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A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting

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Abstract

In market based societies consumers are able to express the intensity of their preference for an object by paying more for it. However, under some voting systems, consumers are unable to express the intensity of their preference for a candidate due to the constraint of the “one person, one vote” principle. Cumulative voting maintains the equality of the “one person, one vote” principle by allotting each voter the same number of votes, while also allowing for expression of intensity of candidate preference. This paper provides an experimental analysis of voter behavior under different voting systems.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Morehouse College, 830 Westview Drive SW, Atlanta, GA, 30314, USA

    Duane Cooper

  2. Department of Economics, University of North Carolina Charlotte, 9201 University City Blvd., Charlotte, NC, 28223, USA

    Arthur Zillante

Authors
  1. Duane Cooper
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  2. Arthur Zillante
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Correspondence to Arthur Zillante.

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Cooper, D., Zillante, A. A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting. Public Choice 150, 363–383 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9707-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9707-5

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