Abstract
In a paper that recently appeared in this journal, we proposed a model that aims at providing a comprehensive account of our ability to intelligently use tools, bridging sensorimotor and reasoning-based explanations of this ability. Central to our model is the notion of generalized motor programs for tool use, which we defined as a synthesis between classic motor programs, as described in the scientific literature, and Peircean habits. In his commentary, Osiurak proposes a critique of the notion of generalized motor program, and suggests that the limitations of our model can be solved by integrating it with the view that motor programs are generated by a previous mechanical reasoning, independent from sensorimotor knowledge. Here we reply that while on the one hand our reference to Peircean habits gets over the temptation to consider motor programs as fixed internal entities, it also rejects the view, endorsed by Osiurak, that intelligent practice is a mixture of antecedent abstract reasoning and subsequent motor execution.
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Notes
Automatic abduction is explained in terms of practical knowledge related to our experience and practice with tools. It is immediately retrieved under given circumstances. Abduction by selection employs previous motor knowledge and experiences, adjusting the right habit in consideration of the objects available and of our biological constraints. Finally, creative abduction implies an ex novo constitution of motor routines, given the lack of previous mediation laws.
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Caruana, F., Cuccio, V. Overcoming the acting/reasoning dualism in intelligent behavior. Phenom Cogn Sci 16, 709–713 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9471-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-016-9471-1