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Rights bearers and rights functions

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Abstract

The Will Theory of Rights has commonly been criticized for excluding from the class of rights bearers all subjects who are incapable of agency. The Interest Theory of Rights faces the challenge of avoiding undue proliferation of the class of rights bearers. I advance a novel argument for a specific demarcation of the class of rights bearers. I then argue that this demarcation implies that the function of the moral rights of subjects incapable of exercising agency is to protect them from being treated with illegitimate disregard in a certain sense. I advance reasons for holding that this theory is neither a Will Theory nor an Interest Theory, or a combination of these theories. The proposed account is significant also if it is interpreted as a version of the Interest Theory. It brings significant benefits in the form of cohesiveness, simplicity, and intuitive appeal.

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Notes

  1. Here, I follow my discussion in Andersson (2013, pp. 176–179).

  2. I am grateful to a referee of this journal for drawing my attention to this point.

  3. Here, I follow my discussion in Andersson (2013, pp. 186–187).

  4. “Demand” theories of rights hold that rights are something that can be “demanded” or “insisted upon.” Cf. ( Feinberg 1973, pp. 58–59; Darwall 2006, p. 18; Skorupski 2010, XII. 6, XIV. 2–3). Such accounts accept unwaivable rights. Will Theorists and Demand theorists agree, however, that competence for agency is necessary in order to be a rights bearer, and this is the only aspect of these theories that is relevant for the issue of inclusion or exclusion of unempowered individuals in the class of rights bearers. Hence, the argument advanced in this article applies to all these theories.

  5. He then refines this model, but discussing the “Simple Hybrid” model is sufficient for my purposes.

  6. I am here following my discussion in Andersson (2013, pp. 175–190).

  7. It could be objected that adolescents acquire the capacity to exercise agency before becoming adults. I will assume that any subject with capacity to exercise agency in the sense of being able to make reflective choices between alternative courses of action and being able to reflect over her preferences is an adult. This ability, rather than age, determines whether a subject is an adult in the relevant sense.

  8. For thorough discussion, see (Andersson 2013, pp. 185–190).

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Acknowledgments

The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of a referee of this journal.

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  1. Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy, The Faculty of Law, The University of Cambridge, 10 West Road, Cambridge, CB3 9DZ, UK

    Anna-Karin Margareta Andersson

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Andersson, AK.M. Rights bearers and rights functions. Philos Stud 172, 1625–1646 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0368-y

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