Abstract
This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem which establishes several other philosophically interesting, though less controversial, barriers to logical consequence.
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Russell, G. How to Prove Hume’s Law. J Philos Logic 51, 603–632 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-021-09643-3