Abstract
Scholars contend that presidents exert some influence over the implementation of national policy. Yet, prior research has overlooked the importance of local context, specifically socio-political conditions, and how it can shape an agency’s response to executive-level guidance. We examine the effect of local context on county-level immigration removals by ICE agents from 2013 through 2018. We predict local removals starting with the Secure Communities program, continuing under Obama’s two-year Priority Enforcement Program (PEP), and up through Trump’s zero-tolerance policies. Obama-era executive guidance, which advised agents to target only dangerous criminal immigrants, did lead to a significant national decline in total removals. However, conservative localities continued to remove large numbers, even during PEP. Notably, the difference between conservative and liberal communities was largest for non-criminal immigrant removals. Despite Obama’s guidance to focus on dangerous immigrants, ICE agents continued to remove undocumented immigrants without criminal records from conservative U.S. counties. Our analysis indicates street-level agents are most responsive to chief-executive direction in the absence of local-level opposition to top-down demands.
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Notes
EO 13768: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/02/21/qa-dhs-implementation-executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united-states (accessed 2/12/20).
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) oversees enforcement at border, posts of entry, and checkpoints within the 100-mile border zone: https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1084/~/legal-authority-for-the-border-patrol (accessed 3/10/19).
We use “removal,” the legal term used by ICE. “Deportation” is an old term formally used by the now-defunct Immigration and Naturalization Service (Law 2014).
Crimes need not be too serious to lead to removal. Any crime subject to a one-year jail sentence – even if the sentence is suspended—can be subject to removal. This includes individuals who were convicted or pled guilty to rather petty offenses, e.g., forging a signature on a traffic ticket (McLeod 2012).
“Secure Communities.” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (accessed 9/23/11).
IIRIRA (1996) established 287(g) (Rodríquez et al., 2010, 5–6).
ICE mostly enforces S-Comm through county-level jails (Chand and Schreckhise 2015).
S.744—Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act: https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/744 (accessed 2/24/20).
Johnson’s guidance stated all Priority 1 immigrants were removable and only individuals in Priority 2 subsections (a) and (b). These latter two subsections would include some misdemeanors such as domestic violence or driving under the influence. See Johnson (2014b) for all offenses in these categories: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf (accessed 2/26/20).
ICE began using new request for hold forms, replacing detainers, in June 2015. See ICE’s archived webpage for PEP: https://www.ice.gov/pep (accessed 2/26/20).
Section "Discussion and conclusion" of EO: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-enhancing-public-safety-interior-united-states/ (accessed 2/26/20).
“Secure Communities: Overview,” https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (accessed 10/21/17).
White House Office of the Press Secretary, Nov. 20, 2014: https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-President-address-nation-immigration (accessed 5/15/22).
ICE Union’s press release on the vote: http://iceunion.org/download/286-287-press-release-pd-memo.pdf (accessed 2/24/20).
Because the distribution of the crime rates and population across jurisdictions was heavily skewed, we use natural logs.
Because most counties have zero or few removals, a variable that measured county-level removals per capita would also be heavily skewed, rendering OLS models bias. The skewness persists even when examining a removal rate that consists of the number of removals per foreign born resident in each county.
Due to computational difficulties, our numerous efforts to render models that examined state-level effects were unsuccessful. Upon the advice of an anonymous reviewer, we included in our models a region variable that might capture some of these effects Although we found some regional effects, including the region variable did not substantively alter the findings from our models presented below. The results of these models that include the region variable are included in Appendix B.
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Appendices
Appendix
Appendix 1: Summary statistics
Variable | Mean | Std. Dev | Min. | Max. | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total removals | |||||
Overall | 22.5076 | 154.2020 | 0 | 5407 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 147.4564 | 0 | 3635.3330 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 45.1735 | − 1323.1590 | 2482.3410 | T = 6 | |
Non-criminal removals | |||||
Overall | 1.6008 | 14.0831 | 0 | 764 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 11.6128 | 0 | 338.3333 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 7.9694 | − 192.0659 | 567.6008 | T = 6 | |
Level 3 Removals | |||||
Overall | 8.9888 | 66.9278 | 0 | 3119 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 63.1492 | 0 | 2015.5 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 22.1938 | − 926.3445 | 1112.489 | T = 6 | |
Level 2 Removals | |||||
Overall | 2.9982 | 22.8840 | 0 | 1127 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 21.4422 | 0 | 620.3333 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 8.0021 | − 217.6684 | 509.6649 | T = 6 | |
Level 1 Removals | |||||
Overall | 8.9197 | 60.8304 | 0 | 2053 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 58.8444 | 0 | 1496.333 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 15.4465 | − 507.2469 | 743.0864 | T = 6 | |
PEP | |||||
Overall | 0.5000 | 0.5000 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0000 | 0.5 | 0.5 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.5000 | 0 | 1 | T = 6 | |
Conservatism | |||||
Overall | 0.6146 | 0.1496 | 0.0833 | 0.9479 | N = 18,648 |
Between | 0.1496 | 0.0833 | 0.9479 | n = 3108 | |
Within | 0.0000 | 0.6146 | 0.6146 | T = 6 | |
Border county | |||||
Overall | 0.0073 | 0.0854 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0854 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0000 | 0.0073459 | 0.0073459 | T = 6 | |
287 (g) MOA | |||||
Overall | 0.0092 | 0.0955 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0922 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0251 | − 0.490791 | 0.8425423 | T = 6 | |
LEA budget | |||||
Overall | 201.4140 | 181.5511 | 1.516127 | 3707.451 | N = 18,629 |
Between | 181.9207 | 1.516127 | 3707.451 | n = 3109 | |
Within | 0.0000 | 201.414 | 201.414 | Bar = 5.99196 | |
Years active | |||||
Overall | 4.2003 | 1.9280 | 0 | 9 | N = 18,752 |
Between | 0.8971 | 2.5 | 8 | n = 3127 | |
Within | 1.7078 | 1.700299 | 6.700299 | Bar = 5.9968 | |
%Hispanic | |||||
Overall | 9.0767 | 13.5824 | 0.2008032 | 96.27631 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 13.5771 | 0.4617246 | 96.0753 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.4392 | − 6.604667 | 12.95019 | T = 6 | |
Crime (ln)t−1 | |||||
Overall | 3.0605 | 0.6263 | 0 | 6.117783 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.5804 | 0 | 5.998533 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.2355 | 0.0716438 | 6.238304 | T = 6 | |
Population (ln)t−1 | |||||
Overall | 10.2730 | 1.4731 | 4.454347 | 16.13008 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 1.4732 | 4.676729 | 16.12341 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0178 | 9.962205 | 10.50889 | T = 6 | |
Unemployment | |||||
Overall | 6.1347 | 2.5204 | 1.1 | 27.4 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 1.0753 | 3.083333 | 18.1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 2.2795 | − 1.482013 | 24.80132 | T = 6 | |
Median income | |||||
Overall | 47.8399 | 12.5053 | 0 | 136.191 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 6.3598 | 26.47083 | 121.3978 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 10.7679 | 1.669738 | 128.5096 | T = 6 | |
ICE CDFt−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0031 | 0.0555 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0540 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0126 | -0.330246 | 0.8364207 | T = 6 | |
ICE IGSA publict-1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0378 | 0.1908 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.1792 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0656 | − 0.795486 | 0.8711807 | T = 6 | |
ICE IGSA privatet-1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0042 | 0.0647 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0607 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0225 | − 0.829128 | 0.8375386 | T = 6 | |
ICE othert−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0266 | 0.1610 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.1556 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0413 | − 0.806718 | 0.8599489 | T = 6 | |
BOP publict−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0270 | 0.1621 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.1618 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0089 | − 0.473012 | 0.5269882 | T = 6 | |
BOP privatet−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0034 | 0.0583 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0520 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0263 | − 0.829927 | 0.6700735 | T = 6 | |
USMS publict−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0328 | 0.1781 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.1717 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0473 | − 0.800543 | 0.8661237 | T = 6 | |
USMS privatet−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0037 | 0.0605 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.0582 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0166 | − 0.82966 | 0.6703396 | T = 6 | |
State publict−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.2022 | 0.4016 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.4017 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0000 | 0.2021718 | 0.2021718 | T = 6 | |
State privatet−1 | |||||
Overall | 0.0517 | 0.2215 | 0 | 1 | N = 18,786 |
Between | 0.2215 | 0 | 1 | n = 3131 | |
Within | 0.0000 | 0.0517407 | 0.0517407 | T = 6 | |
Appendix 2: Models with the variable region
See Tables
3 and
4.
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Schreckhise, W.D., Chand, D.E. Local implementation of U.S. federal immigration programs: context, control, and the problems of intergovernmental implementation. Policy Sci 56, 797–823 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-023-09511-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-023-09511-8