Abstract
Using meta-metaphysical instruments, the paper analyzes the dispute between ‘reductionist’ Humean categoricalism and ‘bold’ Anti-Humean dispositionalism. It is argued (contrary to a widespread intuition) that both views are non-Quinean, hence, heavyweight ontological realisms: careful analysis of specific scientific theories alone is not sufficient. Further, sophisticated philosophical reasoning is needed to defend Anti-Humeanism as well as Humeanism. The paper finally suggests that most if not all ontological disputes are unavoidably “speculative” due to (perhaps, disguised) essentialism which cannot be read off contemporary physical theories.
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Notes
Categoricalism is the view according to which fundamental physical properties are purely qualitative, i.e. not modally-laden, whereas according to dispositionalism such properties are (the grounds of) de re modalities.
The same holds for the characterization according to which metaphysics provides a coherent world-view and unifies otherwise disconnected scientific theories (see Ladyman and Ross 2007, chap. 1; Esfeld 2008, 7). If such a unification does not lead to new predictions (which, in fact, would be a scientific unification), then it can be lightweight (“thin”) or heavyweight (“thick”).
Of course, most of them are at the same time very critical of the philosophical intuitions of analytic metaphysicians.
In the sense that both views allow the same set of first-order properties interpreted to be categorical or dispositional, respectively.
The ‘scientific’ reviewer (now: reader) might blame that it is circular to criticize “scientific” metaphysics with instruments from a part of “speculative” metaphysics. Be that as it may.
According to a “scientific” metaphysician, it is “never a good sign for a field when the literature is in part devoted to whether there are answers to certain types of questions in the field” (Callender 2011, 35). Contrary, I suggest that it is a very good sign for the analytic metaphysicians that they self-critically reflect their doings.
An inflationary, heavyweight ontological realist is Sider, a popular opponent for “scientific” metaphysicians. For a defense, see Sider (2009).
For more on the Carnap/Quine controversy and its relevance for the philosophy of science, see the contribution from Price (2009).
Defenders of “scientific metaphysics” might object that it is not intended that ontological claims must be entailed by science. However, it is obviously not enough to require that ontology be merely compatible with science, since even Plato’s heavyweight realism of universals might well be ‘compatible with’ (say) quantum field theory (see, analogously, Chakravartty 2013, 47).
Of course, Lewis certainly did not think of himself that way. On the contrary, he disregarded arguments that appealed directly to science. Instead, one should have in mind philosophers of science, such as Loewer (2004), defending a Humean, “deflationist”, or “thin” ontology. The critique, then, is that the only non-vague characterization of such an ontology—namely: lightweight realism—requires the absence of sophisticated philosophical reasoning.
The problem might be that reference to other possible worlds is needed in order to distinguish an essentially categorical property from an essentially dispositional one, whereas science is concerned merely with the actual world.
For contrast, look at the presentist/eternalist dispute: applied to spacetime physics they do not even agree about the existence of present entities, because it is already controversial which objects or events are present.
This way they would argue according to good Quinean naturalism. However, compare with the claim “there are particles”, uttered by working physicists or by philosophers of quantum field theory: Is there scientific agreement as to the truth-value of this sentence? How to apply the Quinean strategy if not?
I will ignore several alternative views: (i) According to Maudlin (2007), laws are primitive. Though they do not supervene on a Humean mosaic, they are neither stemming from modally-laden, dispositional properties. (ii) According to (early) Mumford’s (1998) “neutral monism”, there is no duality of categorical versus dispositional properties. However, for my purpose, the clear contrast between Humean metaphysics and dispositionalism, i.e. metaphysics of powers, suffices (see Bird 2007, chap. 3; Esfeld 2008, chap. 5).
For a critique of metaphysical necessity in this respect, see Schrenk (2010).
For simplicity, I will consider only the contrast between pan-categoricalism and pan-dispositionalism, i.e., the views that all fundamental properties are categorical (dispositional).
The situation apparently mirrors typical disagreements between two heavyweight ontological realists, such as the dispute between Plato who affirms that there are universals ante rem (and denies universals in re) and Aristotle who affirms that there are universals in re (and denies universals ante rem).
Remarkable that Bird himself admits that Humean metaphysics draws a “thin picture”, in contrast to his own version of dispositionalism (see Bird 2007, 1).
According to some philosophers of physics, Humean metaphysics is not scientific, because quantum entanglement strikes against Lewis’ position that fundamental physical properties are ‘always’ localized in spacetime [for this criticism, see Humphreys (2013, 57) and Maudlin (2007, chap. 2)]. However, this by no means undermines the intuition that Humean metaphysics is scientific with respect to its central aspect that physical properties, if localized or not, are not modally-laden.
This specific disposition does not need an external trigger but manifests itself by spontaneous localizations.
Note that GRW is both realistic and indeterministic.
More precisely, Bartels only argues that relativity rules out the metaphysics of powers but not that it supports Humean categoricalism. In fact, the author himself opts for Mumford’s neutral monism, but I will leave aside this complication.
Recall that general relativity is a deterministic theory so that the alleged de re modality could not be a mere tendency but is necessity.
The same curve is both geodetic in the affine sense as well as geodetic in the metrical sense.
Note: if Bird and others admitted that there might be such a contingent constraint, their further claim that the dynamical laws (or the dispositional properties) are themselves metaphysically necessary would be challenged.
For my purpose, Kripkean a posteriori necessities are interpreted in the way that, e.g., twin-earth water (XYZ) is epistemically possible, ‘although’ metaphysically impossible given that in the actual world water is H2O.
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Acknowledgments
For stimulating discussions, I am grateful to the audiences of my talks at the GWP- and GAP8-conferences (held in Hannover and Konstanz, respectively). Special thanks go to the two (‘speculative’) reviewers of this journal for helpful comments.
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Friebe, C. Categoricalism Versus Dispositionalism: A Case Study in Metametaphysics. J Gen Philos Sci 45 (Suppl 1), 5–15 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9265-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-014-9265-5