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Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes

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Abstract

We consider a game theoretic congestion model with parallel nodes and homogeneous customers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the priority passes improve social welfare for such a system. To this end, we prove the existence of an equilibrium. The system with no priority pass has a unique equilibrium. With the introduction of priority passes, the uniqueness of the equilibrium may be destroyed. We provide a sufficient condition under which the system with priority passes outperforms the system with no priority passes. The problem is explored numerically as well.

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Notes

  1. In the traditional Wardrop equilibrium problem, each customer strives to minimize the travel time subject to the demand satisfaction constraint. In this paper, we do not assume that customers have a fixed demand. Instead, each customer strives to maximize the benefit from visiting stations minus the time cost of spending in stations, subject to a constraint on the total amount of time spent in the theme park. The priority scheme tends to improve the net benefit because the customers usually do not necessarily visit as many stations (or as many numbers of in each station) as they do under the system with no priority.

  2. This question was raised by the referees of this paper.

  3. The equilibrium model \(\mathcal {P}(F)\) is unlikely to be a potential game. Beckmann’s transformation (see Beckmann et al. 1956 and Correa et al. 2004) does not work for \(\mathcal {P}(F)\). The congestion function of the non-priority service at station j is a function not only of \(x_{j}^{-}\) but also of \(x_{j}^{+}\), which violates a standard assumption underlying Beckmann transformation, which is that the congestion function of a link depends solely on the traffic of the link, or more generally, the congestion function Tp (x+, x) is a gradient of some function; see, e.g., Nagurney (1993) and Friesz and Bernstein (2016).

  4. This fact somewhat resembles the results of El Azouzi and Altman (2003) and Correa et al. (2004) although their model setting and assumptions are different from ours. They show that in a routing network with no priority, the equilibrium is no longer unique if there are side constraints. Iryo (2015) discusses the issue of multiple equilibria in the setting of dynamic traffic assignment.

  5. Here, the degeneracy of the optimal solution \(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}\) of linear problem \(B(\boldsymbol {T}(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}))\) means that (\(\bar {x}_{j}= 0\) and uj (0) = 0) or (\(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\) and uj (1) = 0) holds. This type of degeneracy is different from that mentioned in Section 2, where many stations have the same value of uj (xj) owing to the selfishness of individual customers.

  6. The approach in this section was suggested by one of the referees of this paper.

  7. This definition of the user equilibrium with side constraints appears to be more straightforward than Definition (3.1) of Correa et al. (2004). This is the benefit of assuming a homogenous population of customers assigning probabilities to paths (rather than each customer choosing a path independently). This approach works for a model with multiple origin–destination pairs. We assume that customers sharing the same origin–destination pair are homogeneous and that they assign the same probabilies to the paths, so that the model variables are probabilities rather than flow volumes.

  8. If \(\mathcal {J}_{p}\) is defined by the set of all paths satisfying the priority pass constraint as \(\mathcal {J}_{p}=\{(P^{+},P^{-}):P^{+},P^{-}\in \mathcal {J},\)\(P^{+}\cap P^{-}=\varnothing ,\left \vert P^{+}\right \vert \leq F\}\), then (27) is not necessary. We define \(\mathcal {J}_{p}\) as above for the sake of relating the approach of this section and \(\mathcal {P}(F)\).

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Acknowledgements

The insightful and detailed comments of two referees are gratefully acknowledged. The revised paper has greatly benefited from their efforts. The authors thanks Tomohiro Shigemasa and Yutaka Toyoizumi for their helpful comments.

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Correspondence to Yasushi Masuda.

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The research of the first author is supported by JSPS KAKENHI 15K01203.

Appendix

Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1

The dual linear program to (1) is

$$\begin{array} [c]{rl} & \min\limits_{a,\boldsymbol{z}}Ha+\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{J}z_{j}\\ {\text{s.t.}} & t_{j}a+z_{j}\geq b_{j}-ct_{j},\quad j = 1,2,\ldots,J,\\ & a\geq0,\quad\boldsymbol{z}\geq\boldsymbol{0}. \end{array} $$

Note that x is optimal if and only if x is feasible and there exists a dual feasible solution (a, z) satisfying the complementarity condition, i.e., \(a\cdot \left ({\sum }_{j = 1}^{J}t_{j}x_{j}-H\right ) = 0\), zj (1 − xj) = 0 and xj (tja + zj − (bjctj)) = 0. This is equivalent to the condition of the lemma. □

Proof of Theorem 1

Let xB (T(x)). Then, from Lemma 1, x is a feasible solution of (1), and there exists a ≥ 0 such that the complementarity condition and (3) hold true. To show that x = x(a) holds, we will prove that (a) uj (0) ≤ axj = 0; (b)\(u_{j}(1)<a<u_{j}(0)\Rightarrow x_{j}=u_{j}^{-1}(a)\); and (c) uj (1) ≥ axj = 1. Suppose that (a) does not hold, so that uj (0) ≤ a and xj > 0. Lemma 1 and xj > 0 imply uj (xj) ≥ a. Since uj is strictly deceasing, uj (0) > a, contradiction. Thus, (a) holds. To prove (b), we note from Lemma 1 that uj (1) < a < uj (0) implies 0 < xj < 1(otherwise,xj = 0 or 1, which implies uj (0) ≤ a or uj (1) ≥ a, contradiction). This in turn implies from Lemma 1 that uj (xj) = a. To prove (c), suppose otherwise, i.e., uj (1) ≥ a and xj < 1. Lemma 1 and xj < 1 implies uj (xj) ≤ a, so that uj (1) < a, contradiction. To prove the converse of Theorem 1, we will show that x = x(a) satisfies (a) xj = 0 ⇒ uj (xj) ≤ a; (b) 0 < xj < 1 ⇒ uj (xj) = a; and (c) xj = 1 ⇒ uj (xj) ≥ a. To prove (a), suppose xj = 0 and uj (xj) > a. Since uj (0) > a, (5) implies xj (a) > 0, contradiction. To prove (b), suppose 0 < xj < 1 and uj (xj) ≠ a. Note that uj (xj) ≠ a and (5) imply xj = 0 or 1, contradiction. To prove (c), suppose xj = 1 and uj (xj) < a. Thus, uj (1) < a, which implies xj (a) < 1 (see (5)), contradiction. □

Proof of Theorem 2

Let \(h(\boldsymbol {x})\equiv {\sum }_{j = 1}^{J}x_{j}T_{j}(x_{j})\). As h(x) and x(a) are increasing and nonincreasing, respectively, h(x(a)) is nonincreasing. Furthermore, for a large enough, x(a) = 0 so that h(x(a)) = 0. Hence, either (a)s there exists \(\bar {a}>0\) such that \(h(\boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a}))=H\), or (b)h(x(a)) < H holds for all a > 0, but not both. We first examine Case (a). Let

$$S\equiv\{\bar{a}:\bar{a}>0,h(\boldsymbol{x}(\bar{a}))=H\}. $$

Suppose that S is a single ton with \(S=\{\bar {a}\}\). Then, \(\boldsymbol {x}=\boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a})\) satisfies (7), and no other x with x = x(a), a > 0, does. Note that x(0) is not an equilibrium because it does not satisfy the time constraint of (1). This completes the subcase of\(S=\{\bar {a}\}\). Suppose that S is not asingleton. As \(h(\boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a}))\) is constant over \(\bar {a}\in S\), x(a)is non increasing and h(x) is increasing, we conclude that \(\boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a})\) is constant over \(\bar {a}\in S\). Thus, \(\boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a})\), \(\bar {a}\in S\), is the only x with x = x(a), a > 0, satisfying (7).To show that x(0) is not another equilibrium, suppose contrarily that x(0),\(\boldsymbol {x}(0)\neq \boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a})\), \(\bar {a}\in S\), is an equilibrium. As h(x) and x(a) are increasing and non increasing, respectively, \(\boldsymbol {x}(0)\neq \boldsymbol {x}(\bar {a})\), \(\bar {a}\in S\), implies that \(H\geq h(\boldsymbol {x}(0))>h(\boldsymbol {x} (\bar {a}))=H\), which is a contradiction. Thus, x(0) is not an equilibrium. We next examine Case (b). In this case, a = 0 is the only way that (7) is satisfied. Clearly, (b) implies that h(x(0)) ≤ H. Thus, x(0) satisfies the constraint of (1). □

To prove Theorem 3, we require some mathematical tools.

Definition 1

A correspondence ϕ : X → 2Y is upper semicontinuous if for any sequence (xn), (yn) the conditions \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\boldsymbol {x}^{n}=\boldsymbol {x},\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\boldsymbol {y}^{n}=\boldsymbol {y},\boldsymbol {y}^{n} \in \phi (\boldsymbol {x}^{n})\) for all n imply that yϕ(x). ϕ is lower semicontinuous if \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\boldsymbol {x}^{n}=\boldsymbol {x}\,\) and yϕ(x) implies that there exists ynϕ(xn) such that \(\lim _{n\rightarrow \infty }\boldsymbol {y}_{n}=\boldsymbol {y}\). ϕ is continuous if it is both upper and lower semi continuous (see, e.g., Wets 1985).

Let Q be defined by the optimal value of a linear program as follows:

$$ Q(\boldsymbol{e})=\sup\{\boldsymbol{\gamma}\cdot\boldsymbol{x}:A\boldsymbol{x} \leq\boldsymbol{\beta},\boldsymbol{x}\geq0\} $$
(29)

where \(\boldsymbol {e}=(\boldsymbol {\gamma },A,\boldsymbol {\beta })\in {\mathbb {R}}^{n}\times {\mathbb {R}}^{m\times n}\times {\mathbb {R}}^{m}\) represents the parameters of the linear program. Let E = {e : − < Q(e) < }. Define the feasible regions of the primal and the dual programs as

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} K(\boldsymbol{e}) & =&\{\boldsymbol{x}:A\boldsymbol{x}\leq\boldsymbol{\beta },\text{ }\boldsymbol{x}\geq0\}, \end{array} $$
(30)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} D(\boldsymbol{e}) & =&\{\boldsymbol{y}:\boldsymbol{y}A\geq\boldsymbol{\gamma },\text{ }\boldsymbol{y}\geq0\}. \end{array} $$
(31)

Theorem 6

  1. 1.

    LeteE. If correspondencesK andD are continuous ate, thenQ is continuous ate (Wets 1985).

  2. 2.

    IfintK(e) ≠ for alleEand no row of (A, β) is identically0for alleE, thenK is continuous onE. Similarly, ifintD(e) ≠ ∅ for alleEand no column of\(\binom {A}{\boldsymbol {\gamma }}\)isidentically0for alleE, thenD is continuous on E (Wets 1985).

  3. 3.

    Ifϕ1 : X → 2Yandϕ2 : Y → 2Zare upper semicontinuous andY is compact, then the compositecorrespondence\(\phi (\boldsymbol {x})=\bigcup \{\phi _{2}(\boldsymbol {y}):{\boldsymbol {y}\in \phi _{1}(\boldsymbol {x})}\}\)isupper semicontinuous (Hogan 1973).

  4. 4.

    Let\(X\subset {\mathbb {R}}^{n}\)bea compact and convex set, and letϕ : X → 2Xbe an upper semicontinuous correspondence such that the setϕ(x) ⊂ Xis convex and nonempty for allxX. Thenϕhas a fixed point, i.e.,xϕ (x) (see, e.g., p.423 of Arrow and Hahn (1971)).

Let \(\hat {Q}(\boldsymbol {t})\) be the optimal value of problem P(t;F), t = (t+, t), in (16). Define

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} A & =&\left( \begin{array} [c]{cc} \begin{array} [c]{cccc} t_{1}^{+} & t_{2}^{+} & {\cdots} & t_{J}^{+}\\ 1 & 1 & {\cdots} & 1 \end{array} &\begin{array} [c]{cccc} t_{1}^{-} & t_{2}^{-} & {\cdots} & t_{J}^{-}\\ 0 & 0 & {\cdots} & 0 \end{array} \\ \boldsymbol{I} & \boldsymbol{I} \end{array} \right) , \end{array} $$
(32)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \boldsymbol{\beta} & =&(H,F,1,1,\ldots,1)^{T}\in{\mathbb{R}}^{2+J} , \end{array} $$
(33)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \boldsymbol{\gamma} & =&(b_{1}-ct_{1}^{+},\ldots,b_{J}-ct_{J}^{+} ,b_{1}-ct_{1}^{-},\ldots,b_{J}-ct_{J}^{-}) \end{array} $$
(34)

where I is an identity matrix of order J. Then, the feasible region \(\hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\) of (16) and the feasible region \(\hat {D}(\boldsymbol {t})\) of its dual are given by

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \hat{K}(\boldsymbol{t}) & =&\{\boldsymbol{x}\in{\mathbb{R}}^{2J} :A\boldsymbol{x}\leq\boldsymbol{\beta},\text{ }\boldsymbol{x}\geq0\},\\ \hat{D}(\boldsymbol{t}) & =&\{\boldsymbol{y}\in{\mathbb{R}}^{2+J} :\boldsymbol{y}A\geq\boldsymbol{\gamma},\text{ }\boldsymbol{y}\geq0\}. \end{array} $$

As \(\hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\) is compact and nonempty, linear program (16) has an optimal solution for all \(\boldsymbol {t}\in {\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{2J}\) where \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}=[0,\infty )\). Thus, P(t;F)≠ for all \(\boldsymbol {t}\in {\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{2J}\).

Lemma 2

Suppose thatF > 0 . Then, (a) correspondences\(\hat {K}\)and\(\hat {D}\)arecontinuous, (b) function\(\hat {Q}\)iscontinuous, and (c) correspondenceP(t;F)is upper semicontinuous with respect tot = (t+, t).

Proof

For a sufficiently small ε > 0, \(\boldsymbol {x}^{\ast } =(\varepsilon ,\varepsilon ,\ldots ,\varepsilon )\in {\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{2J}\) is an interior point \(\hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\). Equations (32) and (33) show that no row of (A, β) is 0. Thus, the conditions of Theorem 6 (2) are met for \(\hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\). Similarly, \(\hat {D}(\boldsymbol {t})\) too satisfies the conditions of Theorem 6 (2). Thus, \(\hat {K}\) and \(\hat {D}\) are continuous on \({\mathbb {R}}_{+}^{2J}\), proving (a). Part (b) follows from part (a) and Theorem 6 (1). Clearly, P(t; F) can be written as

$$P(\boldsymbol{t};F)=\{\boldsymbol{x}:\hat{Q}(\boldsymbol{t})=\pi (\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{t}),\boldsymbol{x}\in\hat{K}(\boldsymbol{t})\} $$

where

$$\pi(\boldsymbol{x},\boldsymbol{t})=\sum\limits_{j = 1}^{J}(b_{j}-ct_{j}^{+})x_{j} ^{+}+(b_{j}-ct_{j}^{-})x_{j}^{-}. $$

Let tnt, xnx as n and xnP(tn; F). Then, \(\hat {Q}(\boldsymbol {t}^{n} )=\pi (\boldsymbol {x}^{n},\boldsymbol {t}^{n})\) and \(\boldsymbol {x}^{n}\in \hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t}^{n})\). Since \(\hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\) and \(\hat {Q}(\boldsymbol {t})\) are continuous from Parts (a) and (b), \(\hat {Q}(\boldsymbol {t})=\pi (\boldsymbol {x},\boldsymbol {t}),\)\(\boldsymbol {x} \in \hat {K}(\boldsymbol {t})\), so that xP(t; F) holds true, proving that P(t; F) is upper semi continuous in t. □

Proof of Theorem 3

If F = 0, then Theorem 2 can be invoked. So, suppose F > 0. Define

$$\bar{T}_{j}^{k}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})=\min\{{T_{j}^{k}}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j} ^{-}),H+\varepsilon\},\quad k=+,-,j = 1,2,\ldots,J $$

where ε > 0 is arbitrarily fixed. Clearly, the equilibrium set \(\mathcal {P}(F)\) remains the same (regardless of whether \(\mathcal {P}(F)\) is empty or not) after replacing \({T_{j}^{k}}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})\) with \(\bar {T}_{j}^{k}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})\). Define a function \(\boldsymbol {\bar {T}}_{p}:[0,1]^{2J}\rightarrow \lbrack 0,H+\varepsilon ]^{2J}\) by \(\boldsymbol {\bar {T}}_{p}(\boldsymbol {x}^{+},\boldsymbol {x}^{-})=((\bar {T}_{j}^{+}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})),(\bar {T}_{j}^{-}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-}))\). We note that the range of \(\boldsymbol {\bar {T}}_{p}\) is compact. Hence, from Theorem 6 (3) and Lemma 2, the composite correspondence \(P(\boldsymbol {\bar {T}}_{p}(\cdot );F):[0,1]^{J}\rightarrow 2^{[0,1]^{J}}\) is upper semi continuous. Thus, using Theorem 6 (4) we see that correspondence\(P(\boldsymbol {\bar {T} }_{p}(\cdot );F)\) hasa fixed point. □

We need a lemma to prove Theorem 5, which is a direct consequence of the duality condition of (16).

Lemma 3

Let\(\boldsymbol {x}=(\boldsymbol {x}^{+} ,\boldsymbol {x}^{-})\in \mathcal {P}(F)\)andleta be the dual variable associated with the time constraint of linear programP(Tp (x+, x); F). Then,

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} x_{j}^{+}<1,x_{j}^{-}= 0\quad\Rightarrow\quad u_{j}^{-}(x_{j}^{+},0)\leq a \end{array} $$
(35)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} x_{j}^{+}+x_{j}^{-}<1,0<x_{j}^{-}\quad\Rightarrow\quad u_{j}^{-}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})=a \end{array} $$
(36)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} x_{j}^{+}+x_{j}^{-}= 1,0<x_{j}^{-}\quad\Rightarrow\quad u_{j}^{-}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})\geq a \end{array} $$
(37)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} 0<x_{j}^{+}\quad\Rightarrow\quad u_{j}^{+}(x_{j}^{+},x_{j}^{-})\geq a \end{array} $$
(38)

Proof of Theorem 5

  1. (Part 1)

    Let \(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}\) and \((\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{+},\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{-})\) be the equilibria of \(\mathcal {B}\) and \(\mathcal {P}(F)\), respectively. We prove that

    $$ (b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{+} +(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{-}\geq (b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar{x}_{j}))\bar{x}_{j} $$
    (39)

    for each j. Since the time constraint is not binding,\(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}} \) is an equilibrium of \(\mathcal {B}\) if and only if (18) holds true for every j. Similarly, the equilibrium \((\boldsymbol {\bar {x} }^{+},\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{-})\) satisfies the conditions in Lemma 3 with a = 0. Based on \(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{+}\), we consider twocases of attraction j: (a) \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 0\); (b) \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}>0\). Suppose that (a) is the case. Consider the following subcases: (a-1)\(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 0\); (a-2)\(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\in (0,1)\); (a-3)\(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 1\). In subcase(a-1) \([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 0,\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 0]\), (13), (35) and the continuity of the congestion function simply

    $$0\geq b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(0,0)=b_{j}-cT_{j}(0). $$

    Thus, if xj > 0, then bjcTj (xj) <  0 sinceTj is increasing. Hence, we see from (18) that \(\bar {x}_{j}= 0 \). We now see that both sides of (39) are zero and that (39) holds. Consider subcase (a-2) \([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 0,\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\in (0,1)]\). Equations (36) and (13) imply that

    $$0=b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(0,\bar{x}_{j}^{-})=b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar{x}_{j}^{-}). $$

    Hence, from (18) and the monotonicity ofTjwe see that\(\bar {x}_{j}=\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\). (To see why, assume that \(\bar {x}_{j} >\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\) holds. Then, \(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar {x}_{j})<0\), which implies \(\bar {x}_{j}= 0\) from (18). This contradicts \(\bar {x}_{j}>\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\). A similar contradiction is obtained if we assume that \(\bar {x}_{j}<\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\).) Thus, (39) holds.Consider subcase (a-3) \([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 0,\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 1]\). In a similar manner, one has from (37) and (13) that

    $$0\leq b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(0,1)=b_{j}-cT_{j}(1). $$

    Thus, using (18) again, we have \(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\). Hence (39) holds. Next suppose that (b) is the case. We examine the following subcases inturn: (b-1) \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 1\); (b-2) \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}<1,\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 1\); (b-3)\(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}<1\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 0\); and (b-4) \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}<1\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}>0\). For subcase(b-1) \([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 1]\), it follows from (38) and (13) that

    $$0\leq b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(1,0)=b_{j}-cT_{j}(1). $$

    Thus from (18) we see that \(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\) (otherwise it contradicts the monotonicity of Tj).Hence, (39) holds with equality. For subcase (b-2) \([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\in (0,1),\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 1]\),

    $$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} T_{j}(1) & =&\bar{x}_{j}^{+}T_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-} )+\bar{x}_{j}^{-}T_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-})\\ & <&\bar{x}_{j}^{+}T_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-})+\bar{x}_{j} ^{-}T_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-})\\ & =&T_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}) \end{array} $$

    where the first equality follows from (13) and the inequality follows from \(x_{j}^{+}>0\) and (14). Thus, from (37)

    $$0\leq b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-})<b_{j}-cT_{j}(1). $$

    Using the same argumentas above, \(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\) and(39) follows. Consider subcase (b-3)\([\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\in (0,1)\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 0]\). Suppose that \(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},0)<0\) holds. Then, (38) implies \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}= 0\). Contradiction, i.e., \(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},0)<0\) does not arise. Next suppose that \(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},0)= 0\) holds. Then, \(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+})= 0\) follows, which together with (18) implies that \(\bar {x}_{j}\in (0,1)\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}=\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\). This implies (39). Next suppose that \(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},0)>0\) holds. Then, one has \(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+})>0\), and thus from (18), \(\bar {x}_{j}>\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\) follows (otherwise, \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\geq \bar {x}_{j}\), which implies \(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar {x}_{j})>0\), thus \(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\). This contradicts \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}<1\)). Since \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\in (0,1)\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}-\bar {x}_{j}^{+}>0\), it follows from (15) and (35) that

    $$ b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+})<b_{j}-cT_{j} ^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},0)\leq0. $$
    (40)

    Thus, using \(\bar {x}_{j}^{-}= 0\), (15) and (40), we see that

    $$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} && (b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{+} +(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{-}\\ & =&(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j} ^{+}\\ & \geq&(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+}))\bar {x}_{j}^{+}\\ & >&(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+}))\bar{x}_{j}^{+}+(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+} ))(\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+})\\ & =&(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar{x}_{j}))\bar{x}_{j} \end{array} $$
    (41)

    Hence, (39) holds true with strict inequality. Consider subcase (b-4) \([0<\bar {x}_{j}^{+},0<\bar {x}_{j}^{-},\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}<1]\). From (36) and (14), one seesthat

    $$0=b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-})<b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}). $$

    Thus, \(b_{j}-c(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-})T_{j}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-})>0\). Hence, from (18),\(\bar {x}_{j}>\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\) (otherwise, \(b_{j}-c\bar {x}_{j}T_{j}(\bar {x}_{j})>0 \) holds true, so that \(\bar {x}_{j}= 1\), which contradicts \(\bar {x} _{j}\leq \bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}<1\)). We note from (15) and (36) that \(\bar {x}_{j}-\bar {x}_{j}^{+}>\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\) and \((b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},\bar {x}_{j}-\bar {x}_{j}^{+}))<b_{j} -cT_{j}^{-}(\bar {x}_{j}^{+},\bar {x}_{j}^{-})= 0\). Thus,

    $$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} & &(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{+} +(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}^{-}))\bar{x}_{j}^{-}\\ & >&(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{+}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+}))\bar{x}_{j}^{+}+(b_{j}-cT_{j}^{-}(\bar{x}_{j}^{+},\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+} ))(\bar{x}_{j}-\bar{x}_{j}^{+})\\ & =&(b_{j}-cT_{j}(\bar{x}_{j}))\bar{x}_{j}. \end{array} $$

    This implies that (39) is satisfied with strict inequality.

  2. (Part 2)

    If \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}>0\) and \(0<x_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}<1\), then station j satisfies either subcase (b-3) or (b-4) in Part 1. Hence,(39) holds true with strict inequality for station j. Other stations in \(\mathcal {P}(F)\) are at least as good as those in \(\mathcal {B}\), see Part 1. Thus, the statement follows.

  3. (Part 3)

    We note that \((\boldsymbol {0},\boldsymbol {\bar {x}})\in \mathcal {P} (0)\). Since we assumed that cTj (0) < bj for all j and there is no time constraint, we have \(\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}>\boldsymbol {0}\). Note that we assumed that \(\bar {x}_{j}<1\) for all j. For a sufficiently small F > 0, \((\boldsymbol {0},\boldsymbol {\bar {x}})\in \mathcal {P}(0)\) and \((\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{+},\boldsymbol {\bar {x}}^{-})\in \mathcal {P}(F)\) are close, so that \(0<\bar {x}_{j}^{-}\) and \(\bar {x}_{j}^{+}+\bar {x}_{j}^{-}<1\) for all j. Let \(\hat {\jmath }\) be the station that maximizes the attractiveness \(u_{j}^{+}(0,\bar {x}_{j})\). Then, the pare use dat \(\hat {\jmath }\) so that \(0<\bar {x}_{\hat {\jmath }}^{+}\). Thus, station \(\hat {\jmath }\) satisfiessubcase (b-4) in Part 1. The rest of the argument is same as Part 2.

Remark 1 (Numerical Evaluation of \(\mathcal {P}(F)\))

Let A, β and γ be as defined in (32) to (34). Then, linear program P(t+, t;F) is written as

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{x}}\boldsymbol{\gamma}\cdot\boldsymbol{x}\text{\quad s.t.\quad}A\boldsymbol{x}\leq\boldsymbol{\beta}\text{ and }\boldsymbol{x} \geq\boldsymbol{0} $$

where \(\boldsymbol {x}=\binom {\boldsymbol {x}^{+}}{\boldsymbol {x}^{-}} \in {\mathbb {R}}^{2J}\). Thus, from the complementary slackness theorem, x and \(\boldsymbol {y}\in {\mathbb {R}}^{2+J}\) are the optimal solutions of (16) and its dual program, respectively, if and only if they satisfy the complementarity condition and the feasibility condition (see, e.g., Chvatal 1983), i.e.,

$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} & \left\{ \begin{array} [c]{c} \left( \boldsymbol{\beta}-A\boldsymbol{x}\right)^{T}\boldsymbol{y}= 0,\\ \left( \boldsymbol{\gamma}-\boldsymbol{y}A\right) \boldsymbol{x}= 0, \end{array} \right. \end{array} $$
(42)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} & \left\{ \begin{array} [c]{c} A\boldsymbol{x}\leq\boldsymbol{\beta},\quad\\ \boldsymbol{y}A\geq\boldsymbol{\gamma},\quad \end{array} \right. \end{array} $$
(43)
$$\begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} & \left. \boldsymbol{x}\geq\boldsymbol{0},\boldsymbol{y}\geq\boldsymbol{0} .\right. \end{array} $$
(44)

Hence, the equilibria \(\mathcal {P}(F)\) can be evaluated by solving (42) to (44) with (t+, t) = Tp (x+, x) with respect to x, y, and (t+, t). For numerical computation, we examine all possible cases of which constraints are binding and non-binding in (43). To be more specific, we follow the following procedure. Denote the set of inequalities (43) by T.

  1. 1.

    Generate the power set \(\mathcal {T}\) of the set T of the inequalities. For each \(S\in \mathcal {T}\), repeat the following three steps.

  2. 2.

    Replace each inequality in S by an equality. Denote the resulting equality constraints by SE. If the dual variable yk is associated with an inequality constraint in TS, then set yk = 0. Similarly, if the primal variable \(x_{j}^{+}\) (\(x_{j}^{-}\)) is associated with an inequality constraint in TS, then set \(x_{j}^{+}= 0\) (\(x_{j}^{-}= 0\)).

  3. 3.

    Solve the system of equations consisting of SE and (t+, t) = Tp (x+, x) with respect to (t+, t), x and y (excluding those \(x_{j}^{\pm }\) and yk set to zero in Step 2 where \(\boldsymbol {x}=\binom {\boldsymbol {x}^{+} }{\boldsymbol {x}^{-}}\).

  4. 4.

    Check if the solution satisfies the inequality constraints TS and the nonnegativity condition. If it does, then the solution is an equilibrium.

The numerical experiments in Section 4 are implemented using Mathematica 10. The system of equations in Step 3 is solved by NSolve of Mathematica. When the number of stations is large, this procedure suffers a combinatorial explosion, so that a more sophisticated method would be necessary.

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Masuda, Y., Tsuji, A. Congestion Control for a System with Parallel Stations and Homogeneous Customers Using Priority Passes. Netw Spat Econ 19, 293–318 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11067-018-9396-z

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