(1), 29–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1987). Collateral and rationing: Sorting equilibria in monopolistic and competitive credit markets. International Economic Review, 28(3), 671–689.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boot, A. W. A., Thakor, A. V., & Udell, G. F. (1991). Secured lending and default risk: Equilibrium analysis, policy implications and empirical results. Economic Journal, 101(406), 458–472.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Booth, J. R. (1992). Contract costs, bank loans, and the cross-monitoring hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, 31(1), 25–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brown, D. T., & Riddiough, T. J. (2003). Financing choice and liability structure of real estate investment trusts. Real Estate Economics, 31(3), 313–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985). Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17(1), 84–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chan, Y., & Thakor, A. (1987). Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and private information. The Journal of Finance, 42(2), 345–363.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chichernea, D., Miller, N., Fisher, J., Sklarz, M., & White, B. (2008). A cross-sectional analysis of cap rates by msa. Journal of Real Estate Research, 30(3), 249–292.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colla, P., Ippolito, F., & Li, K. (2013). Debt specialization. The Journal of Finance, 68(5), 2117–2141.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deng, Y., Devos, E., Rahman, S., and Tsang, D. (2015). The role of debt covenants in the investment grade bond market – the reit experiment. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 1–21.

  • Faulkender, M., & Petersen, M. (2006). Does the source of capital affect capital structure? Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), 45–79.

  • Giambona, E., Mello, A. S., and Riddiough, T. J. (2012). Collateral and the limits of debt capacity: Theory and evidence. working paper available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2039253.

  • Giambona, E., Golec, J., and Schwienbacher, A. (2013). Debt capacity of real estate collateral. Real Estate Economics.

  • Graham, J. R. (2000). How big are the tax benefits of debt? The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 1901–1941.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, D. M., Panasian, C. A., & Seiler, M. J. (2011). Further evidence on the capital structure of reits. Real Estate Economics, 39(1), 133–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jimnez, G., Salas, V., & Saurina, J. (2006). Determinants of collateral. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(2), 255–281.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knyazeva, A., & Knyazeva, D. (2012). Does being your banks neighbor matter? Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(4), 1194–1209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liu, C. H., Liu, P., and Zhang, Z. (2015). Real assets, liquidation value and choice of financing. Real Estate Economics, Forthcoming.

  • Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961). Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of shares. The Journal of Business, 34(4), 411–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morellec, E. (2001). Asset liquidity, capital structure, and secured debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(2), 173–206.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Park, C. (2000). Monitoring and structure of debt contracts. The Journal of Finance, 55(5), 2157–2195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rajan, R., & Winton, A. (1995). Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. The Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1113–1146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rauh, J. D., & Sufi, A. (2010). Capital structure and debt structure. Review of Financial Studies, 23(12), 4242–4280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riddiough, T. J. and Steiner, E. (2015). One size does not fit all: Reit capital structure and firm value. Working Paper.

  • Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. The American Economic Review, 71(3), 393–410.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stulz, R., & Johnson, H. (1985). An analysis of secured debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 14(4), 501–521.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sun, L., Titman, S. D., and Twite, G. J. (2014). Reit and commercial real estate returns: A postmortem of the financial crisis. Real Estate Economics.

Download references

Acknowledgments

I’d like to thank James B. Kau, an anonymous referee, Linda Allen, CF Sirmans, Ko Wang, Su Han Chan, Timothy Riddiough, Joseph Weintrop, David Dennis, Moussa Diop, Vladimir Khasin, Rinat Letdin and seminar participants of Baruch College Finance Department Seminar, Midwest Finance Association Meetings 2015, American Real Estate Society Meetings 2015 and American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Meetings 2016 for their helpful feedback and comments. Alev Yalman and Paul Dunn provided excellent research assistance. The remaining errors are my own.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mariya Letdin.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Letdin, M. Under the Lender’s Looking Glass. J Real Estate Finan Econ 55, 435–456 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-016-9561-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-016-9561-4

Keywords

Navigation