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Replies to commentators

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Abstract

I reply to three commentators—Friederike Moltmann, Daniel Rothschild, and Zoltán Szabó—on six topics—sense and reference, the unity of subject matter, questions, presupposition, partial truth, and content mereology.

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Notes

  1. A fourth commentary, by Kit Fine, speaks to some of these themes as well; it will appear in a later issue with my reply.

  2. Neale and Dever (1997).

  3. Is indeed identical to a way for A to be false.

  4. \({p} {\vee } {q}\)’s truthmaker q is not implied by any truthmaker for p, and its falsemaker \(\overline{\mathbf{p}}{\wedge }\overline{\mathbf{q}}\) is not implied by any falsemaker for p.

  5. “Truthmaker”: a misleading but handy term for ways of being true. “Trueways” (pronounced like “throughways”) is not a word, yet.

  6. A falsemaker for Someone has broken in is going to have to entail that no one has broken in, in particular that Betty hasn’t. A fact strong enough to entail that Betty hasn’t broken in is overkill when it comes to ensuring the falsity of Al has broken in.

  7. Ciardelli et al. (2013) is a good summary. Ciardelli (2013) draws connections between inquisitive possibility semantics and Kit Fine’s truthmaker semantics.

  8. Rufous and red are overlapping color categories neither of which includes the other.

  9. Abrusán (2011).

  10. Tichý (1974), Gemes (2007).

  11. Niiniluoto (1987), Oddie (2005).

  12. I try, following Gemes, to resuscitate the extensive-parts approach in Aboutness.

References

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  • Ciardelli, I. (2013). Inquisitive semantics as a truth-maker semantics. Unpublished manuscript.

  • Ciardelli, I., Groenendijk, J., & Roelofsen, F. (2013). Inquisitive semantics: A new notion of meaning. Language and Linguistics Compass, 7(9), 459–476.

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  • Gemes, K. (2007). Verisimilitude and content. Synthese, 154(2), 293–306.

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  • Lewis, D. (Ed.). (1988). Statements partly about observation. In Papers in philosophical logic. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

  • Neale, S., & Dever, J. (1997). Slingshots and boomerangs. Mind, 106(421), 143–168.

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  • Niiniluoto, I. (1987). Truthlikeness (Vol. 185). Berlin: Springer.

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  • Oddie, G. (2005). Value, reality, and desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press on Demand.

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  • Tichý, P. (1974). On popper’s definitions of verisimilitude. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 25(2), 155–160.

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  1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Stephen Yablo

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  1. Stephen Yablo
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Yablo, S. Replies to commentators. Philos Stud 174, 809–820 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0757-5

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