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The Use of Innovative Incentives in the Classroom to Explore the Impact of Peer Monitoring on Academic Achievements

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Abstract

In a population of undergraduate students, we examined the impact of reciprocal peer monitoring of educational behaviors on academic performance. Reciprocal peer monitoring is a novel design of incentives that promotes peer-observing and checking the behavior of others. To distinguish the pure effect of peer monitoring from self-motivation, we also examined the effects of individual incentives on academic performance. Using a randomized controlled trial, this study showed that a joint-liability incentives arrangement was more effective than the individual incentives approach to increase students’ academic performance. The results also showed that participants reported negative views of aspects of the joint-liability incentives intervention. The current procedures entailed a novel system of incentives for students that does not require tangible reinforcers and requires them to exert more effort to succeed in a course. These procedures may be characterized as an innovative insight for the design of grading policies in the classroom and other social settings.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Universidad de Montevideo, 2544 Prudencio de Pena St., 11600, Montevideo, Uruguay

    Alejandro Cid & José María Cabrera

  2. Universidad de Montevideo, Montevideo, Uruguay

    José María Cabrera

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  1. Alejandro Cid
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  2. José María Cabrera
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Correspondence to Alejandro Cid.

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The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

All the research was performed following ethical standards. Institutional Review Board (IRB) Approval: The project was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Universidad de Montevideo, resolution A 22-08-13: voluntary and informed participation; respect for the rights and dignity of participants, including confidentiality and anonymity; conducted with integrity and transparency; appropriateness of the local research environment and facilities.

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Cid, A., Cabrera, J.M. The Use of Innovative Incentives in the Classroom to Explore the Impact of Peer Monitoring on Academic Achievements. J Behav Educ (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10864-023-09524-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10864-023-09524-6

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