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A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists

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Abstract

The principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) tells us that an agent is morally responsible for an action only if he could have done otherwise. Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) provide an extremely influential challenge to the PAP (Frankfurt, J Philos 66:829–839, 1969). And Frankfurt-style compatibilists are motivated to accept compatibilism about responsibility and determinism in part due to FSCs. But there is a significant tension between our judgments about responsibility in FSCs and our judgments about responsibility in certain omissions cases. This tension has thus far largely been treated as an internal puzzle for defenders of FSCs to solve. My goal here is to regiment this tension into a clear argument which (if sound) undermines the FSC based critique of PAP. I will also argue that there is an in principle reason to doubt that Frankfurt-Style Compatibilists will be able to successfully respond to my argument.

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Notes

  1. Here and throughout it should be assumed that by ‘responsible’ I mean morally responsible (unless I explicitly state otherwise).

  2. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 125).

  3. I know of no one in the literature who has claimed that he is.

  4. This case is also from Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 138). They credit David Kaplan for suggesting the case.

  5. Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and Byrd (2007, pp. 56–67) attempt to do this.

  6. This sort of case was suggested by Frankfurt (1994, pp. 620–623).

  7. Fischer and Ravizza (1998, pp. 140–141) make this critical point. Randolph Clarke holds the view that the timing of the counterfactual intervention does matter. See Clarke (1994, pp. 195–208) and Clarke (2011, pp. 594–624).

  8. This case is drawn from Fischer and Ravizza (1991, pp. 258–278).

  9. Fischer and Ravizza (1991). Sartorio (2005) argues that Sloth is not a counterexample to The Asymmetry Thesis.

  10. Frankfurt (1994).

  11. See Fischer and Ravizza (1998).

  12. See Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Sartorio (2005) and Clarke (2011). I criticize each of these individual accounts in “Omissions and the Frankfurt cases: A challenge” (Unpublished Manuscript).

  13. Frankfurt (1969).

  14. Fischer (2010, pp. 267–278). See p. 269.

  15. ‘mere’ in the sense that they are not also A-Factors.

  16. Given this picture, one way to understand the dilemma defense is that it calls into question whether it is true that a mere B-Factor can rule out the ability to do otherwise.

References

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Acknowledgments

For helpful comments on this paper thanks to Randolph Clarke, D. Justin Coates, Chris Franklin, Joshua Hollowell, Ben Mitchell-Yellin, Garrett Pendergraft, John Perry, Michael Nelson, Adam R Thompson and Patrick Todd. Thanks also to the UCR Agency Writing Workshop and to audiences at the Central APA and the Tennessee Value and Agency Workshop. And extra-special thanks are due to John Martin Fischer for his significant help and encouragement.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, HMNSS Building, Room 1604, 900 University Avenue, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    Philip Swenson

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  1. Philip Swenson
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Correspondence to Philip Swenson.

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Swenson, P. A challenge for Frankfurt-style compatibilists. Philos Stud 172, 1279–1285 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-014-0349-1

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