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Abstract

Plural first-person pronouns have often been ignored in the literature on indexicals and pronouns. The assumption seems to be that we is just the plural of I. So, we can focus on theorizing about singular indexicals and about non-indexical plurals then combine the results to yield a theory of plural indexicals. Here I argue that the “divide and conquer” strategy fails. By considering data involving plurals, generics, and complex demonstratives, I argue for a referential semantics on which we can refer to two sorts of group-like entities. Further, by considering the nature of semantic theorizing, I argue that semantics must draw some metaphysical distinctions, including between groups of two sorts.

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Notes

  1. Or perhaps they are ignored as indexicals and pronouns are complicated enough without adding the complications that plural expressions bring. For instance, Forbes (2003) states in a handbook article on indexicals that “since plural expressions raise special problems” the entry focuses on singular indexicals.

  2. Plural first-person pronouns can also occur bound or as anaphorically dependent on other expressions. For instance, we is bound in ‘Whenever a pianist comes to visit, we play duets’ (based on Partee 1989).

  3. There are two ways to characterize what makes an expression genuinely referential, rather than descriptive (Marti 1995). On one characterization being referential is about what an expression’s contribution is to the proposition expressed by statements containing it. An expression is referential if it contributes an object. On the other characterization it is about how an expression designates an object. An expression is referential if it designates an object in a way that is not mediated by a semantic rule. Given our focus on indexicals, the first characterization is the one that is relevant.

  4. Following Russell (1905), Hale and Wright say “[a]n expression denotes when the rules of language assign specific conditions to the expression that an object must meet to be designated by it” (1997, 681).

  5. Kaplan does not include we in his list of examples of indexicals [although he ends the list of expressions with ‘etc.’ so it is clearly not meant to be exhaustive (1989a, 489)].

  6. Here can also be used as a demonstrative. For instance, if Obama points to a map and says we will be here on Wednesday it is plausible that here does not refer to where Obama is presently located, but to the place that the location on the map he demonstrated represents.

  7. Some languages have distinct lexical items for inclusive and exclusive first-person plural pronouns (e.g., Bahasa Indonesia or Indonesian).

  8. Theories differ on how to interpret plural expressions like Megan and Dante. Some take plurals to plurally refer, so that Megan and Dante and an equivalent instance of we plurally refers to Megan and Dante (to them) without referring to a single collective entity (McKay 2006; Oliver and Smiley 2001, 2013; Yi 2005, 2006). Others take plural expressions to refer to lattice-theoretic sums (Link 1983) or to sets (Landman 1989a, b; Schwarzschild 1996). On these views there is an entity (a set or sum) that is the referent of Megan and Dante and instances of we that are referentially equivalent.

  9. Have you ever seen a monkey turn into a man?! Confusion about evolution itself and the semantics of lexical kind predicates underlies this quizzical argument against the theory of evolution.

  10. Others appeal to similar evidence to argue that we is not just plural I. Wechsler states that the “first-person plural refers, not necessarily to a multiplicity of speakers, but rather to ‘the speaker plus associates’” (2010, 337). Korta states that “it is absurd to assume that “we” is just the plural counterpart of “I” and just means “the speakers of the utterance” in plural. Utterances have a single speaker, even when they are simultaneous” (2016, 339). Nunberg notes that while “[i]t is not in doubt that we is plural; what is less certain is that it is the plural of I” (1993, 7).

  11. Vallée notes that while I is “intention-proof”, “intentions may play a major role in the determination of part of the referent” of we” (1996, 223). Roberts (ms), Margolin (1996), Neale (2017), and Korta (2016) also note that we is not pure.

  12. MST operates given truth-conditional and grammaticality data. What the truth-conditional and grammatical data to be accounted for is may be open for debate. For instance, there is controversy over whether (1) and (2) are truth-conditionally distinct:

    1. (1)

      Herman believes Hesperus is visible.

    2. (2)

      Herman believes Phosphorus is visible.

    How MST is to be applied depends on having a settled set of data.

  13. The view of semantic theorizing here accords with views argued for by Yalcin (2018) and Ball (2018). Both take semantics to involve modeling or measuring in a way that allows for abstraction without theoretical disadvantage.

  14. Alternatively one could add all of the possible groups as elements in the context, but this would involve adding many elements to the context and either allowing for tuples of variable arity or including a set of groups to the context. The semantics would still require something to choose which of the groups is the referent of we. It is simpler to add an assignment function to the context, so I do so here.

  15. The character for we given here is of the general form for definite pronouns with Φ-features given by Buring (2011).

  16. Chierchia (1998) develops a similar view on which kinds are modeled as individual concepts which are in the domain of individuals.

  17. A plural reference view on which conjunctions of proper names (and the referents of we in 1 and 2) are many entities might be understood in a way that involves reference to each of the many. Alternatively it could be understood as involving a new plural reference relation that plurally refers to the plurality without individually referring to any one entity. Choice on the nature of plural reference would determine whether we referred to the speaker in these cases.

  18. Korta says that we “is partly automatic in referring to the speaker of the utterance and partly discretionary in referring to other individuals” (2016, 350). Vallée (1996) holds that a use of we always involves reference to the speaker in developing an account on which we is 10-ways ambiguous.

  19. Braun (2006) calls a theory like this ‘Kind Designation Theory’.

  20. King (2006) focuses exclusively on adverbs of quantification as triggers, given the range of data “triggers” should also include modals or an alternative strategy like that argued for by Hunter (2010) should be used to account for descriptive interpretations that involve modals.

  21. See Borg (2000) and Glanzberg and Siegel (2006) for arguments that F in that F is a constraint included in the character or which plays a “policing” role that requires that the object denoted be F.

  22. Accounts of slurs that posit negative or derogatory content (e.g., in their truth conditional contribution, a conventional implicature, a presupposition, or an expressive element) usually posit that appropriated slurs are ambiguous. Yet, the theories falter in explaining why only in-group members can use slurs with their appropriated meanings. If, e.g., appropriated instances of bitch involve a conventional implicature (or presupposition or…) that we women are laudable for being women only a woman could express the appropriated content as a man could not use we to pick out the group women. Ritchie (2017) argues for this view.

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Acknowledgments

I thank participants at the New York Philosophy of Language Workshop and the Nova Scotia Meaning Workshop for feedback on early versions of this paper. In particular I thank Derek Anderson, David Braun, Alex Grzankowski, Eric Mandelbaum, Eliot Michaelson, Gary Ostertag, Craige Roberts and an anonymous referee for helpful discussions and comments.

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  1. CUNY Graduate Center and City College of New York, North Academic Center, 5/144C, 160 Convent Avenue, New York, NY, 10031, USA

    Katherine Ritchie

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Ritchie, K. What we can do. Philos Stud 177, 865–882 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1210-8

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