Abstract
Recently, a number of experimental philosophers have converged on the position that the ordinary concept of weakness of will does not solely consist in “judgment” or “intention” violation but is more like a cluster concept in which each factor plays contributory roles in the application of the concept. This, however, raises the question as to which factor is more central or plays a more significant role in folk’s understanding of the concept. I contend that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is primarily constituted by the “executive commitment” rather than the “evaluative commitment” practices. Drawing on extensive evidence from developmental psychology, I will argue that the executive commitment, which, as I will show, involve intention recognition and metarepresentation, is developmentally prior and more fundamental in our exercise and intuitive understanding of the concept.
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Notes
Often referred to as akrasia
“Resolution” refers to a specific type of intention that is designed to stand firm in the face of future contrary inclinations. (Holton 2009, p. 9-10)
Strength of will as one’s success to persist with an executive commitment.
The Ignorance Question asks “Does [name of the other child] know what is really in the box, or does he [she] not know that?”. The Belief Question asks “If we ask [name of the other child], what will he [she] say is in the box?” (Hogrefe et al. 1986, p. 569).
For a critique of the false-belief test, see Bloom and German (2000).
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Heris, A.Y. The ordinary concept of weakness of will. Phenom Cogn Sci 19, 123–139 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09617-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09617-6