Abstract
This paper presents an Anscombian alternative to the traditional deontic conception of ought. According to the Anscombian conception of ought developed here, ought is general as opposed to ‘peculiarly moral’, norm-referring instead of law- or obligation-referring, and ‘heroic’ in the sense that it does not presuppose that individuals can do or be as they ought. Its connection to matters of fact can, moreover, be clearly stated. In the first part of the paper, I describe some significant logical characteristics of this conception, and argue that it provides a more suitable account of the oughts of ethics as compared to the deontic conception. One particular strength of the Anscombian conception of ought is that it does justice to the possibility of tragedy in human life, where tragedy is understood as the possibility that a thoroughly well-intentioned individual might sometimes ensure her own moral imperfection, precisely by doing what is morally right or best at every step along the way. To motivate this feature of the view, I sketch a corresponding picture of responsibility for actions in terms of ownership of one’s deeds. This conception of responsibility allows that what one ought to do is not always constrained by what one can do, while saving the intuitions about fairness and the practical scope of moral norms that principally motivate ‘ought implies can’. To illustrate and motivate the overall account I discuss a number of cases, including the character Winston from George Orwell’s 1984.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
The grounds for seeing the world as rationally ordered will be different according to what sort of broader view grounds one’s deontic conception of normativity—e.g. Kantian versus theological, etc.
In Ethics by Nature, ms. in preparation, I look in detail at the significance of norms and normative inferences like these for ethical naturalism, especially neo-Aristotelian naturalism along the lines of what Philippa Foot proposed. It should be apparent even from this brief discussion, however, that there are no quick and easy, straightforward relationships between ethical norms and natural norms.
I do not argue in the present context that all senses of ought are covered by the Anscombian conception. But it may be the case that all senses of ought are tied to norms in a way that can be explicated in terms of kind-instantiation. For example I believe the analysis applies to deontic oughts, because the practices and institutions which give rise to such oughts and make them intelligible are themselves norms which can easily be understood as delineating types or kinds of behaviors and practices. Evaluation of particular behaviors or practices is then easily understood along the lines of inferences 1–3. For example we might say: (1) it is a law in this country that those behind the wheel of a car ought not to be intoxicated, (2) this person is behind the wheel of a car in this country, therefore (3) this person ought not to be intoxicated. Here the ought is a deontic ought—it is legally impermissible to drive drunk in the US—and it is also possible to construe it as a kind-instantiation ought, because the norm is given by a law and the driver falls under the law in virtue of being an instance of the kind of thing the law governs.
I think that desire-referenced oughts, of the sort found in hypothetical imperatives or in instrumental practical reasoning, can probably also be understood along similar lines. Hypothetical imperatives arise in a practical context and the pertinent norm is derived from the end in question. We might put it like this: (1) when people are sick the most effective means they can take to get better is to follow their doctor’s orders. (2) Joe is sick and his doctor has given him pertinent orders. (3) Joe ought to follow those orders, in order to take the most effective means to becoming well. This way of putting it brings out the fact that ‘the most effective means to an end’ is not synonymous with ‘the best thing to do’ or ‘the thing you ought to do all things considered’. Joe might for example not take the most effective means to his end for ethical or aesthetic reasons—perhaps the only available cure involves animal cruelty or would make him so ugly that he’d rather be sick.
It is an open question whether bigotry of the sort I have described is attributable to agents in the sense Gary Watson and others have discussed (Watson 1996). Is the conduct of the sexist professor conduct that “expresses the agent’s own evaluative commitments, [his] adoption of some ends among others” (Watson 233)? Or in Angela Smith’s words, is it conduct that “reflects [his] own evaluative judgments or appraisals” (2005: 237)? For an argument in favor of the view that individuals are morally responsible for implicit biases, see Holroyd (2012). See also Brownstein and Saul (2016). For my own part, I do not mean to imply that bigotry is always inadvertent, only that it often starts out that way, and that once acquired, it is not easily eradicated. According to the view I propose below, the professor is responsible for his actions in the sense that he should be held accountable for them and they are a deep part of who he is, even though they are not properly attributable to him in Watson’s sense.
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for this and many other helpful suggestions.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958a). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 1, 1–34.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958b). On brute facts. Analysis, 18, 69–72.
Blum, A. (2000). The Kantian Versus Frankfurt. Analysis, 60, 287–288.
Brownstein, M., & Saul, J. (Eds.). (2016). Implicit bias and philosophy (Vol. 2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Charlow, N., & Chrisman, M. (Eds.). (2016). Deontic modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Copp, D. (1997). Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibility. Noûs, 31, 441–456.
Copp, D. (2003). ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’, blameworthiness, and alternate possibilities. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities (pp. 265–299). Aldershot: Ashgate Press.
Copp, D. (2008). ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and the derivation of the principle of alternate possibilities. Analysis, 68, 67–75.
Frankfurt, H. (1998). The importance of what we care about. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gehrman, K. (ms. in preparation). Ethics by nature.
Graham, P. (2011). ‘Ought’ and ability. Philosophical Review, 120, 337–382.
Haslanger, S. (2014). The normal, the natural, and the good: Generics and ideology. Politica & Societa, 3, 369–392.
Hilpinen, R. (Ed.). (1971). Deontic logic. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Hilpinen, R. (Ed.). (1981). New studies in deontic logic. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Holroyd, J. (2012). Responsibility for implicit bias. Journal of Social Philosophy, 43, 274–306.
Marcus, R. B. (1987). Moral dilemmas and consistency. In C. W. Gowans (Ed.), Moral dilemmas. New York: Oxford University Press.
Murdoch, I. (2002). The idea of perfection. In The sovereignty of good (pp. 1–44). London: Routledge.
Orwell, G. (1950). 1984. New York: Signet Classic.
Saul, J. (2017). Are generics especially pernicious? Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1285995.
Scanlon, T. M. (1988). What we owe to each other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Smith, A. M. (2005). Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life. Ethics, 115, 236–271.
Smith, A. M. (2006). Control, responsibility, and moral assessment. Philosophical Studies, 138, 367–392.
Strawson, P. F. (1962). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy, 48, 1–25.
Thomason, R. (1981). Deontic logic and the role of freedom in moral deliberation. In Risto Hilpinen (Ed.), New studies in deontic logic (pp. 177–186). Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Von Wright, G. H. (1951). Deontic logic. Mind, 60, 1–15.
Wallace, R. J. (1994). Responsibility and the moral sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Watson, G. (1996). Two face of responsibility. Philosophical Topics, 24, 227–248.
Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Tennessee, especially Clerk Shaw, Jon Garthoff, and Josh Watson, to Paul Nichols, and to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophical Studies for helpful discussion of this paper at various stages of development. I would also like to acknowledge the University of Tennessee Humanities Center for Fellowship support during 2015-2016 which furthered completion of this essay.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gehrman, K. Tragedy and the constancy of norms: towards an Anscombian conception of ‘ought’. Philos Stud 176, 3077–3097 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1164-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1164-x