Abstract
I consider a model of multiple winner elections with several types of spoilers. In single-office elections, a “classic” spoiler turns a winner into a non-winner and a non-winner into a winner. Such spoilers rarely appear in multi-office elections. In such elections, spoilers include a “Kingmaker”, who turns a non-winner into a winner; a “Kingslayer”, who turns a winner into a non-winner; a “Valuegobbler”, who subtracts from some competitor more seats than it receives; and “Selfspoilers”, who may be hurt by competing separately rather than creating an electoral coalition. Various strategic spoilers, such as fake parties, are possible as well. I look for spoilers in eight Polish parliamentary elections that have taken place since the fall of communism in 1989. In two elections, the consequences of spoilers were massive. In 1993, multiple spoilers on the right helped the two post-communist parties return to power, slow down decommunization and create strong institutional obstacles to further democratization. In 2015, a spoiler manufactured a majority for the largest party (PiS) and, as a consequence, enabled PiS quickly to implement radical reforms. In other elections, spoilers had smaller, but noticeable consequences. The results suggest that parliamentary elections using PR party-list systems are vulnerable to spoiler problems that may cause significant political effects.
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Notes
The plurality method does poorly in simulations testing its robustness against the spoiler problem. Other majoritarian methods, such as majority runoff and instant-runoff voting (IRV), also get low scores (Dougherty and Edward 2011, p. 93).
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice). For acronyms of major parties and electoral coalitions, see the “Appendix”.
In 1993, 15 parties and electoral coalitions registered their candidate lists nationwide; six parties and two minority committees won seats. Election results cited hereafter come from the following sources: M. P. (Monitor Polski) (1991, 1993, 1997), PKW (Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza) (2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015). For the main parameters of the electoral laws, see the “Appendix”.
Another party, KORWiN (Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope), received 4.76% of votes. A total of 16.61% of votes was cast for parties or coalitions that didn’t clear their relevant thresholds. Eight parties and electoral coalitions registered their candidate lists in at least half of all districts; five parties and one minority committee won seats (PKW 2015).
The rules were generous to smaller parties. Every vote up to 5% was valued at 5.77 PLN (Polish Zloty), while every vote over 30% would generate only 0.87 PLN in state subsidy.
The highest judicial power in Poland is fragmented into a Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), a Chief Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny), a Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) and a National Council for the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa); some power is ceded to other bodies (Konstytucja RP 1997, Chapters 8 and 9).
In June 2017, only 28% of the respondents held a positive opinion on the court system while 49% held a negative opinion (CBOS 2017, p. 2). On July, 26–28, 2017, 81% of respondents believed that the judiciary required reforms, while 14% had an opposite opinion (Ipsos Observer 2017). The support for specific reforms proposed by PiS typically was lower and depended on the wording of questions.
In regional legislative elections in Russia the strategic use of spoilers brought only modest results (Golosov 2015).
Webster–Sainte–Laguë formula is a divisor method based on consecutive odd numbers.
Polski Związek Zachodni, Blok Ludowo-Chrześcijański, Polska Partia Ekologiczna-Zielonych and Sojusz Kobiet Przeciw Trudnościom Życia.
With an open list, voters vote for a candidate or candidates and the seats are assigned consecutively according to the numbers of votes. With a closed list, the vote is for a list only and the seats are assigned according to candidate positions on the list.
Flis (2011) discusses two scenarios of potential PiS–PJN and SLD–RP (RP = Palikot’s Movement) electoral coalitions or mergers under the assumption of additive votes that probably overestimates slightly the total votes of both coalitions. Under such additive scenarios, the total seats of the PO-PSL coalition would fall two and nine seats short of a majority, respectively. .
Shugart and Taagepera (2017, pp. 3–8) use the 2015 Polish elections as their chief example that “electoral rules matter”.
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Acknowledgements
The support of the UCI’s Center for the Study of Democracy is acknowledged. I am grateful to Jarosław Flis, Bernie Grofman, Jac Heckelman, Barbara Kamińska, Barbara Kataneksza, Robi Ragan, the editor and two anonymous Reviewers for comments.
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Appendix
Appendix
See Table 4.
Acronyms of major parties and coalitions of parties appearing in the article follow the format: ACRONYM—Polish Name (English Name) [possibly short comment]
AWS—Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (Electoral Action Solidarity)
AWSP—Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right) [successor of AWS]
BBWR—Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform (Non-partisan Bloc Supporting Reforms)
KORWiN—Koalicja Odnowy Rzeczpospolitej Wolność i Nadzieja (Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic Freedom and Hope)
KPEiR—Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów (National Party of Pensioners and Retired)
KPEiR RP—Krajowe Porozumienie Emerytów i Rencistów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (National Alliance of Pensioners and Retired of the Republic of Poland) [clone of KPEiR]
KPN—Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of Independent Poland)
KPN–OP—KPN Obóz Prawicy (KPN-Camp of the Right) [part of KPN after split]
KPN-PPP—KPN Porozumienie Prawicy Polskiej (KPN-Alliance of Polish Right) [part of KPN after split]
LPR—Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)
PiS—Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) [successor of Porozumienie Centrum]
PJN—Polska Jest Najważniejsza (Poland is Most Important)
PO—Platforma Obywatelska (Citizens’ Platform)
PSL—Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish Farmers’ Party)
PSL–PL—Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe-Porozumienie Ludowe (Polish Farmers’ Party-Farmers’ Alliance) [split from PSL]
ROP—Ruch Odbudowy Polski (Movement for Reconstruction of Poland) [successor of 1993 Coalition for Republic]
RP—Ruch Palikota (Palikot’s Movement)
SLD—Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Alliance of Democratic Left)
UD—Unia Demokratyczna (Democratic Union)
UP—Unia Pracy (Labor Union)
UW—Unia Wolności (Freedom Union) [successor of UD]
ZL—Zjednoczona Lewica (United Left) [coalition created mostly by SLD]
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Kaminski, M.M. Spoiler effects in proportional representation systems: evidence from eight Polish parliamentary elections, 1991–2015. Public Choice 176, 441–460 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0565-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0565-x