Abstract
I use Carl Gillett’s much heralded dimensioned theory of realization as a platform to develop a plausible part–whole theory. I begin with some basic desiderata for a theory of realization that its key terms should be defined and that it should be explanatory. I then argue that Gillett’s original theory violates these conditions because its explanatory force rests upon an unspecified “in virtue of” relation. I then examine Gillett’s later version that appeals instead to theoretical terms tied to “mechanisms.” Yet I argue that it too violates the desiderata, since it defines realization for mechanisms in terms of two undefined ideas whose explanatory credentials have not been established—“implementation” and “grounds.” Thus I drop those ideas in favor of an explicit constraint that the parts and properties provide a mechanistic explanation. I also distinguish a special mechanistic theory from a preferred general theory that incorporates other kinds of part–whole explanations that target causal powers or capacities. The result is a theory that has the explanatory virtues of mechanistic theories as well as a broader scope desired by Gillett. I also compare the result to a similar idea from Robert Cummins that has been neglected in recent discussions of realization, namely, his general property analysis rather than his functional analysis. Finally, I defend the preferred general theory against possible objections that attempt to show a conflict between metaphysical demands on a theory of realization versus facts about good scientific explanation.
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Notes
Another lesser problem is an ambiguity between properties and property instances. Thus, on the left-hand side of the biconditional, the wording of “an instance of a property F” makes it clear that “F” stands for a property, yet the absence of the preposition in "property/relation instance(s) G 1 –G n " seems to indicate that the terms "G 1 –G n " stand for instances. See also the shift between properties and instances when Gillett describes a flat theory's structure "COMBO" (2002, p. 320). But this ambiguity is ultimately harmless, since realization can be defined for either category (see Endicott 2010).
Cf. Endicott’s (2011, p. 196) synthesis of flat functional-role and dimensioned views that defines functional realization in terms of a three-place relation whereby an object’s occupier G i realizes its functional F in virtue of properties G 1 –G n possessed by its parts. This conjoins rather than disjoins the two ideas.
E.g., the flat causal-role functionalist theory of realization implies that the instantiation of a realizer property G determines the instantiation of the realized F, for if it is a matter of law that G stands in causal relations R, and if F is defined as the property possessed by an object when it has some property that stands in R, then it will be a matter of law that whenever an object has G it has F (see Tye 1995, pp. 41, 47–48).
Aizawa and Gillett recently refer to [D] as a "thumbnail sketch" (2009, p. 186, fn. 9). But providing a sketch does not preclude the obligation to provide enough information in the definition to identify the pertinent kinds of part–whole explanation.
The reference to triggering conditions in [C] creates a problem for [Dm], since the latter does not mention them. In any case, I will count them in [Dm]'s background conditions.
Also, there is but one disjunction in the definiens about what receives the powers from the parts, namely, the "powers [are] contributed by G 1 –G n to y 1 –y n (or x)," and I assume this only means that the multiple property instances contribute powers either directly to the parts y 1 –y n or indirectly to the whole x by their direct contributions to the parts.
E.g., in the case of neurotransmission, the explanation proceeds by breaking down the signaling function of a neuron into various processes involving certain parts, including the reception of neurotransmitter molecules, the opening of ion channels in a neuron's membrane, and the entrance of positively charged ion atoms through those channels into the cell body, all of which are crucial to the cell's depolarization (for more details, see Dolye et al. 1998; Jensen et al. 2012).
In a later paper Gillett (2013, p. 312) says that a "process" is an individual manifesting a power that results in an effect, and he says that an individual "grounds" that process when its powers so result in an effect (2013, ibid.). This seems to be a different claim than what is made in [C] (2007). In [C] (2007) the triggering and manifestation of powers ground the individual mechanism. But in (2013) the individual mechanism grounds the triggering and manifestation of powers (presumably because the individual is a part of that larger process). Either way, the grounding remains undefined.
Gillett adds in a more recent work that the parts in a constitution relation have "spatio-temporal, powerful, and/or productive" relations to each other (2013, p. 311). But Gillett does not define the kind of "spatio-temporal relations" in question or indicate how they would either exclude unexplained emergent cases or capture the desired range of scientific explanations. Also, by "powerful" Gillett (2013, p. 312) only means the notion of causal powers introduced by Shoemaker. And by "productive" Gillett (2013, p. 312) only means the power of an individual to be triggered and manifested to produce an effect—all of which are ideas already expressed in [C] and [Dm].
Polger (2010, p. 2002) also seems to tie this point to Shapiro's (2004) argument that, for purposes of functional analysis, one should discriminate among the parts and properties that combine to determine a functional property. However, Shapiro's argument applies even after one has set aside the options of identity and spatially-overlapping constitution and settled upon a relation of proper parts to whole. That is, among an object's proper parts, some will be relevant to a functional analysis and others not.
Likewise, Bechtel and Richardson (1993, p. 26) distinguish between aggregate systems for whom intersubstitution of parts holds, component systems for whom intersubstitution fails but the functional behavior of a part is intrinsically determined, and integrative systems for whom intersubstitution fails but the functional behavior of a part is determined by a broader systemic organization, such as feedback among subsystem parts. I also think that Haugeland's (1978) distinction between "morphological" versus "systematic" explanations is roughly equivalent to the latter two cases, i.e., composed systems (e.g., explaining how a cup holds coffee and how a fiber-optics bundle preserves the data it received) and then the functionally organized systems (e.g., explaining how an automobile engine works and how the brain does its information processing).
Interestingly, it might not be true that compositional explanations are always underwritten by simple aggregate explanations, e.g., if quantum-entangled states are not determined by the intrinsic physical properties of the individual particles but rather arise non-locally, exemplifying a kind of non-separability (see Maudlin 1998).
Cummins says that property theories fall under the general "analytic strategy" exhibited in the sciences (1983, p. 17). Compare how Nancy Cartwright summarizes the "analytic method" in physics: "to understand what happens in the world, we take things apart into their fundamental pieces; to control a situation we reassemble the pieces, we reorder them so they will work together to make things happen as we will" (1999, p. 83).
Although Cummins presents his functional analysis as a way to understand the function of a part in terms of a containing system (e.g., the heart vis-à-vis the circulatory system), it is also a way to thereby understand a function of the whole in terms of the functions of the parts.
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Acknowledgments
I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that I address the issue of potentially excessive multiple realization in the final section. I also thank Carl Gillett and Thomas Polger for many discussions of realization.
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Endicott, R. Developing the explanatory dimensions of part–whole realization. Philos Stud 173, 3347–3368 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0674-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0674-7