Abstract
Just how realistic about human nature and real possibilities must a theory of justice, or a moral theory, more generally, be? Lines have been drawn, with some (e.g. John Rawls) holding that idealizing away from reality is indispensable and others maintaining that utopian thinking is not just useless but irrelevant. In Utopophobia David Estlund defends the value of utopian theory. At his most modest, Estlund claims that it is a legitimate approach, not ruled out of court by anti-idealists on entirely inadequate grounds—merely “by assumption or definition” as he puts it (hence the “phobia” charge). Yet he also argues against what we call real world theory, which takes account of human imperfection and feasible options. It invites complacency and undermines aspiration, he argues, and he accepts Rawls’ claim that it will of necessity be unsystematic, thanks to its realism. We accept that the utopian approach is neither useless nor irrelevant. Yet we press hard against the charges against real world theory, maintaining that, properly understood, it invites neither complacency nor aspiration and can perfectly well offer a systematic and principled account of normative concepts, including justice specifically.
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Notes
Not only is Estlund’s main argument a negative one—that criticisms of so-called Ideal Theory are not decisive—it is also notable that the two central attributes in the approach Estlund hopes to defend—non-complacency and non-concessiveness—are expressed by him in negative form.
Perhaps it is worth noting that along with certain idealizing assumptions, ideal theory also regularly takes as given, various features of the human situation that are, pretty much by all accounts, seen as less than ideal. What leverages a theory into the category of ideal theory is not that it idealizes away from all things that we might wish were different, but that it takes certain features that we recognize are almost surely not going to be realized and nonetheless build them into the conditions under which we judge the acceptability of candidate principles of justice.
Of course, absent some way of comparing failures to meet the ideal, Ideal theory will lack the resources for distinguishing among opportunities except as they realize, or fail to realize, the ideal. When we are thinking about ways our world might actually be, a reasonable suspicion is that every available option will end up registering simply as a failure.
See, for example, the final section of Cohen (2003).
If the equilibrium in question is not unique then there is presumably an issue of equilibrium choice that would permit some action-guiding element.
The general point is that normative assessment is first a matter of attitudes; and attitudes can be appropriate even though no action by anyone could change things.
We are not here endorsing this view, just noting the intelligibility, and general attractiveness of distinguishing the between the attitudes one might appropriately have to others and those one might have to one’s self.
There is a substantial literature in psychology about biased self-appraisal—or “positive illusions” as they are sometimes called. See Taylor and Brown (1988).
There is in play here a distinction relevant for the theorists in question between ‘doing theory’ and ‘promulgating theory’.
In particular, it is worth emphasizing that the probability of getting there, if one tries, is not the same as the expected costs of making the attempt.
Interestingly, to ignore the prospect of our own carelessness seems to be an instance of…well, ‘complacency’.
p. 29 and following and Chapter 8: The Concessive Requirement, pp. 152–153. See Jackson and Pargetter (1986).
There is plenty of interesting debate about this revolving around whether what we ought to do depends on what we will actually do or what we could possibly do.
Here we are thinking that there is an important difference between what we reasonably anticipate someone will do and what we reasonably expect that person to do. But that latter is, on our view, rightly sensitive both to what is easy or difficult for that person to do (which itself is often shaped by what others will do).
To underline the distinction between the reflexive and the many person case, consider what the editor should do. Should she send the paper to Procrastinate anyway, knowing what she knows about his most likely response? Should she instead send the reviewing exercise to the next best person on her list—Professor Prompt? If she chose the latter option, she might be letting Procrastinate off the hook—but is putting him on the hook by making his failures more conspicuous, a consideration that the editor ought to weigh in securing the predicted best outcome? Whatever the answer to these questions, there is no implication that the editor should feel ‘complacent’ about Procrastinate’s weaknesses—she might well feel frustrated by, and disgusted at, his professional slackness!.
Cited by Estlund on p. 7; from Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, revised edition, Sect. 2, 8.
Estlund mentions Spencer as having anticipated Rawls, and Sidgwick as having resisted, while registering that they were both concerned with what sort of theory would be most interested in whether ideal theory, or real-world theory, would actually be most useful.
Moreover, as earlier emphasized, there are many measures of inequality or lack of straightness available—and specifying the ‘correct’ one is necessary for a complete (as well as an applicable) understanding of equality/straightness in any world where equality/straightness is problematic.
In tilting this way, we are embracing what Estlund thinks of as “the Bent View” of human nature. But we draw a distinction, that Estlund does not, between seeing the principles of justice as shaped, in some way, by what people might willingly do and seeing them as shaped, in some way, by what motives are characteristic of human agents (p. 103). Just what counts as what people, or a particular person, might willingly do we here leave unexplored, even as we think it is neither set by nor restricted to characteristic motives of human agents. See Estlund’s Chapter 7 “Justice Unbent,” where he helpfully distinguishes, as we think must be done, between individual motives being individually mitigating and their being collectively mitigating (p. 124 and following).
Of the kind familiar from the antics of Professor Procrastinate and his commentators.
Of course, you do not unilaterally determine what institutional arrangement will prevail. And since your vote (or promotional activity) makes very little difference to the outcome, you might be inclined to vote in an exemplary fashion for institution package A. (See Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Brennan and Sayre-McCord 2015 for relevant discussion. Such complications are however not essential here.).
That is, we do not suppose that with heterogeneous actors selection cannot do important normative work. Some institutions work by incentives; some by selection; most by some degree of both. In other words, what ‘people’ are willing to do does not presuppose that all people are identically motivated—which ‘people’ is often a central question.
Estlund helpfully introduces and explores the idea of (what he terms) Plural Requirements, which do not apply to an agent (considered alone) but only to sets of agents and then impose obligations on each only on the condition that the other(s) act in certain ways. See Chapter 12. A nice question that we here leave to one side is whether these Plural Requirements are themselves sensitive to what people might willingly do.
References
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Brennan, G., & Sayre-McCord, G. (2015). Voting and causal responsibility. Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, 1, 36–59.
Broome, J. (1999). “Goodness is reducible to betterness” in ethics out of economics, ch 10. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cohen, G. (2003). Facts and principles. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31, 211–245.
Jackson, F., & Pargetter, R. (1986). Oughts, options and actualism. Philosophical Review, 95, 233–255.
Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103(2), 193–210.
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Brennan, G., Sayre-McCord, G. Real world theory, complacency, and aspiration. Philos Stud 178, 2365–2384 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01531-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01531-x