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Competitive lobbying in the influence production process and the use of spatial econometrics in lobbying research

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Abstract

Much of the lobbying process is inherently competitive: when lobbyists with opposing goals attempt to move outcomes in their preferred direction, successful lobbying by one actor will disadvantage opposing actors. This article theorizes and quantifies the indirect form of influence that competing lobbying actors exert on each other. While existing theories of competitive lobbying have focused on legislation, we argue that all stages of the lobbying process involve competition. Our findings make two contributions to the study of lobbying influence. First, using spatial econometrics, we present the first estimates of how the success of one lobbying actor is shaped by the lobbying activities of opposing actors. Second, we study competition in three diverse empirical settings that capture three different stages of the lobbying process: (1) lobbying camps favoring opposite legislative outcomes in five European countries, (2) US lobbying firms competing over client resources, and (3) corporations competing for administrative trade barriers in 19 World Trade Organization member countries. The results reveal important insights about how interdependence among lobbyists conditions their effectiveness. Our application of spatial techniques to model interdependence between actors is useful for all scholars who want to take competitive or collaborative diffusion mechanisms into account in studies of lobbying and public policy.

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Data availability

Data and code for replication can be found here: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MZF8EH.

Notes

  1. For more on the additional phases of the lobbying and policymaking processes, see Godwin et al. (2013).

  2. We do not reproduce Becker’s full model here. Rather, we rely on the comparative statics he derives to show how his model predicts that changes in camp characteristics will affect competition (Becker 1983, pp. 378–380).

  3. The distinction between contract and in-house lobbying is important. In the former, the interest group hires one or more professional lobbying firms to act on its behalf. In the latter, the group hires one or more lobbyists to work in a dedicated public affairs division of the group. We focus on the former because competition is more clearly observable.

  4. Note that the practice is sanctioned by the World Trade Organization and, as previous research has shown, antidumping duties have large negative effects on competition and the volume of international trade (Blonigen & Prusa, 2003; Bown & Crowley, 2007).

  5. For more information, see: https://govlis.eu/.

  6. Link to the CRP bulk data: https://www.opensecrets.org/bulk-data.

  7. The countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, the European Union, India, Israel, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States.

  8. We obtain similar results when we enter a binary measure of success and the variable is not log transformed.

  9. The inverse index (1-HHI) ranges from 0 (most homogenous: only one group type in the camp) to 1 minus 1/number of different group types, which is the most diverse distribution. For more details, see Appendix A.2.

  10. When estimating Moran’s I—without conditioning on covariates—diffusion is estimated as −0.98; we cannot reject the possibility that it is exactly −1. The smaller spatial diffusion parameter in the full model indicates that part of the competition between camps is captured by the camp-level characteristics that are included in the model.

  11. We obtain the same result using the log of inverse distance, a convex functional form, or a binary matrix.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions they have received from Marcel Hanegraaf, Thomas Holyoke, Torben Iversen, Jennifer Victor, Christoffer Pfeiffer Cappelen and Florian Weiler. Previous versions of this manuscript were presented at annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, the Danish Political Science Association, and the European Consortium for Political Research. The authors also thank Professor William Shughart II, and the four anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, and Kelley Friel for excellent copy-editing. Any remaining errors are the authors’ own.

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  1. Department of International Economics, Government and Business, Copenhagen Business School, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Benjamin C. K. Egerod

  2. Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Wiebke Marie Junk

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Correspondence to Wiebke Marie Junk.

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Egerod, B.C.K., Junk, W.M. Competitive lobbying in the influence production process and the use of spatial econometrics in lobbying research. Public Choice 191, 193–215 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-022-00962-w

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