Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Selfish and Cooperative Voting: Can the Majority Restrain Themselves?

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Political Behavior Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

At every scale from small committees to national elections, voters face tradeoffs between self-interest and the common good. We report three experiments in which participants vote for policies with real payoffs at stake. We manipulate self-interest by randomly assigning participants to two groups in society with different policy payoffs. Participants in the majority group are confronted by a simple choice between a policy that is better for themselves or a policy that is best for society. Overall, we find a clear effect of self-interest: Participants are more likely to choose the policy that earns them more money, compared to participants in the other group, even when the policy is detrimental to the common good. Simultaneously, we observe considerable levels of cooperative voting among participants in the majority, ranging from 47% to 79% across different payoff regimes. Finally, participants were not more cooperative when voting compared to when they chose between the same policies with a lottery or leader institution, departing from the hypothesis that voting institutions promote cooperative motives. We discuss implications for multiple literatures about voting behavior.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aarøe, L., & Petersen, M. B. (2013). Hunger games: Fluctuations in blood glucose levels influence support for social welfare. Psychological Science,24, 2550–2556.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal of Economics,115, 1167–1199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Adams, J., & Adams, C. F. (1787). The works of John Adams, Second President of the United States. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amir, O., & Rand, D. G. (2012). Economic games on the internet: The effect of $1 stakes. PLoS ONE,7, 31461.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arrow, K. J. (1950). A difficulty in the concept of social welfare. The Journal of Political Economy,58, 328–346.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battaglini, M., & Mechtenberg, L. (2015). When do conflicting parties share political power? Journal of Experimental Political Science,2, 139–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battaglini, M., Morton, R., & Palfrey, T. (2007). Efficiency, equity, and timing of voting mechanisms. American Political Science Review,101, 409–424.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Battaglini, M., Morton, R. B., & Palfrey, T. R. (2010). The swing voter’s curse in the laboratory. The Review of Economic Studies,77, 61–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benabou, R. (2000). Unequal societies: Income distribution and the social contract. American Economic Review,90, 96–129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berinsky, A. J., Huber, G. A., & Lenz, G. S. (2012). Evaluating online labor markets for experimental research: Amazon.com’s mechanical turk. Political Analysis,20, 351–368.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. American Economic Review,90, 166–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brennan, G., & Hamlin, A. (1998). Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium. Public Choice,95, 149–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). The American voter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caplan, B. (2007). The myth of the rational voter: Why democracies choose bad policies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chong, D., Citrin, J., & Conley, P. (2001). When self-interest matters. Political Psychology,22, 541–570.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Condorcet, M. D. (1785). Essay on the application of analysis to the probability of majority decisions. Paris: Imprimerie Royale.

    Google Scholar 

  • Darley, J. M., & Latane, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,8, 377–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., McElreath, R., & Smirnov, O. (2007). Egalitarian motives in humans. Nature,446, 794–796.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dawes, C. T., Loewen, P. J., & Fowler, J. H. (2011). Social preferences and political participation. The Journal of Politics,73, 845–856.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeScioli, P., & Krishna, S. (2013). Giving to whom? Altruism in different types of relationships. Journal of Economic Psychology,34, 218–228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • DeScioli, P., Massenkoff, M., Shaw, A., Petersen, M. B., & Kurzban, R. (2014). Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money. Proceedings of the Royal Society B,281, 20142112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diermeier, D., & Morton, R. (2005). Experiments in majoritarian bargaining. In D. Austen-Smith & J. Duggan (Eds.), Social choice and strategic decisions (pp. 201–226). New York: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. The Journal of Political Economy,65, 135–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckel, C., & Holt, C. A. (1989). Strategic voting in agenda-controlled committee experiments. The American Economic Review,79, 763–773.

    Google Scholar 

  • Edlin, A., Gelman, A., & Kaplan, N. (2007). Voting as a rational choice: Why and how people vote to improve the well-being of others. Rationality and Society,19, 293–314.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, S. (1982). Economic self-interest and political behavior. American Journal of Political Science,26, 446–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ferejohn, J. (1986). Incumbent performance and electoral control. Public Choice,50, 5–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, M. P., & Plott, C. R. (1978). Committee decisions under majority rule: An experimental study. American Political Science Review,72, 575–598.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fowler, J. H. (2006). Altruism and turnout. Journal of Politics,68, 674–683.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frechette, G. R., Kagel, J. H., & Lehrer, S. F. (2003). Bargaining in legislatures: An experimental investigation of open versus closed amendment rules. American Political Science Review,97, 221–232.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerber, A. S., Huber, G. A., Biggers, D. R., & Hendry, D. J. (2017). Self-interest, beliefs, and policy opinions: Understanding how economic beliefs affect immigration policy preferences. Political Research Quarterly,70, 155–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gomez, B. T., & Wilson, J. M. (2001). Political sophistication and economic voting in the American electorate: A theory of heterogeneous attribution. American Journal of Political Science,45, 899–914.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Großer, J., & Schram, A. (2010). Public opinion polls, voter turnout, and welfare: An experimental study. American Journal of Political Science,54, 700–717.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guarnaschelli, S., McKelvey, R. D., & Palfrey, T. R. (2000). An experimental study of jury decision rules. American Political Science Review, 94, 407–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hamilton, A., Madison, J., & Jay, J. (1788). Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18.

  • Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., & Smith, V. (1994). Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior,7, 346–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kagel, J., & Roth, A. (Eds.). (2016). The handbook of experimental economics (Vol. 2). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. (1981). Sociotropic politics: The American case. British Journal of Political Science,11, 129–161.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kocher, M. G., Martinsson, P., & Visser, M. (2008). Does stake size matter for cooperation and punishment? Economics Letters,99, 508–511.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kramer, G. H. (1983). The ecological fallacy revisited: Aggregate-versus individual-level findings on economics and elections, and sociotropic voting. American Political Science Review, 77, 92–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • List, J. A. (2007). On the interpretation of giving in dictator games. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 482–493.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Malhotra, N., Margalit, Y., & Mo, C. H. (2013). Economic explanations for opposition to immigration: Distinguishing between prevalence and conditional impact. American Journal of Political Science,57, 391–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mansfield, E. D., & Mutz, D. C. (2009). Support for free trade: Self-interest, sociotropic politics, and out-group anxiety. International Organization,63, 425–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mansfield, E. D., & Snyder, J. (2007). Electing to fight: Why emerging democracies go to war. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDermott, R. (2002). Experimental methods in political science. Annual Review of Political Science,5, 31–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meehl, P. E. (1977). The selfish voter paradox and the thrown-away vote argument. American Political Science Review,71, 11–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. The Journal of Political Economy,89, 914–927.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morton, R. B., & Williams, K. C. (2010). Experimental political science and the study of causality. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Munger, M. C., & Munger, K. M. (2015). Choosing in groups. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ostrom, E. (2006). The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,61, 149–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Palfrey, T. R. (2016). Experiments in political economy. In J. Kagel & A. Roth (Eds.), The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Petersen, M. B., Aarøe, L., Jensen, N. H., & Curry, O. (2014). Social welfare and the psychology of food sharing: Short-term hunger increases support for social welfare. Political Psychology,35, 757–773.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Hutchinson & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reilly, B. (2006). Political engineering and party politics in conflict-prone societies. Democratization,13, 811–827.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W. H., & Ordeshook, P. C. (1968). A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review,62, 25–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rogers, J., & Tyszler, M. (2016). Information and economic voting. Political Science Research and Methods. https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2016.27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryan, J. B. (2011). Social networks as a shortcut to correct voting. American Journal of Political Science,55, 753–766.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryan, J. B. (2013). An experimental study of persuasive social communication. Political Communication,30, 100–116.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sauermann, J., & Kaiser, A. (2010). Taking others into account: Self-interest and fairness in majority decision making. American Journal of Political Science,54, 667–685.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. C. (2010). Game theory: A practitioner’s approach. Economics and Philosophy,26, 27–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sears, D. O., Lau, R. R., Tyler, T. R., & Allen, H. M. (1980). Self-interest vs. symbolic politics in policy attitudes and presidential voting. American Political Science Review,74, 670–684.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the victim: Altruism and identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,26, 5–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. L. (1982). Microeconomic systems as an experimental science. The American Economic Review,72, 923–955.

    Google Scholar 

  • Snyder, J. L. (2000). From voting to violence. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, K. A., De Freitas, J., DeScioli, P., & Pinker, S. (2016). Recursive mentalizing and common knowledge in the bystander effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,145, 621–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomas, K. A., DeScioli, P., Haque, O. S., & Pinker, S. (2014). The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,107, 657–676.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1959). Problems of majority voting. The Journal of Political Economy,67, 571–579.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weeden, J., & Kurzban, R. (2014). The hidden agenda of the political mind. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • White, I. K. (2007). When race matters and when it doesn’t: Racial group differences in response to racial cues. American Political Science Review,101, 339–354.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank Yanna Krupnikov for comments on this manuscript. We also thank participants at the New York Area Political Psychology Meeting, Spring 2017. The data and analysis code are available at the Political Behavior Dataverse at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CFEIEQ.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, 11794-4392, USA

    Peter DeScioli, Bowen Cho & Andrew W. Delton

  2. Institution for Social and Policy Studies and the Center for the Study of American Politics, Yale University, New Haven, CT, 06511, USA

    Scott Bokemper

  3. College of Business, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, 11794-4392, USA

    Andrew W. Delton

Authors
  1. Peter DeScioli
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Bowen Cho
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Scott Bokemper
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Andrew W. Delton
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Peter DeScioli.

Electronic supplementary material

Below is the link to the electronic supplementary material.

Supplementary material 1 (DOCX 13 kb)

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

DeScioli, P., Cho, B., Bokemper, S. et al. Selfish and Cooperative Voting: Can the Majority Restrain Themselves?. Polit Behav 42, 261–283 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9495-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-018-9495-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation