Abstract
Arrow’s impossibility result not only had a profound influence on welfare economics, but was, as this paper shows, also widely discussed in philosophy of science and in the engineering design literature.
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I am very grateful to an anonymous referee and the editor of this journal for several perceptive comments and suggestions.
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Gaertner, W. Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem stretching to other fields. Public Choice 179, 125–131 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0503-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0503-y