Abstract
In this paper I construct a system of semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic based on epistemic norms governing belief expansion. Working in the AGM-framework of belief change, I give a generalisation of Gärdenfors’ notion of belief systems which can be defined without reference to a logical consequence operator by using a version of the Ramsey Test. These belief expansion systems can then be used to define epistemic models which are sound and complete for either classical or intuitionistic propositional logic depending on which of the two notions of epistemic validity, identified by Levi and Arló-Costa, is used. Finally, I offer a discussion on how these results can be understood as providing a model theory within the framework of logical expressivism.
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24 September 2023
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Dahl, N. From Epistemic Norms to Logical Rules: Epistemic Models for Logical Expressivists. J Philos Logic 52, 1517–1533 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09712-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-023-09712-9