Abstract
In this paper I investigate an underappreciated element of Husserl’s phenomenology of images: the consciousness of the depicted subject (Sujet or Bildsujet), which Husserl calls the Sujetintention, e.g. the awareness of the sitter of a portrait. Husserl claims that when a consciousness regards a figurative image, it is absorbed in the awareness of the depicted subject and yet this subject some how withholds its presence in the midst of its appearance in the image-object (Bildobjekt). Image-consciousness is an intuitive (anschaulich) consciousness that intends a being that is both ‘in’ and ‘beyond’ the image: the depicted subject haunts the image. Borrowing Richard Wollheim’s language, the aim of this study is to determine what it means for a consciousness to see a depicted-subject in an image-depiction, which happens on the basis of seeing an image-object in a material image-thing, like paint, canvas, ink, paper etc. Restricting myself to figurative images, I will argue against the view that the relation to the depicted subject is symbolic or signitive. I argue that the consciousness of the Sujet is quasi-perceptual, which allows for a better account of the depicted subject’s sense of absence. I develop this view on the basis of Husserl’s claims that the depicted subject is the bearer of norms inherent to intuitive appearances, which concern how the profiles and movements of an object ought to unfold, though they fail to do so for image-consciousness. This failure is not a mere privation for the image as a perceptual appearance but is inherent to its status as a mediated and artificial presence.
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Notes
I am deeply indebted to the reviewers of this paper and to Prof. Ullrich Melle. Their incisive comments have helped me to improve this paper in a way I could not have done on my own.
Although we may affirm (some) aspects of Stiegler’s analyses in The Discrete Image concerning the impact that digital modes of production have had on the belief (i.e. the thetic attitude) involved in contemporary image-consciousness, his opening remarks—where he invokes the distinction between a ‘pure mental image’ and an ‘image-object’—are misleading insofar as a phenomenology of images never posits the existence of images that would be unconditioned by actual or real image-things. We must add, however, that the phenomenology of images does not and cannot suppose a specific technological history of the production of images. Such analyses must always follow more foundational ones. Further, we may, partially, disagree with Lotz who draws on Stiegler’s essay when he says that Husserl’s phenomenology of images is “anti-cultural” because Husserl ignores the techniques of image production. Rather, it would be closer to the mark to call Husserl’s analyses ‘ante-cultural.’ Cf. Stiegler 2002, 147–149, 158–159; and Lotz 2007, 178.
Throughout I will privilege the use of the German term Sujet. This is to avoid two points of confusion. First, it is best to avoid any relation to the more common philosophical use of the term ‘subject.’ Goodman for one decried the “trick of language” that turns an object into a subject once it is depicted (Goodman 1968, fn #2). Second, the term ‘depicted object’ is not sufficiently clear. As Twardowski observed, when we hear someone speak of a depicted object, say a landscape that a painter has rendered, it is not clear whether s/he refers to image on the canvas or the factual, real landscape (Twardowski 1977, 11–12).
All references to Husserl’s texts are to the Husserliana editions, followed by page references to the English translation in square brackets.
Cf. Aldea 2013, 374–375. The first sort of seeing-in is the one already familiar to us in Wollheim’s work. Translating the two sets of terminology: seeing-in (image-consciousness) demands that we see both the medium (image-thing) and the represented object (image-object) in a single complex perceptual experience (in the unity of an intuitive intentional act) (Wollheim 1980, 219).
“Die ‘Verdecktheit’ des Trägers ist die genuine Weise seiner Gegebenheit. Verdecktheit heißt aber nicht Unsichtigkeit.” My translation.
“…es ist berufener Erreger für eine bestimmte Bilderscheinung.” My translation.
For a concise description of the role of apprehensions and sensory-contents in image-consciousness, cf. Bernet 2004, 86.
Translation slightly modified.
In a later text from 1921/1924 Husserl discusses this in terms of ‘mode of performance’ rather than attitude: “The terms ‘phantasy’ and ‘fiction’ therefore have two significational directions: 1) One is directed toward reproduction (and re-presentation of whatever kind), […] 2) The other is directed toward the mode of performing” (Hua XXIII; 575 [693]). My emphases.
Husserl also notes that there is a class of images that function like signs and bear external, associative relations to their ‘meant’ objects. For instance, a gallery catalogue might present miniature pictures of the paintings on display. These images merely indicate which rooms contain which paintings, and do not really work to depict landscapes, or duchesses, or bowls of fruit. A certain image might also work like an “Erinnerungszeichen”, not so much depicting the Sujet as reminding one of it (Hua XXIII, 35 [38]).
My translation.
Brough also argues that the Sujetintention cannot be a symbolic consciousness, since the symbol and the symbolized do not have the same relation of identity and difference as the depiction and depicted. The appearance of a name neither adequately nor inadequately represents the perceptual traits of the thing it designates (Brough 1999, 120–121).
An important qualification: For Husserl a totally empty intuition is a contradiction in terms, like a round square. The empty components of perception are usually the hidden profiles of an object; one profile is directly visible while we emptily perceive the others. In the case of searching for the key in the cushions, however, we do not yet see any key-profiles or feel any key-surfaces. Nonetheless we do not merely expect the key (in the sense of a presentification of it). Rather, our perception has motivated protentional components; the perception of the key does in some sense have fulfilled components as we feel the couch that we intend as the key-setting. Hence there is a contiguity in the perception of the couch and the eventually found key, even though they are distinct objects.
I stress again that this demand only imposes itself to the extent that we, the viewers of the image, are interested in having the image-subject give itself in a direct intuition.
Brough develops a similar position, though he says that concepts necessarily mediate image-consciousness. This move accommodates non-figurative art, whose Sujet may be an abstract concept which requires abstract artistic representation, but it brings together two definitions of ‘idea’ that I would want to keep separate: one perceptual-prescriptive (which is immanent to perception), the other theoretical-eidetic (which is extraneous to perception and is constituted in a higher order cognitive act). (cf. Brough 2012, 557; 559–560).
“C’est. le vrai Cervin (absent) que je vois à travers ‘la fenêtre’ de l’image et c’est. lui qui m’empêche de prendre l’image-objet pour une vraie réalité.” My translation, my emphasis.
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Eldridge, P. Depicting and seeing-in. The ‘Sujet’ in Husserl’s phenomenology of images. Phenom Cogn Sci 17, 555–578 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9531-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9531-1