Abstract
This paper aims to show that there is a lot of philosophy in the philosophy of chemistry—not only in the problems and questions specific to chemistry, which this science brings up in philosophical discussions, but also in the topics of wider interest like reductionism and emergence, for which chemistry proves to be an ideal case study. The fact that chemical entities and properties are amenable to a quantitative understanding, to measurement and experiment to a greater extent than those in psychology or biology, makes chemistry an ideal case study for those interested in reductionism and emergence.
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Notes
This doesn’t mean that chemistry doesn’t pose difficult problems of its own, for example the problem of chemical substance, matter or material, element, bond, etc. But it does mean that chemistry is free of one of the most vexing problems of contemporary philosophy, and this is a good thing.
Chemistry is the first “special science” according to the layer-cake model of the sciences introduced by the classical article of Putnam and Oppenheim (1958).
Microstructuralism is the view that chemical kinds can be individuated solely in terms of their chemical microstructure (Bird and Tobin 2008).
The existence of emergence and downward causation would have a great impact on the problem of free will, which is relevant to philosophy of mind and ethics.
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I would like to thank two anonymous referees of JGPS for useful comments and suggestions.
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Manafu, A. How Much Philosophy in the Philosophy of Chemistry?. J Gen Philos Sci 45 (Suppl 1), 33–44 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9267-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9267-3