Abstract
We construct a tax competition model in which local governments finance business public services with either a source-based tax on mobile capital, such as a property tax, or a tax on production, such as an origin-based value-added tax, and then assess which of the two tax instruments is more efficient. Many taxes on business apply to mobile inputs or outputs, such as property taxes, retail sales taxes, and destination-based VATs, and their inefficiency has been examined in the literature; however, proposals from several prominent tax experts to utilize a local origin-based VAT have not been analyzed theoretically. Our primary finding is that the production tax is less inefficient than the capital tax under many—but not all—conditions. The intuition underlying this result is that the efficiency of a user fee on the public business input is roughly approximated by a production tax, which applies to both the public input and immobile labor (in addition to mobile capital). In marked contrast, the capital tax applies only to mobile capital and is thus likely to be relatively inefficient.
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Notes
This problem has been mitigated recently in the USA by the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., which specifies that remote sellers can under certain circumstances be required to collect sales taxes even in states in which they have no physical presence.
The 11 states with origin-based treatment of intrastate sales are Arizona, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia (Faggiano 2017).
The Hall–Rabushka flat tax uses the “subtraction” method rather than the almost universally used “invoice-credit” VAT method. Under the subtraction method wages are deductible from the tax base at the business level, but taxed, subject to a standard deduction and personal exemptions, at the individual level.
Gugl and Zodrow (2015) provide further discussion of the assumptions of the model.
The fixed factor can also be thought of as a combination of labor and land, as assumed by ZM.
We follow most of the literature in assuming constant marginal costs for business public services (Oates and Schwab 1988, 1991; Sinn 1997; Bayindir-Upmann 1998; Keen and Marchand 1997; Richter 1994; Matsumoto 2000). Two alternative approaches, which Matsumoto (2000) points out to be equivalent, would be to assume either an imperfectly congestible public input and a constant marginal cost of producing that public input, or a perfectly congestible public input (i.e., our publicly provided private service) and decreasing marginal costs of producing the public service.
For a detailed literature review, see Gugl and Zodrow (2015).
Such is the case for a Cobb–Douglas production function and any CES production function with substitution elasticity greater than 1; see, e.g., Gugl and Zodrow (2015).
In an earlier version of this paper (Gugl and Zodrow, cesifo1_wp5555.pdf), we also compared the production tax to a uniform tax on only private inputs, under the assumption of Cobb–Douglas production functions. The latter tax is efficient in Matsumoto and Sugahara (2017) where the production function is CRS in private inputs only, but we show that it is inefficient in the case of many Cobb–Douglas production functions if the function is CRS in all inputs including public services even though such technology implies that the production tax is efficient.
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Acknowledgements
We thank an anonymous referee, Steve Billon, Jed Brewer, Alexander Ebertz, Bill Fox, Timothy Goodspeed, Brad Hackinen, Andreas Haufler, James Hines, Margaret McKeehan, Matt Krzepkowski, David Wildasin, and John Wilson for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Appendix: Log (sub/super) modularity
Appendix: Log (sub/super) modularity
Before discussing log (sub/super) modularity, we first review (sub/super) modularity and then point out the differences between these two related concepts.
1.1 A.1 Definition and examples
To define (sub/super) modularity of B and K, consider any two input vectors with the same amount of labor, but different amounts of B and K, with one input vector containing strictly less of both \( \left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} ,L} \right) \) than the other \( \left( {\bar{B},\bar{K},L} \right) \). Since we keep labor the same in all our analysis, L is suppressed in our analysis. By definition, modularity holds if and only if
Under modularity, a given increase in one input results in the same increase in output regardless of how much output is being produced. Another way of thinking about the implications of modularity is by choosing the input combinations on the RHS of Eq. (A1) such that
With modularity, the arithmetic mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) must equal \( Y^{0} \). For super (sub) modularity, the arithmetic mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) must be greater (less) than \( Y^{0} \). For example, in the case of submodularity, total output of \( Y^{0} \) can be produced with the arithmetic mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and some other output level generated with larger amounts of both inputs, but the output level \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) is not large enough to achieve this; instead, inputs larger than \( \left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) are necessary to achieve an arithmetic mean of \( Y^{0} \).
An example of a production function that is modular in B and K is one for which the functions involving inputs B and K enter additively, i.e.,
where all the individual functions are increasing in their inputs. By comparison, a function of the form
is supermodular.
Log modularity, in contrast, compares relative marginal products rather than the absolute marginal products of inputs. That is, log modularity in B and K holds if and only if
As in the discussion of (sub/super) modularity, another way to think about the implications of log modularity is by choosing the input combinations on the RHS of Eq. (A3) so that (A2) holds. For log modularity, the geometric mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) must equal \( Y^{0} \). For log super (sub) modularity, the geometric mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) must be greater (less) than \( Y^{0} \). For example, in the case of log submodularity, total output of \( Y^{0} \) can be produced with the geometric mean of \( F\left( {\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{B} ,\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle-}$}}{K} } \right) \) and some other output level generated with higher amounts of both inputs, but the output level \( F\left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) is not large enough to achieve this; instead, inputs larger than \( \left( {\bar{B},\bar{K}} \right) \) are necessary to achieve a geometric mean of \( Y^{0} \).
An example of a production function that is log modular in B and K is one for which the inputs enter multiplicatively, e.g.,
where all the individual functions are increasing in their inputs. Note that such functions are simultaneously supermodular in B and K. An example of a log supermodular function is
which is simultaneously supermodular in B and K.
An example of a log submodular function is
which is simultaneously modular in B and K. However, log submodular functions can also be simultaneously supermodular; an example is
where \( \alpha > 0 \).
1.2 A.2 Proof of Lemma 1: Expressing log (sub/super) modularity in terms of elasticities
Note that log modularity can be expressed as
Hence, a log modular production function must exhibit the same percentage change in output due to a given increase in K, regardless of the level of B, or
where \( \varepsilon_{K} = F_{K} K/F \), which holds if and only if
Since by Young’s theorem \( F_{KB} = F_{BK} \), and \( \varepsilon_{{F_{B} ,K}} = F_{BK} K/F_{B} \), (A6) can be expressed as
Similarly, log submodularity requires \( \varepsilon_{{F_{B} ,K}} < \varepsilon_{K} \) and log supermodularity requires \( \varepsilon_{{F_{B} ,K}} > \varepsilon_{K} \).
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Gugl, E., Zodrow, G.R. Tax competition and the efficiency of “benefit-related” business taxes. Int Tax Public Finance 26, 486–505 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9514-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-018-9514-3