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“Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow” on the implications of deaccess policies for donations to museums

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Abstract

Severe budget cuts in the cultural sectors of many countries have spurred disparate suggestions for alternative sources available to public institutions. Deaccessioning may be an option, although controversial, to guarantee the survival of cultural institutions. This paper addresses the consequences that deaccessioning may have on donations of artworks to museums, by developing a sequential game with incomplete information. We investigate the interactions between donors and museums, when the former is uncertain about the commitment of a museum not to deaccess part of its endowment in the future. Our analysis shows that deaccessioning may reduce art donations to museums. Interestingly, public grants to museums cause a negative externality to a committed museum, which experiences a reduction in donations. Results provide intuitions for the widespread resistance to deaccessioning of museum associations, for their efforts to enforce common regulation restricting the use of proceeds to the acquisition of art, and also for the proliferation of private art museums.

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Notes

  1. This is the general interpretation of deaccessioning adopted also in our analysis. Actually, deaccessioning indicates the permanent removal of an item from a museum’s collection. In principle, the deaccessed item could be loaned for long-term loan (e.g., over 25 years), transferred to another museum (eventually in exchange of other works), donated, destroyed, or sold.

  2. For example, from 2004, the Guggenheim Bilbao allocates for the acquisitions 6 million Euros each year (Plaza 2012). This sum may not be sufficient to buy even a single representative work of a top Post-War artist.

  3. Often works in the collection are not on display. We address this issue further in paper.

  4. The use of revenue from deaccessioning can be restricted by national legislation, self-commitment of the museum, or regulation of museum associations (see Sect. 2). However, through budget transfers, revenue from sales can actually finance a broad set of expenditure. For example, if deaccessioning is restricted just to finance additional acquisitions, other resources already intended for this objective can now be distracted to finance other categories of expenditure, such as building a new wing. Srakar (2012) investigates the incentives that a museum may have to use deaccessioning rather than other sources of revenue to finance its activity.

  5. For example, the austerity measures introduced in reaction to Greece economic crisis has forced museums in that country to cut expenditures and loosen security. The forced budget cuts were blamed to be the main responsible of two robberies in the first 2 months of 2012, at the National Gallery, in Athens, and at the Museum of the History of the Olympic Games, in Olympia and lead to the resignation offered by the Greek culture minister (The Art Newspaper, n.233, March 2012).

  6. For the acceptance of deaccessioning practices in the European Union, see Vecco and Piazzai (2015). Regarding the US, a recent legislation in the State of New York, which is considered particularly stringent within the federation, allows deaccessioning only in very specific cases (such as when the item is inconsistent with the mission of the institution, or has failed to retain its identity, or is redundant, etc.) and only for the acquisition or the preservation of collections excluding explicitly that proceeds from deaccessioning be used for operating expenses or for any other purposes.

  7. The sale of a painting of the contemporary artist Marlene Dumas by the Museum of Gouda (The Netherlands), whose collection actually focuses on religious artworks dating from sixteenth century, was vehemently stigmatized by the Netherlands Museum Association (NMA), which threatened the expulsion of the museum from the Association for breaching the NMA’s code of ethics (The Art Newspaper, n. 233, March 2012). The director of the British Empire and Commonwealth Museum in Bristol (which was closed to the public in 2008, for financial difficulties) was dismissed in 2010 for “unauthorised disposal of museum objects”, although payments were done to the museum. The justifications for this action was that the disposal fell short of the UK’s current ethical guidelines, even though no law seems to have been violated. In 2008, the National Academy Museum in New York sold two paintings in a private sale, earning about $15 million. The proceeds from this sale were used for operating costs, because of the financial crisis. The Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD) reacted by halting exhibition collaborations and suspending loans to the museum. Perhaps, the most disputable recent example is provided by AAMD’s sanction of the Randolph College in Virginia for the sale of George Bellow’s Men of the docks (1912) to the National Gallery of London (The Art Newspaper, n. 256, April 2014). In this case, rather surprisingly, the reprimand concerns the transfer of a painting from one institution whose mission is to educate rather than exhibit or preserve art to an institution having these very goals.

  8. An additional reason, not investigated here, is that deaccessions may crowd-out public support. In such a case, museums—especially the smaller ones—may face a progressive reduction of resources available for their activities.

  9. The assumption of attendance maximisation is consistent with our goal of investigating public as well as private museums. Although their objectives may not coincide (see Frey and Meier 2006), comparisons between museums (such as those published in The Art Newspaper) are often based on yearly visits.

  10. Note that if \(\rho _{2}\) is greater than one, the Museum will not sell the donated collection, and Donor’s utility is \(U(x,g)= \ln {x} + a g\) because of the \(\min\) operator. Notice also that the approval parameter a is assumed to be exogenous, in our model. We could reason, however, that the amount of visitors may have a positive impact on the recognition of the donors and thus imply a larger social approval received for the donation. We argument further about the consequences of such endogenisation in Sect. 5.

  11. Given that \(\rho ^{*} <1\) we can remove the \(\min\) operator.

  12. In fact, where deaccessioning is legally admitted, it may be requested that proceeds of the sale are used to buy artworks.

  13. There are numerous examples of private foundations and museums spurring in the world. Among the most recent ones, we remind the Crystal Bridges Museum established by Wal-Mart in Bentonville, or the Clyfford Still Museum in Denver. The latter was built by the city to host the works of the painter in perpetuity and exclusively according to his will. Consistently with the underlying hypothesis of this paper, that will also explicitly forbids to sell, give or even exchange any donated work.

  14. Moreover, if the last two stages are repeated infinitely, the Folk Theorem applies. In this case—considering a discount rate \(\delta < 1\)—the expected number of visitors is:

    $$\begin{aligned} V^{e} =&\, \frac{1}{1-\delta } \overline{v} + \underbrace{q \left[ E_{1}^{\alpha }R^{\beta } + \frac{\delta }{1-\delta } \alpha ^{\alpha }\beta ^{\beta } \left( \frac{g(\rho _{1}\ge 1) + E_{2}}{\alpha + \beta }\right) ^{\alpha + \beta } \right] }_{pooling} \\ &+\,\underbrace{(1-q) \alpha ^{\alpha }\beta ^{\beta } \left[ \left( \frac{R + E_{1}}{\alpha + \beta }\right) ^{\alpha + \beta } + \frac{\delta }{1-\delta }\left( \frac{g(\rho _{1}< 1) + E_{2}}{\alpha + \beta }\right) ^{\alpha + \beta } \right] }_{separating} \end{aligned}$$
    (10)

    As it can be seen in Expression (10), adding an infinite number of periods increases the chances of following a strategy that avoids deaccessioning. This is because the penalty induces by deaccessioning is relatively big in the infinite horizon. Note, however, that this result depends on the “grim trigger strategy” used by the Donor, who will punish infinitely the museum. Therefore, results change if the penalty does not apply after a certain amount of time. Dynamic results are sensitive to the assumptions on penalties. Insights, however, remain the same. The decision of deaccessioning must consider future consequences in terms of donations. It would be a viable option only if penalties are relatively small with regards to the gain from the sale of artworks.

  15. The difference is \(a \left( 1 - P(A_{2}^{c})\right) - \frac{a\alpha }{\alpha + \beta } \left( 1 - P(A_{2}^{nc})\right)\).

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Correspondence to Luigi Di Gaetano.

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The authors declare they have no conflict of interest.

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Previous version of this papers were presented at the 65th IIPF Congress, at the 18th ACEI Conference and in seminars at the Universities of Frankfurt and Rotterdam. We wish to thank participants and discussants for their comments. We are indebted to one anonymous reviewer for very relevant suggestions that have contributed to improve the paper.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author (Luigi Di Gaetano) and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, the Italian Competition Authority.

Appendices

Appendix

Comparative statics

  • Donations are lower when the signal is \(\rho _{1}<1\), i.e. \(g(\rho _{1}<1) < g(\rho _{1}\ge 1)\):

    $$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{c} g(\rho _{1}<1) = w - \frac{\alpha + \beta }{ a \alpha } < w - \frac{\alpha + \beta }{ a }\left( \frac{p}{p + q(1-p)}\beta + \alpha \right) ^{-1} = g(\rho _{1}\ge 1) \\ \frac{p}{p + q(1-p)}\beta + \alpha > \alpha \end{array} \end{aligned}$$
    (12)
  • Donations are increasing in a and w:

    $$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{ccc} \frac{\partial g(\cdot )}{\partial w} = 1 >0;&\frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}< 1)}{\partial a} = \frac{\alpha +\beta }{a^{2}\alpha } >0;&\frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}\ge 1)}{\partial a} = \frac{\alpha +\beta }{a^{2}\left( \mu \beta +\alpha \right) } >0; \end{array} \end{aligned}$$
    (13)
  • Donations after the signal \(\rho _{1}< 1\) are:

    • increasing in \(\alpha\):

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}< 1)}{\partial \alpha } = \frac{\beta }{a \alpha ^{2}} > 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (14)
    • decreasing in \(\beta\):

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}< 1)}{\partial \beta } = -\frac{1}{a \alpha } < 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (15)
  • Donations after the signal \(\rho _{1}\ge 1\) are:

    • increasing in \(\mu\):

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}\ge 1)}{\partial \mu } = \frac{\partial }{\partial \mu } \left( w - \frac{1}{\mu a + (1 - \mu )a\rho _{2}^{*}} \right) = \frac{(1 - \rho _{2}^{*}) a}{\left( \mu a + (1 - \mu )a\rho _{2}^{*}\right) ^{2}} > 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (16)
    • increasing in the probability p, since \(\mu = p/p + q^{e}(1-p)\) and:

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mu }{\partial p} = \frac{q^{e}}{(p + q^{e}(1-p))^{2}} > 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (17)
    • decreasing in \(q^{e}\), since:

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mu }{\partial q^{e}} = -\frac{p(1-p)}{(p + q^{e}(1-p))^{2}} < 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (18)
    • decreasing in \(\beta\):

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}\ge 1)}{\partial \beta } = \frac{\partial }{\partial \beta } \left( w - \frac{\alpha +\beta }{a}\frac{1}{\mu \beta + a} \right) = - \frac{(1 - \mu ) \alpha }{a \left( \mu \beta + \alpha \right) ^{2}} < 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (19)
    • increasing in \(\alpha\):

      $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial g(\rho _{1}\ge 1)}{\partial \alpha } = \frac{\partial }{\partial \alpha } \left( w - \frac{\alpha +\beta }{a}\frac{1}{\mu \beta + a} \right) = \frac{(1 - \mu ) \beta }{a \left( \mu \beta + \alpha \right) ^{2}} > 0; \end{aligned}$$
      (20)
  • Furthermore, we have that (note that \(q^{e}>0\) implies \(\mu >0\)):

    $$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{c} g(\rho _{1} \ge 1 | q = 0) = w - \frac{1}{a} > w - \frac{\alpha +\beta }{a} \left( \mu \beta +\alpha \right) ^{-1} = g(\rho _{1}\ge 1| q^{e} > 0) \\ \frac{\alpha +\beta }{\mu \beta +\alpha } > 1 \iff (1-\mu )\beta > 0; \end{array} \end{aligned}$$
    (21)
  • Perfect Information Benchmark:

    $$\begin{aligned} \begin{array}{c} g(co) = w - \frac{1}{a} = g(\rho _{1}\ge 1| q^{e} = 0); \\ g(nco) = w - \frac{\alpha + \beta }{a\alpha } < w - \frac{\alpha + \beta }{a(\mu \beta + \alpha )} = g(\rho _{1}\ge 1| q^{e} > 0); \end{array} \end{aligned}$$
    (22)

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Di Gaetano, L., Mazza, I. “Better an egg today than a hen tomorrow” on the implications of deaccess policies for donations to museums. J Cult Econ 41, 237–258 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-015-9262-5

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