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The subjectivist-contrarian position

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Abstract

James Buchanan endorses a radical version of subjectivism at several points in his body of work. I distinguish two distinct criteria for subjectivism in Buchanan. First, Buchanan rejects the realism of preferences, arguing that they serve only as an analytical tool for understanding choice. Second, Buchanan adopts an Austrian perspective inspired by Kirzner and Shackle on the importance of creativity. In addition to reconstructing Buchanan’s subjectivism, I examine how it relates to more recent work in political philosophy, behavioral economics, and psychology in order to ascertain the value Buchanan’s radical approach might still hold.

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Notes

  1. My reconstruction of Buchanan’s views is distinct but complementary to Wagner’s (2017).

  2. Buchanan and Vanberg (1991, p. 170, fn. 8) distinguish between these brands of subjectivism.

  3. Mises makes a similar claim regarding his even barer bones mental model: “the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals” (Mises 1949, p. 95).

  4. Not coincidentally, Buchanan’s perspective is similar to Hayek’s (1964) views on pattern predictions.

  5. One notable exception is Vanberg and Buchanan (1989), which engages with Habermas. The essay allows that talk may permit individuals to share their mental models, while agreement concerns interests. Since this model still treats exchange-like agreement as a necessary normative condition, it remains subject to the challenges outlined here, which rely on alternative notions of agreement and arrives at different institutional presumptions.

  6. I should note that, while it does not represent a majority position, Hargreaves Heap argues that the weight of evidence from behavioral economics is that individuals simply do not have preferences. If he is right, it bolsters Buchanan’s overall view quite a bit.

  7. Shrout and Rodgers (2018) provide an accessible overview of the replication crisis.

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Acknowledgements

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the John Templeton Foundation and the Political Economy Research Institute at Middle Tennessee State (Grant No. 61147). Thanks to Daniel Smith and William Shughart for organizing this collection, to the participants at the Buchanan Centennial (especially G.P. Manish) for helpful feedback, and to Justin Callais for research assistance.

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Martin, A. The subjectivist-contrarian position. Public Choice 183, 479–494 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00808-3

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