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Democracy and state environmental commitment to international environmental treaties

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Abstract

One of the current research endeavors in international environmental politics is understanding the link between democracy and international environmental protection. Scholars in the field seek to identify the international and domestic factors that increase state commitment to international environmental treaties and agreements. Counter to the traditional literature on international environmental commitment, this paper reconceptualizes both traditional and alternative theories in order to identify domestic institutional factors that may increase state cooperation with international environmental agreements. In particular, this study posits that democratic governments in comparison to authoritarian governments increase state compliance with international environmental agreements; however, there may be domestic environmental conditions, such as limited access to clean water that may constrain democracies in participating in international environmental agreements. This study presents a quantitative analysis measuring the effects of democracy on state compliance behaviors with international environmental agreements. The results of the study provide support for an alternative bottom-up theoretical framework focusing on domestic environmental politics in addressing international environmental agreements.

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Notes

  1. Brown Weiss and Jacobson develop a comprehensive analytical model indentifying four categories that impact state implementation, compliance, and effectiveness: for instance, (1) “Characteristics of the Activity Involved” identifies elements, such as “Number of Actors Involved in the Activity…” “Effect of Economic Incentives…Role of MNCs…” (2) “Characteristics of Accord” captures “Perceived Equity of the Obligations…Precision of the Obligations,” (3) “The International Environment” encompasses “Major International Conferences,” “International Nongovernmental Organizations…” and (4) “Factors Involving the Country” identifies “Parameters, Fundamental Factors (Economy, Political Institutions, Attitudes and Values) and Proximate Factors: Administrative Capacity, Leadership, and Nongovernmental Organizations” (see Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998, 536).

  2. The aim of the study is to identify particular political institutional arrangements and typologies that may affect state environmental compliance with international environmental agreements; a meso-level approach is useful in measuring this type of dynamic. However, it is limited in capturing the micro-level behavioral elements, such as state and non-state actors’ environmental concerns, interests, and knowledge that could also influence states commitment to and compliance with environmental agreements. This study acknowledges this theoretical limitation, but proposes that there may be particular institutional arrangements that are conducive for state and non-state actors to facilitate state environmental commitment.

  3. The realist approach has often been coined “Realpolitik” which refers to the power politics of state behavior and relations in the international system. A state’s preferences toward power and security ranks above its willingness to cooperate with other states in an anarchical system where there is no central government in the international system.

  4. Paterson takes an institutional argument where rules, norms, and regimes constrain and facilitate state leaders in shaping the political agenda and policy-making.

  5. Keohane’s After Hegemony (1984) is significant in terms of addressing the gaps in traditional power and hegemonic stability theory. Krasner (1976) predicts a decline in United States power will lead to closure in the international political economy. However, this was not the case; the international political economy remained open partly through international institutions. Keohane’s work on international institutions and stability is significant in understanding state cooperation in an anarchical world.

  6. In Abbott and Snidal’s (1998) work Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, they present a complementary theoretical argument to Keohane’s arguing that international organizations have characteristics of centralization and independence. Here, IOs are actors in the international system and are not subordinate to states; they have influence and could affect state behavior. Further, international organizations increase information and distribution of this information to member states. This action facilitates openness and cooperation among the member states.

  7. Keohane (1982) proposes that institutions can act as constraints on a state’s behavior, and even facilitate particular strategies to increase cooperation.

  8. In their study, Keohane and Levy identify three independent variables: (1) concern, (2) contract, and (3) capacity. The dependent variable is institutional effectiveness in alleviating international environmental degradation. They operationalize institutional effectiveness as, “the extent to which environmental aid programs fulfill their potential ability to solve or alleviate environmental problems” (Keohane and Levy 1996, 15). Their first independent variable—concern—attempts to capture the particular interest that actors, international institutions, domestic groups, donors, developing states, and political elites have toward environmental degradation. The second variable—contract—refers to the agreement between the international institution and participating state. Here, the international institution and state negotiate on how to resolve the environmental issue. The third variable identifies the state’s capacity in addressing the environmental issue.

  9. O’Neill’s propositions allude to the institutional logic of Duverger’s Law, which identifies the association between electoral systems and representation in the legislature. Duverger proposes that SMDP systems tend to constrain multiparty representation in the legislature, whereas PR electoral systems increase party representation (Riker 1982).

  10. A multivariate OLS regression was first tested to provide a standard regression statistical analysis. The OLS regression model is statistically significant, probability > F = 0.000. See “Appendix 1” for OLS regression analysis: state environmental compliance as a Function of democracy, access to clean water, and democracy*access to clean water.

  11. This study posits that the interaction variable creates a different institutional condition on state compliance with international environmental agreements. This is a conditional hypothesis where democracies under a particular environmental context (in this case, limited access to clean water) may demonstrate a particular type of state compliance behavior. Brambor et al. (2006) analyze the utility of interaction variables. They posit, “Analysts should include interaction terms whenever they have conditional hypotheses. A conditional hypothesis is simply one in which a relationship between two or more variables depends on the value of one or more other variables” (Brambor et al. 2006, 64). Further, in addressing institutions and interaction variables, they identify that “Institutional arguments frequently imply that the relationship between political inputs and outcomes varies depending on the institutional context” (Brambor et al. 2006, 64).

  12. There were nine countries that represented the “high” democracy and “limited” access to clean water category: Argentina (79 % of population has access to clean water), Lithuania (55 % of population), Romania (58 % of population), Bolivia (79 % of population), Dominican Republic (79 % of population), Ecuador (71 % of population), El Salvador (74 % of population), Nicaragua (79 % of population), and Jamaica (71 % of population).

  13. See Table 3 for correlation matrix in examining potential multicollinearity issues among the independent variables.

Abbreviations

CFC:

Chlorofluorocarbon

GDP:

Gross domestic product

HST:

Hegemonic stability theory

IEO:

International environmental organization

NGO:

Non-governmental organization

OLS:

Ordinary least squares

PR:

Proportional representation

SMDP:

Single-member district plurality

UNEP:

United Nations environmental program

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, Kent State University at Stark Campus, North Canton, OH, 44720, USA

    Joel R. Carbonell

  2. Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    Juliann E. Allison

Authors
  1. Joel R. Carbonell
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  2. Juliann E. Allison
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Correspondence to Joel R. Carbonell.

Appendices

Appendix 1

See Table 4.

Table 4 Ordinary least squares multivariate regression state environmental compliance as a function of democracy, access to clean water, and interaction variable between democracy and access to clean water
Full size table

Appendix 2

See Table 5.

Table 5 Country compliance with international environmental treaties scores
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Appendix 3

See Table 6.

Table 6 Country government type democracy scores
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Appendix 4

See Table 7.

Table 7 Country membership with international environmental organizations
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Appendix 5

See Table 8.

Table 8 Country access to clean water score
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Carbonell, J.R., Allison, J.E. Democracy and state environmental commitment to international environmental treaties. Int Environ Agreements 15, 79–104 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-013-9213-6

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