Abstract
The topic of the present reflection is Christian religious belief. Specifically, we will use Husserlian tools in order to examine the positional nature of this particular type of belief. We will be less interested in the question concerning the success conditions of this experience and more in its noetic structure. According to our proposal, to believe by faith supposes (although it is not exhausted by) accepting the existence of mundane evidence speaking against this fundamental belief. The believer acknowledges the existence of this contradicting en-doxical basis and nevertheless believes what she believes. We will refer to this simultaneous movement of accepting and cancelling as the concessive structure of the religious attitude. The para-doxical movement of experiencing conflicting evidence as being subjectively ineffective is a key component of this attitude. At least some inchoative conflict with the world is required in order for the religious belief to be religious. Lastly, we will try to show that, with a distinctive terminology, the idea that the Christian religious attitude involves a conflict between subjectivity and world is present not only in Kierkegaard but also in phenomenological figures like Scheler and even Husserl.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This article is the result of the joint research project nr. 61559-17, “On the Rational Justification of the Belief in the Existence of God: Contributions to Reformed Epistemology from a Phenomenological Perspective.” The study was funded by the John Templeton Foundation initiative, Supporting Constructive Research on the Existence of God in Spanish-Speaking Latin America, Grant ID: 61559. Partial financial support was received from the Institute of Theology and Religious Studies (ITER) of University Alberto Hurtado (Chile). We are especially grateful to Luis Rabanaque for discussing with us at length the matters we address in this study, and for the suggestion of some helpful technical terminology. We are also indebted to Zachary Hugo and Timothy Franz for the stylistic revision of the manuscript and the translation of some passages from the German. Lastly, we thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive objections.
The list can be confidently expanded to Unamuno.
Scheler (1957, p. 246).
In what follows, references to the English translations of Husserl, Scheler, Schleiermacher, and Pfänder are provided within square brackets only when those translations do not incorporate the original pagination in German (e.g., Scheler 1954/2010, p. 262 [268]). References to Descartes are abbreviated as AT, according to the Adam and Tannery edition; followed after a semicolon by the reference to The philosophical writings of Descartes, abbreviated as CSM (e.g., AT VI: 22; CSMI, p. 122). References to Kierkegaard, Dufrenne, Ingarden, and Merleau-Ponty (1968) are to the English translations.
Husserl (2014, p. 186). Now, although Husserl openly admits the existence of a conflict between faith and doxa—or heart (Herz) and understanding (Verstand)—it would be unfair to reduce his position to this negative characterization. In effect, he emphatically distinguishes between intellectual faith (Verstandesglaube) and rational faith (vernünftiger Glaube). Vernunft is a higher, integrative form of rationality which incorporates axiological, intellective, practical, and religious validities. Therefore, the conflict between heart and understanding is internal to the realm of Vernunft and it does not exhaust religious existence. For our purposes, the central point is that Husserl, like Scheler and Kierkegaard, highlights the existence of a polemical component within the complexity of the religious noesis. Cf. Husserl (2014, pp. 178, 193, 242).
Kierkegaard (1998c, p. 10).
Cf. Husserl: “Um an mich und mein wahres Ich und an eine Entwicklung darauf hin glauben zu können, muss ich an Gott glauben” (2014, p. 255).
Cf. Kierkegaard (1998, p. 38).
To the best of our knowledge, the convergence between Scheler, Husserl and Kierkegaard on the detection of this polemical component of the religious noesis (which we call religious concessivity) has not been treated in the specialized literature.
Scheler (1957, p. 242).
See for this Stavenhagen (1925, pp. 218–219).
See Reinach (1989 2, p. 611), Stein (1962, pp. 185–192), and Ricoeur (1983; 1990, pp. 32–34). The references to Ricoeur are due to Walton (2004). For further elaborations of the distinction between the non-propositional “belief in” and the propositional “belief that,” in connection with the cited authors, see Mulligan (2013), pp. 118ff.
Scheler (1954/2010, p. 262 [268]).
Cf. Scheler (1957, p. 246).
See for this Husserl (1999, pp. 93–112).
Husserl (1999, p. 110). We follow also Mulligan (2013), p. 119.
Cf. Husserl (2002, pp. 193–196; 177–182).
On the following characterization of the phenomenological concept of attitude, we are in debt with Rabanaque (2011).
Husserl (1976b, p. 326 [280]).
See Gurwitsch (2009, pp. 164 ff.).
The first example is due to Dufrenne (1973, p. 86).
We follow here Carr (1974, p. 21).
Husserl (1976b, p. 141 [138]; author’s footnote).
Cf. Dufrenne (1973, p. lxv).
Scheler (1954/2010, p. 246 [252]).
The expression is due to Ingarden (1973).
The idea of a fundamental religious disposition that can be concretized or embodied by derivative acts can also be found in Reinach’s notes on religious experience. According to this author, position-takings (Stellungnahmen) such as gratitude and concrete trust (konkretes Vertrauen) constitute derivative experiences (derivative Erlebnisse) which are grounded on fundamental experiences (Grunderlebnisse), such as the feeling of absolute dependence purely and simply (Abhängigkeitsgefühl schlechthin) and the feeling of being-sheltered purely and simply (Geborgenheitsgefühl schlechthin) (Reinach 1989 2, pp. 610, 599–600). These fundamental dispositions have a horizonal structure. Their correlate is not an individual object or state of affairs but rather the world confronted in a certain way. This is why Husserl characterizes an attitude as a persistent style rather than as an act. Cf. Husserl (1976b, p. 326 [280]).
“Das Subjekt ist Subjekt von Stellungnahmen, vom Ich neu ausströmenden oder im schon eingebildeten, vom Objekt der Stellungnahme her als Charakter des Daseins, Wertseins, etc. passiv übernommen. Hier tritt der Begriff des Habitus auf. Das Ich hat die allgemeine Eigenheit, dass jede Stellungnahme einen Habitus stiftet. Das Ich hat in jedem Moment einen habituellen Bestand, als Bestand habitueller bestimmter Eigenheiten, die sein künftiges aktuelles Verhalten bestimmen. Das Ich hat einen entwickelten Charakter, der ein Habituelles in Bezug auf Stellungnehmen ist” (Ms A VI 21, p. 23a).
Taylor (1989, p. 29).
Cf. Husserl (1976a, p. 62).
See again Carr (1974, p. 21).
Husserl (2008, pp. 256–257).
Cited in Bruzina (1995, p. lii).
Scheler (1957, p. 246).
Scheler (1957, p. 246).
We follow here Pfänder’s characterization of the syntactical function of “purely functioning concepts” such as “though” (zwar) and “although/albeit” (obgleich). These syncategorematic units are characterized by the fact that they simultaneously concede and contradict (zugleich einräumenden und entgegensetzenden) (2000/2009, pp. 159 [179] and 163 [183]; emphasis added).
The expression “Rechtsgrund” as a way to characterize the experiential legitimation of beliefs is Husserl’s. See Husserl (2002, p. 194).
Scheler (1957, pp. 241; 244; 246).
Scheler (1957, p. 246).
We are thinking, specifically, in Kierkegaard and Unamuno. See in particular Unamuno (2020b, pp. 624–628; 2020a, pp. 434–447).
Kierkegaard goes as far as saying that “it is by way of the objective repulsion that the absurd is the dynamometer of faith in inwardness” (1992, pp. 210–211).
Fabro (2020, p. 87).
Scheler (1957, p. 244).
Scheler (1957, p. 244).
Cf. Husserl (2014, pp. 186–187).
Husserl (2014, p. 193).
Husserl (2014, pp. 186–187).
Husserl (2014, p. 186).
A structurally equivalent claim can be found in Stein (1962, p. 190): “Es gibt Akte, die, obwohl sie den belief-Charakter an sich tragen, doch einer Entkräftung fähig sind […] Der Erfahrungsglaube ist kein endgültiger und unwandelbarer, kein absoluter. Der Glaube an Gott hat diese Absolutheit. Wir können ihn verlieren, aber er kann sich nicht wandeln. Zweifel an Gott ist keine Modifikation der fides. Und streng genommen ist es kein korrekter Ausdruck.”
Husserl (2014, p. 186).
Husserl (2014, p. 186).
Cf. Scheler 1957, p. 246.
The above formulation of the self-corrective character of doxastic experience is due to Serban (2016, p. 90).
Husserl (1976b, p. 148 [146]).
We owe this lucid expression to Luis Rabanaque.
Merleau-Ponty (1968, p. 18).
The objection of fideism (i.e., the view that faith is openly irrational) is always latent, in particular in a reflection like this, which focuses on the examination of a polemical moment of the Christian religious Einstellung. Briefly put, we believe that our position is not vulnerable to this objection both (i) for its limited scope, and (ii) for its limited claim. First, we have circumscribed our reflection to an analysis of a noetic moment of the religious attitude. By “moment” we understand a non-exhaustive aspect of an act or attitude. With this objective in mind, our central claim is that an essential (although not exhaustive) component of the religious “Glaube an” is a conflict between subjectivity and world. Formulated with a different terminology, this is a thesis that can be found in Husserl, Scheler, and Kierkegaard (e.g., the conflict between heart and Verstand in Husserl, the Glaubenstrotz in the face [gegen] of counterevidence in Scheler, the scandal to reason in Kierkegaard). That said, according to our proposal, the distinctive aspect of this conflicting moment of the religious noesis lies in the fact that it is a conflict with the world which does not imply a negation or evasion from the world. Following Pfänder (2000/2009, p. 163 [183]), this noetic movement of both accepting and cancelling is what we call concession. This leads back to the question of fideism. Thus formulated, we consider that our view is moderate enough as to not commit us to a fideistic position. From the claim that a (non-exhaustive) moment of the Christian attitude lies in the conflict with some sort of en-doxical basis (ethical or theoretical) it does not follow, from our point of view, that faith is irrational. The latter would be the case, plausibly, if faith were reduced to a mere rebellion against the evident. A different but related question is the perennial discussion of whether Kierkegaard is a fideist. Addressing this problem would exceed the limits of a systematically motivated reflection like this. Without hiding our preference for an anti-fideistic reading of Kierkegaard (faith is incomprehensible, yet not eo ipso irrational), we refer the reader to divergent interpretations on this matter, e.g., Fabro (2020, pp. 75–103); Amesbury (2022, par. 2.2.2); Sellés (2014, pp. 440–461).
We thank the anonymous reviewer for urging us to make a statement regarding this central point.
In the following line, the reference of “always in the wrong” is Kierkegaard 1980, p. 351
The expression “conative certainty” is due to Mulligan (2013, p. 119). We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this useful grammatical formulation of our claim.
In connection with this point, we consider that Anthony Steinbock is exactly right in his characterization of the moral emotion of hope as the experience of “not being self-grounding.” More specifically: “Hoping is a way of taking up a situation not only by being personally engaged, but by experiencing myself as not being sufficient to the situation or as not in control of the situation […] Therefore, no matter what the objective circumstances are, my hope implies that I am not ultimately in control of the situation, which is to say, I find myself reliant upon ‘something else’ (put most broadly) that is able to support or sustain the situation” (Steinbock 2014, p. 167; emphasis added).
Husserl (2014, p. 242).
Husserl (2014, p. 242). The whole passage reads: “Ich bin von Gott geleitet und fühle mich da in der Gotteskindschaft geborgen” (2014, p. 235). Cited in Walton (2022, p. 44). Similarly, for Reinach, the distinctive nature of religious belief is the feeling of absolute dependence purely and simply (Abhängigkeitsgefühl schlechthin) before God, which is prior to any reflection leading to a theoretical state of conviction about the corresponding state of affairs. He writes in his Aufzeichnungen on religious experience: “Ich erlebe meine absolute Abhängigkeit von Gott. Insofern ich selbst an dieser erlebten Beziehung beteiligt bin, steht der Sachverhalt nicht vor mir, sondern ich selbst erlebe mich in dieser Beziehung, die dann mir natürlich nicht gegenständlich sein kann […] Im Abhängigkeitserlebnis finde ich mich abhängig, ohne dass eine Reflexion nötig wäre, die ja auch nur zur Erkenntnis führen könnte, dass ich mich abhängig fühle” (1989 2, p. 611; emphasis added).
Schleiermacher (2003b, p. 193 [712–713]; emphasis added).
Schleiermacher (2003a, pp. 36, 39 [22, 24]).
Kierkegaard (1980, p. 40; emphasis added).
Steinbock, to whose analysis we are indebted, writes in connection with this point: “Hope can persist in the face of countervailing expectations, probability, and improbability. When it comes to the impossible, the latter is commuted and transformed as sustainable, and in this way, as liberation, a freeing from the impossible” (2014, p. 186).
Kierkegaard (1980, p. 40).
Kierkegaard (1983, 47; emphasis added).
Kierkegaard (1983, 46; emphasis added).
Unamuno (2020a, p. 498).
See for this Kierkegaard (1998a, p. 135, author’s footnote).
Kierkegaard (1980, p. 39; second emphasis added).
Kierkegaard (1980, p. 39; emphasis added).
Kierkegaard (1998c, p. 10; emphasis added).
We follow here, again, Steinbock’s lucid differentiation of hope from optimism. Cf. Steinbock (2014, pp. 164–165, 181–182).
Kierkegaard writes: “For without risk, no faith; the more risk, the more faith; the more objective reliability, the less inwardness (since inwardness is subjectivity); the less objective reliability, the deeper is the possible inwardness. When the paradox itself is the paradox, it thrusts away by virtue of the absurd, and the corresponding passion of inwardness is faith.” (1992, p. 209) Also: “If I am able to apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith” (Kierkegaard 1992, p. 204). A similar observation can be found in Schleiermacher (2003a, p. 28 [14–15]).
The expression is due to Merleau-Ponty (1992, p. 167).
Kierkegaard (1998b, p. 183; emphasis added).
Or Hypothesis, in Peirce’s early terminology.
Peirce (1998, p. 216; 1992, p. 189). He offers an illustrative example of abductive reasoning: “Fossils are found; say, remains like those of fishes, but far in the interior of the country. To explain the phenomenon, we suppose the sea once washed over this land. This is another hypothesis.” (1992, p. 189).
See Kierkegaard: “[A]ll is lost only when one thinks that there is no paradox or only to a certain degree” (1992, p. 226).
This play of words is due to Rescher (2003, p. 403), although in an entirely different context.
See Stavenhagen (1925, p. 52).
Kierkegaard (1998b, p. 184).
Kierkegaard (1998a, p. 143; emphasis added).
See also Kierkegaard (1998a, pp. 41; 103–111).
Scheler (1954/2010, p. 147 [151]).
Kierkegaard (1992, p. 233).
See Rhet. 1385b13-16; 1386b8-15; and AT XI: 475; CSMI, pp. 397–398.
Kierkegaard (1983, p. 60).
We owe this lucid observation to one of the anonymous reviewers.
Husserl (2002, p. 178).
Husserl (2008, p. 231).
Cf. AT VI: 22; CSMI, p. 122. The contrast with Descartes in this respect is noted in Unamuno (2020a, p. 434).
References
Ales Bello, Angela. 1985. Husserl. Sul problema di Dio. Rome: Studium.
Amesbury, Richard. 2022. Fideism. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/fideism/.
Aristotle. 1959. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica, ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (= Rhet.).
Bruzina, Ronald. 1995. Translator’s introduction. In Sixth Cartesian meditation. The idea of a transcendental theory of method, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink. vii-xcii. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Carr, David. 1974. Phenomenology and the problem of history. A study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Descartes, René. 1985. The philosophical writings of Descartes, Vol. I, transl. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Di Meola, Claudio. 1998. Zur Definition einer logisch-semantischen Kategorie: Konzessivität als versteckte Kausalität. Linguistische Berichte 175: 329–349.
Dufrenne, Mikel. 1973. The phenomenology of aesthetic experience, transl. Edward Casey. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Fabro, Cornelio. 2020. Selected works of Cornelio Fabro. Vol. 2. Selected articles on Søren Kierkegaard, ed. Nathaniel Dreyer. Chillum: IVE Press.
Gurwitsch, Aaron. 2009. The collected works of Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973), Vol. I, ed. Jorge García-Gómez. Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, Edmund. 1976a. Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch, Husserliana III/1, ed. Karl Schuhman. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, Edmund. 1976b. Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana VI, ed. Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated in: Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy, transl. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1999. Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg: Meiner.
Husserl, Edmund. 2002. Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der ‘Logischen Untersuchungen’ (Sommer 1913), Husserliana XX/1, ed. Ulrich Melle. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, Edmund. 2004. Einleitung in die Ethik: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1924, Husserliana XXXVII, ed. Henning Peucker. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Husserl, Edmund. 2008. Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937), Husserliana XXXIX, ed. Rochus Sowa. Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, Edmund. 2014. Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie, Husserliana LXII, eds. Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr. Dordrecht: Springer.
Husserl, Edmund, and Fink, Eugen. 1988. VI Cartesianische Meditation. Teil 2: Ergänzungsband, Husserliana Dokumente II/2, ed. Guy van Kerckhoven. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Ingarden, Roman. 1973. The literary work of art. An investigation in the borderlines of ontology, logic and theory of literature, transl. George Grabowicz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1980. The sickness unto death. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. XIX, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1983. Fear and trembling. Repetition. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. VI, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1987. Either/Or. Part II. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. IV, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1992. Concluding unscientific postscript to Philosophical fragments. Vol. I. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. XII.1, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1998a. The book on Adler. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. XXIV, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1998b. The moment and Late writings. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. XXIII, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren. 1998c. The point of view. Kierkegaard’s writings, Vol. XXII, eds. and transl. Howard Hong and Edna Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Könnig, Ekkehard. 1991. Konzessive Konjunktionen. In Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft, eds. Hugo Steger and Herbert Wiegand. 631–639. Berlin: De Gruyter.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1945. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard. Translated in: Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2012. Phenomenology of perception, transl. Donald Landes. London: Routlege.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The visible and the invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, transl. Alphonse Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1992. Texts and dialogues, eds. Hugh Silvermann and James Barry, transl. Michael Smith. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
Moran, Dermot. 2009. The phenomenology of personhood. Charles Taylor and Edmund Husserl. Colloquium 3: 80–104.
Mulligan, Kevin. 2013. Acceptance, acknowledgment, affirmation, agreement, assertion, belief, certainty, conviction, denial, judgment, refusal and rejection. In Judgement and truth in early analytic philosophy and phenomenology, ed. Mark Textor. 97–136. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Peirce, Charles. 1992. The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings (1867–1893), Vol. I, eds. Nathan Houser and Christian Kloesel. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Peirce, Charles. 1998. The essential Peirce. Selected philosophical writings (1893–1913), Vol. II, ed. the Peirce Edition Project. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Pfänder, Alexander. 2000. Logik, ed. Mariano Crespo. Heidelberg: Winter Verlag. Translated in: Pfänder, Alexander, 2009. Logic, transl. Donald Ferrari. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
Rabanaque, Luis. 2011. Actitud natural y actitud fenomenológica. Sapientia 67: 147–164.
Reinach, Adolf. 1989. Sämtliche Werke. Two Vols, eds. Karl Schuhmman and Barry Smith. Munich: Philosophia Verlag.
Rescher, Nicholas. 2003. Imagining irreality. A study of unreal possibilities. Chicago: Open Court.
Rescher, Nicholas. 2007. Conditionals. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Ricoeur, Paul. 1990. Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Scheler, Max. 1954. Vom Ewigen im Menschen. In his Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 5, ed. Maria Scheler. Bern: Francke Verlag. Translated in: Scheler, Max. 2010. On the eternal in man, transl. Bernard Nobel. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Scheler, Max. 1957. Glauben als Aktart (“faith” und “belief”). In his Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 10, ed. Maria Scheler. 241–255. Bern: Francke Verlag.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2003a. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. I Abt. Band 13, 1. Der christliche Glaube. 2. Auflage (1830–1831), ed. Rolf Schäfer. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Translated in: Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2016. Christian Faith, Vol. I, ed. Catherine Kelsey and Terrence Tice. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2003b. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. I Abt. Band 13, 2. Der christliche Glaube. 2. Auflage (1830–1831), ed. Rolf Schäfer. Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. Translated in: Schleiermacher, Friedrich. 2016. Christian Faith. Vol 2, ed. Catherine Kelsey and Terrence Tice. Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press.
Sellés, Juan. 2014. La antropología de Kierkegaard. Pamplona: EUNSA.
Serban, Claudia. 2016. Phénoménologie de la possibilité: Husserl et Heidegger. Paris: PUF.
Stavenhagen, Kurt. 1925. Absolute Stellungnahmen. Eine ontologische Untersuchung über das Wessen der Religion. Erlangen: Verlag der Philosophischen Akademie.
Stein, Edith. 1962. Welt und Person. Beitrag zum christlichen Wahrheitsstreben. In Edith Steins Werke. Vol. VI, eds. Lucy Gelber and Romaeus Leuven. Louvain: Nauwelaerts.
Steinbock, Anthony. 2014. Moral emotions. Reclaiming the evidence of the heart. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Taylor, Charles. 1989. Sources of the self. The making of the modern identity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Unamuno, Miguel. 2020a. Del sentimiento trágico de la vida. In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida y otros ensayos. Barcelona: Penguin Random House.
Unamuno, Miguel. 2020b. La agonía del cristianismo. In Del sentimiento trágico de la vida y otros ensayos. Barcelona: Penguin Random House.
Vigo, Alejandro. 2021. Husserl y la fenomenología de la negación. Investigaciones fenomenológicas 16: 135–169.
Walton, Roberto. 2004. Glaube. In Wörterbuch der phänomenologischen Begriffe, ed. Helmut Vetter. 241. Hamburg: Meiner.
Walton, Roberto. 2022. Fenomenología, excedencia y horizonte teológico. Buenos Aires: SB Editorial.
Funding
This study is the result of the joint research project nr. 61559-17, “On the Rational Justification of the Belief in the Existence of God: Contributions to Reformed Epistemology from a Phenomenological Perspective.” The study was funded by the John Templeton Foundation initiative, Supporting Constructive Research on the Existence of God in Spanish-Speaking Latin America. Grant ID: 61559. Partial financial support was received from the Institute of Theology and Religious Studies of University Alberto Hurtado.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Contributions
The manuscript was written by the first author. Both authors contributed to the study in its conception, design, and the preparation of the relevant sources and materials. Both authors read, discussed and approved the final version of themanuscript
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher’s Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Vicuña, E., Rubio, R. Gottesglaube as Glaubenstrotz. The concessive structure of the Christian religious attitude. Cont Philos Rev (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09620-4
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-023-09620-4