Skip to main content
Log in

Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals

  • Published:
Law and Philosophy Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Caruso, Gregg. ‘Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior: A Public Health-Quarantine Model’, Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (1) (2016).

  • Hare, Richard. ‘Punishment and Retributive Justice’, in his Essays on Political Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

  • Hare, Rirchard M. ‘Some Reasoning about Preferences’, in his Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  • Hodgson, David. Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Levy, Neil. ‘Skepticism and Sanction: The Benefits of Rejecting Moral Responsibility’, Law and Philosophy 31 (2012): pp. 477–93.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, Derk. Living Without Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, Derk. Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pereboom, Derk. and Caruso, Gregg. (forthcoming). ‘Hard-Incompatiblism Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life’ in D. Caruso and O. Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Moral, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

  • Rawls, John. ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, in The Philosophy of Punishment, edited by H.B. Acton (London: Macmillan, 1969).

  • Smart, John J.C. in Smart and B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

  • Smilansky, Saul. ‘Utilitarianism and the ‘Punishment’ of the Innocent: The General Problem’, Analysis 50 (1990): pp. 256–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smilansky, Saul. ‘Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio’, Law and Philosophy 30 (2011): pp. 353–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Waller, Bruce. Against Moral Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Waller, Bruce. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015).

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Lemos.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Lemos, J. Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals. Law and Philos 35, 461–483 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9266-0

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9266-0

Navigation