Introduction

The purpose of this Article is to examine the European Union’s external relations with the hypothetical mutant nation of Krakoa through the perspective of intellectual property and human rights filtered through a trade agreement between the parties.

In doing so, the potential trade agreement with Krakoa allows for the critical reflection of the scope and application of international intellectual property protection, enforcement, and development but also allows for challenges to this existing standard that are not possible elsewhere due to broader economic and political reasons. It discusses the progressive inclusion of TRIPS-Plus provisions in EU international agreements and how this sets the stage for this trade agreement. This paper identifies the extent to which the EU is seeking higher levels of intellectual property protection in the global sphere and discusses to what extent the use of TRIPS-Plus provisions has clashed with the objective of the promotion and protection of human rights in the EU external action.

This Article is divided into three parts, firstly outlining the scope and benefit of this study. In essence, what can be learned from a trade agreement between the EU and Krakoa? Secondly, this article examines the purpose and limitations of IP within trade agreements. In doing so, following a brief summary of IP at play, this looks at IP and human rights in conflict through trade, but also the linkage of IP and the dual objectives of trade. Throughout, this facilitates the question of how human rights concerns are balanced against intellectual property obligations. Finally, this Article turns to the inclusion of human rights clauses within the international trade history of the EU and some of the issues they face, which will then be transported to the IP-Human rights debate. This Article concludes with some comments on how such a trade agreement will impact future developments of the EU in this field.

Methodology and Scope

‘To me my X-men’. Often the rallying call of Prof. X to his students, followers, and soldiers but a phrase which takes a new meaning in the Krakoan Age. Rather, it now serves as a call for identity and extends the offer of Krakoan citizenship to mutants of the world. As such, this narrative pivot, allows the examination to shift from the X-men providing a stand-in for various forms of racism, bigotry, and discrimination,Footnote 1 to that of a hypothetical nation with pre-defined scope and agency. Thus, allowing the X-men comics to serve as a litmus test of various elements of international law.Footnote 2 In this connection, while Rev. Stryker asks if ‘[y]ou dare call that…thing…human?!?’, we must assume the broad scope of human rights applies to mutants with equal measure. To address the broader question of what it means to be human is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is sufficient to recall recent narrative developments,Footnote 3 external perspectives view both Homo Sapiens and Home Superior as human, save that one has an activated X-gene. Additionally, The UN Declaration on Human Genome and Human Rights offers some guidance from under Article 3 in relation to mutations and Article 6 regarding discrimination based on genetic characteristics.

In doing so, this continues to develop the concept where comics examine areas such as politics, sociology, philosophy, ethics, and of course law, which ‘have all positively engaged at some level with the medium’.Footnote 4 The law exists as a ‘dazzlingly complex array of social, cultural, linguistic, and normative practices’.Footnote 5 At the same time, ‘[l]iterature, it is said, sheds light on law’s gap, rhetoric, and moral stances. It elucidates law’s limits and highlights law’s exclusion. Interpretation methods conventionally applied to fictional texts can be applied productively to legal texts, and narrative techniques that draw readers into novels and plays can be employed in the service of legal arguments’.Footnote 6 By combining the two, through the prism of Krakoa, we can not only assess the impact and the influence of the EU’s ambitious and comprehensive trade agenda, but we can also account for the wider factors of the legal landscape without having to dwell on or mitigate elements from a self-made hypothetical. As, by and large, legal academics would not be as well versed in game theory, statecraft, sociology, or political studies to effectively create a fully-fledged hypothetical. That is not to say, the narrative writers would be either, but by removing the creation of the hypothetical study from the hands of those who seek to use it as a benchmark, this removes any bias or unintended weighting which may occur when operating in a vacuum.

Finally, the question of why Krakoa as a case study rather than Genosha or Wakanda. Unlike in such examples, we are given access to Krakoa in a more robust manner. Wakanda is famously closed off from the rest of the world, both metaphorically and in some cases physically, while Genosha was a mutant nation, little was discussed from the State’s perspective prior to its destruction. In essence, this approach permits the projection of the literature a the heart of the question from ‘the abstract into the concrete’.Footnote 7 In this connection, it has been argued that ‘law is inevitably a matter of language’ and in combination with literature, confront the ‘struggle over certain words or forms of representation’.Footnote 8 In addition, such an approach attempted to bring the divide where ‘[m]odern law is born in its separation from aesthetic considerations and the aspirations of literature and art, and a wall is built between the two … Art is assigned to imagination, creativity, and playfulness, law to control, discipline, and sobriety’.Footnote 9 Thus, the use of comics, ‘aims to engage more fully with text-image relationships, and the associated but more general relationships between the rational and aesthetic, in a legal context’.Footnote 10

What is Intellectual Property

This Article generally refers to IP and Intellectual Property Rights, including patents, trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), copyright, and traditional and genetic knowledge. In general, the overall aim of IP rights is that of protecting and facilitating ‘innovation’,Footnote 11 as many scholars have considered IP rights as ‘legal constructs which govern the use of information’.Footnote 12 While IP rights have a long and complex history within the spheres of international trade and politics, this has not be an equal focus between the various elements. While Copyright, Patents, and Trademarks, and to a lesser extent GIs, have been the focus of debate, the protection and scope of traditional and genetic knowledge has often been under-examined in law.Footnote 13 However, while the real world has seen some shifts in this,Footnote 14 when one factors in the nature of Krakoa, this will become a more contested area of exploitation. This was clearly illustrated in the theft of the Krakoa seeds by the Hordeiculture.Footnote 15 While this focused more on the ‘piracy’ aspect of biopiracy due to the nature of Krakoa, it nonetheless shows the underlying issue with the lack of protection at the international level, which in turn allows more traditional occurrences of biocolonialism.Footnote 16 Scholars have noted that Western-based industries, through the use of patents, have economically exploited indigenous cultural production.Footnote 17 This has been well noted in the free-riding or appropriation of traditional knowledge by pharmaceutical industries, which has additional drawbacks as indigenous peoples do not share in the technological and medical benefits arising from such exploitation.Footnote 18

Aside from the more primary purpose of protecting and promoting ‘innovation’ in an overarching sense, IP rights are also territorial in nature, i.e. they confer protection on the rightsholder in a particular territory, and they are exclusive, i.e. they give monopoly protection (provided that there are no adequate substitute technologies that might preserve the possibility of competition), for a limited period of time. This territorial nature of IP rights is inextricably linked to the fact that IP law has generally been created along national lines and drafted at the national level (albeit deeply influenced by international law, including the WIPO conventions and the WTO’s and TRIPS). In this connection, the ‘lack of understandings between Northern, industrialised countries and least developing countries has lead, in large part, to the exclusion of moral and philosophical views of holders of TK or the ultization of plants’.Footnote 19 Torsen arguments that IP systems of the past and present are a poor fit for the task of protecting cultural elements associated with indigenous people.Footnote 20 Coombe goes so far as to accuse Developed Nations ‘of having an inappropriate individual bias towards a Eurocentric model of the author, being predominate market-orientated, and unduly emphasising or enabling the privatisation of knowledge with respect to resources’.Footnote 21 As such, Krakoa exists as a functional case study, as it possesses both the economic ability to push against such norms. However, a purely economic analysis would be inappropriate to do so. Thus, we must examine where IP and Human rights coexist (if at all possible) and how this possibility may be further expanded or developed going forward.

IP, Human Rights, and Trade in Conflict

In this connection, scholars argued that this new conflict was inherently stemming from the different nature of the IP and human rights systems.Footnote 22 This conflict can be largely attributed to the expansion of IP protection under TRIPS on the one hand,Footnote 23 and the rise of the third generation of human rights on the other.Footnote 24 TRIPS, and later TRIPS-plus would then increased the tensions between IP regimes and other international regimes.Footnote 25 In part, a result of the increase of the scope of IP, but also the third generation of human rights also expanded in a comprehensive manner.Footnote 26 This was evident in the debate leading to UN Resolution 2000/7,Footnote 27 which provided a hard-line in the conflict between IP rights and human rights. This Resolution, while criticising the TRIPS-Plus agenda and the conflict it created,Footnote 28 also suggested that:

‘[g]overnments and national, regional, and international economic policy forums [need] to take international human rights obligations and principles fully into account in international economic policy formation’.Footnote 29

This mirrors the sentiments found within the subsequent General Comment No. 17 released by the CESR Committee. General Comment No. 17 stated that:

‘any intellectual property regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply with its core obligations in relation to health, food, education, especially, or any other right set out in the Covenant, is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations of the State party’.Footnote 30

The conflict between IP rights and human rights is complex, as is the debate surrounding it. This primarily relates to the obligation to balance IP protection with other interests was somewhat reflected in Article 7 of TRIPS.Footnote 31 However, this provision remains quite general in tone and does not endeavour to expand upon how to achieve this balance between competing rights. In 2005, the CESCR Committee in General Comment No. 17 tried to find such a balance.Footnote 32

A full discussion of this debate is far outside the scope of this paper. However, the use of a trade agreement between the EU and Krakoa as a case study allows a birds-eye view of the conflict that could be transplanted or extrapolated to the broader debate. Partly due to repeated conflicts of terms, the EU negotiating multiple agreements concurrently, and the attempts to standardise the terms across all of its trade policy. The interaction between IP and the right to health, the right to food, and the rights of indigenous peoples respectively remains quite controversial and is, to a certain extent, intertwined with the debate surrounding the principle of sustainable development.Footnote 33 Possibly the most contested overlap between IP protection and human rights is in the context of the right to health, and in particular, access to vital medicines.Footnote 34 Again, the narrative nature of Krakoa and its exportation of the ‘Miracle Drug’ as a core aspect of its trade policy shows the strength of this case study.

The recognition of the right to health has been formalised in a large body of international human rights conventions.Footnote 35 Article 12 of the ICESCR is the most prominent international provision to address the right to health explicitly.Footnote 36 Due to the controversies surrounding this provision, the CESR Committee adopted General Comment No 14 on the Right to Health in 2000,Footnote 37 marking a significant turning point in the debate. Furthermore, it is essential to note that the Committee broadly interpreted the right to health,Footnote 38 which encompasses inter alia the right to access essential medicines. In that regard, the Committee stated that the ‘[f]unctioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State party’.Footnote 39 This expanded scope of the right to health has been present within Krakoa, in particular the access to programmes and facilities. This prominence and importance, as well as the actual engagement, places the question of the balance between the protection of IP and human rights at the forefront of discussions. In this respect, TRIPS was brought under the microscope as the main cause of limited access to medicines. Article 27(1) TRIPS requires ‘new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application’ for a patent to be granted, recognised, and protected, to be expanded beyond the tangible medical product but also to the overall pharmaceutical production process.Footnote 40 In the post-TRIPS era ‘so long as an invention meets the technical requirements of patentability, a patent must be granted for an innovative product, including a pharmaceutical compound, even if it would negatively impact the accessibility of drugs’.Footnote 41

Following the ‘global drug gap’,Footnote 42 where most of the pharmaceutical resources only supply developed nations,Footnote 43 the need to re-frame the patent debate away from its current IP (economic) dominated perspective to a human right perspective became all the more pressing. Efforts to address broader impact factors will, however, also be required, as simply:

‘removing the patent barrier will not miraculously produce access to medicines. There will still be the need for funding for drugs, for effective health systems, and for wise selection of medicines’.Footnote 44

IP and the Dual Objectives of Trade

At present, the EU is engaging in a variety of trade agreements with a growing number of trading partners, a common trend is that they all include strong trade components and IP provisions. At the same time, Krakoa, while illustrating its ability to be self-sufficinet in most instances, engages the global trade forum as a means to further its poltical objectives moreso than trade for the sake of development.Footnote 45 The negotiations processes are, in several cases, still open and subject to diverse and often competing political and economic trends in relation to IP matters.

In doing so, the EU operates from the TRIPS Agreement in providing standardization of terms for all Parties. However, the flaws inherent within the TRIPS Agreement quickly arose. This, in turn, led to calls for vast reform and disparaging comments regarding its suitable for use,as ‘market forces and technology have moved beyond [the then] current laws and are now in conflict with them’.Footnote 46 As such, we have and continue to see shifts to fill this void with the expanded use of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

In that connection, it is perhaps worth noting that such barriers can arise from the very nature of acknowledging IP, rights as is the very existence of attributing ownership and recourse to protect the exploitation by the rightful owners, which itself can be then seen as a restriction on trade. However, the progressive inclusion and expansion of IP-focused chapters within the various trade agreements can be seen as a trade-off as part of the negotiations between the parties. For the EU, this would be to further facilitate trade under an EU-led norm, while for Krakoa this would more related to further acceptance of its broader political agenda. To that effect, the expanded inclusion of such terms also illustrates that there is no one size fits all application of IP protection, mirroring many of the issues seen in relation to the negotiation of the TRIPS Agreement.

The conceptualisation of IP protection as a restriction on trade places IP as an ever-more salient and central feature within trade agreements, and as a result, a growing importance within the EU trade agenda. Furthermore, this expansion is seen as part of the increase in the strength afforded to IP enforcement provisions. For example, the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and South Korea,Footnote 47 obligates the party to ensure effective remedies to prevent and combat IP infringement. However, such sections are required to be interpreted in light of the obligations under Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. As such, where there is significant scope for human rights considerations, it would be more likely that Krakoa would push towards such a position rather than towards more restrictive IP rights.

While one can argue that increases in IP protection provisions would be a restriction on trade, IP can also serve as a mechanism or a tool to enhance trade. From this perspective, there is a strong economic argument that IP provisions and the increased scope and enforcement ability of such provisions contribute to innovation and economic growth through an increased flow of trade.Footnote 48 Broadly, this argument is centred on the idea that by providing ‘adequate and effective’ protection, the IP rightsholder would be incentivised to trade in the nation in particular or be willing to invest in the production of protected work.Footnote 49 Thus, IP provisions could be viewed as a strong incentive facilitating Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) at the global level.Footnote 50 While there is debate regarding the precise correlation of IP protection provisions and FDI, the majority of scholarship suggests that more substantial levels of IP protection encourage and facilitate trade-related investment.Footnote 51 As such, the expansion of IP protection serves to both enhance, while concurrently, restrict trade.Footnote 52 This dual nature can be seen to confirm and continue the ‘multifaceted and ambiguous’ relationship between international trade and IP protection.Footnote 53

Human Rights Clauses Within the European Union Trade Policy

At the same time the EU has vastly expanded its trade policy, objectives, and associated methodology to achieve these aims, the EU has also been systematically including human rights clauses and considerations within the trade agreements.Footnote 54 This has been in the broader sense of ensuring the reflection and recognition of human rights, but from an IP perspective, we’ve seen gradual inclusion as a strong aspect in the balancing equation, as touched on above.

There is no question that the EU exists with the power to regulate whatever arena it enters.Footnote 55 There is, however, a question over the precise level of this power and influence and in recent years the EU has gone from a leading figure,Footnote 56 to ‘emerging as a global rule-maker’.Footnote 57 Nonetheless, the ability to successfully and strongly shape international maters is seen as a central aspect of the EU’s presence.Footnote 58 This ability is often linked to the EU’s ‘goal achievement’ in the international sphere.Footnote 59 However, this itself is problematic in its use as this puts forward the claim that the EU is abusing its position by exporting its own values.

Through the Lomé Conventions and later in their successor, the Cotonou Agreement, the EU has a long and somewhat nebulous history regarding its engagement in a developmental framework with its African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) trading partners. The general nature of these human rights clauses relates to ‘a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions in support of which an international financial institution or other agency will provide specific amounts of financial assistance’.Footnote 60 However, the broader human rights clauses included in the Cotonou Agreement can be viewed as the EU extension of its ‘idea of human rights to international systems and has developed its external relations based on human rights’.Footnote 61 The introduction of the human rights clauses within the agreements is itself dependent on the power dynamics between the Parties, as is the actual enforcement of the clause. In this regard, Crawley and Blitz note that ‘the inclusion of a ‘human rights clause’ in the Cotonou Agreement is illustrative of the primary tool that the EU already has at its disposal to leverage improvements in access to international protection and human rights’.Footnote 62 However, the question of the mandatory nature of human rights clauses within agreements was not restricted to the negotiations with the ACP nations.Footnote 63 The inclusion of such right clauses was noted as a significant point of tension during the negotiations of trade agreements between the EU and Mexico, and more recently in relation to CETA. While this has been seen as an obstacle in negotiations, the mentality of the Krakoa state has been to not only accept the existing framework but to excel under it and to turn it to their advantage. Thus, unlike the ACP nations, Krakoa not only has the economic and political ability to trigger such clauses against the EU, Krakoa also has Magento.Footnote 64

There is significant criticism relating to the human rights clauses. One of, if not the most, levied grounds of criticism is that such clauses operate as an extension of neo-colonialism.Footnote 65 The criticism of neo-colonialism is centred on the role of the EU as an international actor, but also as an (arguably self-appointed) international mediator. The claim of neo-colonialism is further seen with the long-held criticism that the EU is seeking to export its rules concerning human rights issues.Footnote 66 This criticism connects well with the critical approach to the inclusion of IP protection as the imposition of ‘Western standards’. So, by rejecting human law, Krakoa appears to push back against this imposition. Or rather it would if addressed directly within the narrative. The claim of neo-colonialism, or at least the strong colonial undertones within the human rights clauses, is then linked to the question of the implementation and actual use of the clause.Footnote 67 This criticism focuses on the impact of the agreements on the receiving Parties,Footnote 68 primarily centring on the claim that the scope of protection and enforcement sought was ‘broad and asymmetrical’.Footnote 69

Conclusion

Following from, and in part as a result of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU has taken a more progressive and engaged approach to the recognition of human rights considerations within its external action policy. In doing so, this is reflective of the shifts within the EU, but the broader reflection of how the ‘growth in importance of human rights goes hand in hand with a rising consensus that the global economy needs to be regulated in a more balanced way in order to secure basic ethical principles and the most fundamental values of society’.Footnote 70

However, there remains a lingering question of how this balance is achieved, in particular within the context of IP rights as presented in this article. Over the last twenty-five years following the TRIPS agreements, the EU, with other developed nations have pushed IP ‘harmonisation forward at a pace that is greater than is apparently possible within the framework of the WTO’.Footnote 71 In doing so, the various trade-based agreements have only increased the EU’s position as a regulatory power and were further seen in the attempts by the EU to shape and dictate these preferences to its trading partners.

As a consequence, stemming from these developments, tensions between human rights and IP rights have emerged. Within many of the agreements in the years following TRIPS, the human rights clauses and the IP protection and enforcement measures were clearly separated. To the point that the human rights clauses were often mitigated or qualified under the notions of proportionality and balance, they would appear to satisfy an obligation rather than actively shape the following agreement. However, as the concept of human rights began to develop over the subsequent decades, its place within the discussions became more prominent. From this, we saw the explicit linkages with trade and IP obligations became evident that the various IP provisions were underpinned by the (economically motivated) political will to develop and expand IP protection within the trade relationship between the EU and Third Countries.

Within the context of a trade agreement with Krakoa, the EU would be facing a similar push towards a more balanced position between protecting human rights and intellectual property right, as seen in previous agreements with its South and Central American trading partners. While these agreements marked a highpoint for human rights in IP considerations, this was not as enthusiastically carried over to subsequent trade agreements. However, due to the nature of Krakoa and the rapid expansion of its international footprint, as well as the broad political and economic ability to back up its negotiations, we would see similar if not identical provisions requiring a stronger human rights aspect in IP in other agreements. As such, this gives rises to the potential that the EU and its future trading partners would be required to account for this new level going forward, thereby continuing the developments, and pushing them as the new norm. Thereby achieving a stronger and more present human right approach to IP protections in the international trade sphere, reflective of the often preamble but without the trade-mandated compromised, and further calling back to the attempts of previous agreements to introduce and continue to engage with a balance such as this.