Abstract
We show the existence of the Braess paradox for a traffic network with nonlinear dynamics described by the Lighthill–Whitham–Richards model for traffic flow. Furthermore, we show how one can employ control theory to avoid the paradox. The paper offers a general framework applicable to time-independent, uncongested flow on networks. These ideas are illustrated through examples.
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Notes
Throughout this paper, \(\mathbf {{C}^{k}} ([a,b];{{\mathbb {R}}}_+)\) denotes the set of functions defined on the real interval \([a,b]\), attaining values in \({{\mathbb {R}}}_+\) whose \(k\)th derivative is defined and continuous on \([a,b]\).
Also called average latency of the system or social cost of the network.
Also called social optimum for the system.
References
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Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by the Research Council of Norway and by the Fund for International Cooperation of the University of Brescia.
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The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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Communicated by Michael Patriksson.
Appendix: Technical Details
Appendix: Technical Details
Lemma 6.1
Let (q) hold. Then, the speed \(v = v (\rho )\), defined by
is well defined, continuous in \([0, \rho _m]\), strictly positive and weakly decreasing.
Proof
Continuity follows from l’Hôpital’s rule. Moreover,
The concavity of \(q\) implies that \(q' (0) \ge q (\rho )/\rho \ge q' (\rho )\). Hence, \(v' \le 0\). \(\square \)
Lemma 6.2
If (q) holds, the map \(\rho :\vartheta \mapsto \rho (\vartheta )\) with \(q\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) = \vartheta \varphi \) satisfies:
-
1.
\(\rho \in \mathbf {{C}^{2}} ([0,1]; [0,1])\) and \(\rho (0) = 0\);
-
2.
\(\rho ' (\vartheta ) > 0\) and \(\rho '' (\vartheta ) > 0\) for all \(\vartheta \in [0,1]\);
-
3.
if \(q\) is strictly convex, then \(\rho '' (\vartheta ) > 0\) for all \(\vartheta \in [0,1]\).
Proof
Existence and regularity of \(\rho \) are immediate. By (q) and \(q (\rho (\vartheta )) = \vartheta \, \varphi \), it follows that \(\rho (0) = 0, \,\rho ' (\vartheta ) = \frac{\varphi }{q'\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) } > 0\) and \(\rho '' (\vartheta ) = - \frac{\varphi ^2 \, q''\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) }{\left( q'\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) \right) ^3} \ge 0\), and the latter inequality is strict as soon as \(q\) is strictly convex. \(\square \)
Lemma 6.3
Let (q) hold. Then, the map \(\vartheta \mapsto 1/v\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) \) is weakly increasing. If, moreover, \(q''' (\rho ) \le 0\) for \(\rho \in [0,1]\), then the map \(\vartheta \mapsto 1/v\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) \) is convex.
Proof
We find \(\frac{\mathrm {d}}{\mathrm {d}\vartheta } \left( \frac{1}{v\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) }\right) = - \frac{v'\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) \, \rho ' (\vartheta )}{\left( v\left( \rho (\vartheta )\right) \right) ^2} \ge 0\). Moreover,
Call \(f (\rho ) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{q(\rho )}{q'(\rho )}\right) ^2 q''(\rho ) + q(\rho ) - \rho \, q'(\rho )\). Observe that \(f (0) = 0\) and
thereby completing the proof. \(\square \)
Asking \(q''' (\rho ) \le 0\) is sufficient, but not necessary, for the travel time convexity.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
If \(f \in \mathbf {{C}^{2}} ({{\mathbb {R}}}_+; {{\mathbb {R}}})\) is convex and increasing, then also \(x \mapsto x\,f (x)\) is convex and increasing. By Lemma 6.2, for \(i=1, \ldots ,m\), the map \(\xi \mapsto \tau _{r_i} (\xi ) \, \xi \) is convex on \([0,1]\). Hence, also the map \(\vartheta \mapsto \sum _i \tau _{r_i} (\vartheta _i) \, \vartheta _i\) is convex on \([0,1]^n\). Since \(\varGamma _{ij} \in \{0,1\}\), also the map \(\vartheta \mapsto T (\vartheta )\) is convex. \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 3.1
By Definition 3.3, the configuration \(\vartheta ^N_1 = \vartheta ^N_2 = 0\) is clearly an equilibrium, the only relevant time being the equilibrium
By (7), it is also a Nash point, since \(\tau _a (0,0) = \tau _\beta (0,0) > \bar{\tau }\) and, by continuity, the same inequality holds in a neighborhood of \(\vartheta ^N\).
Assume there exists an other equilibrium point \(\bar{\vartheta }\) in the interior of \(S^2\). Then, by symmetry, \(\bar{\vartheta }_1 = \bar{\vartheta }_2\) and, by Definition 3.3,
By assumption, the left-hand side above is a strictly increasing function of \(\vartheta _1\), while the right-hand side is weakly decreasing, so that
which contradicts (9). To prove the uniqueness of the Nash points, consider the configuration \((0,1)\). In this case, the only relevant time is \(\tau _\alpha (0,1)\) and
proving that \((1,0)\) is not a Nash point. The case of \((0,1)\) is entirely analogous.
Finally, \(\tau _\alpha (1/2,1/2) = \tau _b (1/2, 1/2)\) is the globally optimal time for the case of four roads, and the leftmost bound in (7) allows to complete the proof. \(\square \)
Lemma 6.4
Let the travel time \(\tau _a,\tau _b \in \mathbf {{C}^{0}} ([0,1]; {{\mathbb {R}}}_+)\) be non-decreasing and convex, at least one of the two being strictly convex. Then, there exists a map \(\varTheta \in \mathbf {{C}^{0}} ({{\mathbb {R}}}_+;[0, 1/2])\) such that the partition \(\left( \varTheta (\vartheta ), \varTheta (\vartheta )\right) \) is the point of global minimum of the mean travel time \(T\) defined in (6), (5), (8) over \(S^n\).
Proof
The travel time \(T\) is convex by Proposition 3.1. By symmetry, its point of minimum is of the type \((\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) and if \(\vartheta \in ]0, 1/2[\), then \(\frac{\mathrm {d}}{\mathrm {d}\vartheta } T (\vartheta ,\vartheta )=0\). Hence,
so that \(\vartheta \mapsto T (\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) is strictly convex and it admits a unique point of minimum \(\varTheta (\tilde{\tau })\) in \(]0, 1/2[\). By the implicit function theorem, \(\varTheta \) is continuous. \(\square \)
Lemma 6.5
Let the travel times \(\tau _a,\tau _b \in \mathbf {{C}^{0}} ([0,1]; {{\mathbb {R}}}_+)\) be non-decreasing and convex, at least one of them being strictly convex. Then, there exists a \(\tilde{T} \in \mathbf {{C}^{0}} ([0, 1/2]; {{\mathbb {R}}}_+)\) such that assigning the travel time \(\tilde{T} (\vartheta )\) on road \(e\) makes the configuration \((\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) the unique local Nash point in the sense of Definition 3.3.
Proof
Given \(\vartheta \in [0,1/2]\), we seek \(\tilde{\tau }\) such that \((\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) is an equilibrium point. To this aim, we solve \(\tau _a (\vartheta ,\vartheta ) = \tau _b (\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) together with \(\tau _a (\vartheta ,\vartheta ) = \tau _\gamma (\vartheta ,\vartheta )\). By symmetry considerations, the former equality is satisfied for \(\vartheta \in [0, 1/2]\). The latter is equivalent to: \(\tau _a (1-\vartheta ) + \tau _b (\vartheta ) = 2 \tau _a (1-\vartheta ) + \tilde{\tau }\). Therefore, we set
By construction, \((\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) is an equilibrium configuration in the sense of Definition 3.1, once the travel time \(\tilde{\tau }\) along the road \(e\) is set equal end \(\tilde{T} (\vartheta )\).
When \(\vartheta \in ]0, 1/2[\), to prove that \((\vartheta ,\vartheta )\) is a local Nash point, thanks to the present symmetries, it is sufficient to check that for all small \(\varepsilon >0\) we have \(\tau _\alpha (\vartheta +\varepsilon , \vartheta ) > \tau _\gamma (\vartheta ,\vartheta ), \,\tau _\alpha (\vartheta +\varepsilon , \vartheta -\varepsilon ) > \tau _\beta (\vartheta ,\vartheta ), \,\tau _\gamma (\vartheta -\varepsilon , \vartheta ) > \tau _\alpha (\vartheta ,\vartheta )\), or,
and all these inequalities hold by the monotonicity of the travel times. \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Let \(\varTheta \) and \(\tilde{T}\) be as defined in Lemmas 6.4 and 6.5. Set \(\varUpsilon :[0,1/2] \rightarrow [0,1/2], \,\varUpsilon = \varTheta \circ \tilde{T}\), and call \(\vartheta _*\) a fixed point for \(\varUpsilon \). Then, \((\vartheta _*, \vartheta _*)\) is a local Nash point, if \(\tilde{\tau }_* = \tilde{T} (\vartheta _*)\) is the travel time along road \(e\). \(\square \)
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Colombo, R.M., Holden, H. On the Braess Paradox with Nonlinear Dynamics and Control Theory. J Optim Theory Appl 168, 216–230 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-015-0729-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-015-0729-5