Abstract
Candrakīrti deals with epistemological problems in his works, but he has not propounded a systematic theory of knowledge. Candrakīrti thoroughly discusses Madhyamaka’s ontological view in his explication of Nāgārjuna’s view on two truths (dve satye). Most of his Tibetan commentators and contemporary interpreters engage in explaining Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka ontology. However, Jamyang Zhepa reconstructs Candrakīrti’s theory of knowledge in his magnum opus, Tshig gsal stong thun gyi tshad ma’i rnam bshad (A commentary on epistemological exposition in Prasannapadā). Although Jamyang Zhepa’s work is a novel contribution to Candrakīrti’s scholarship, there are some issues in his interpretation in terms of philosophical portrayal of Candrakīrti’s thought. In the present paper, the author reexamines Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s epistemology and submits that his interpretation faces some textual inconsistencies and philosophical problems in depicting Candrakīrti’s epistemological views. The paper is divided into five sections, and the first section or the introductory section discusses whether Candrakīrti holds his own philosophical position or not. The second section deals with the origin of Tibetan doxographical debates on Candrakīrti’s epistemology. The third section discusses the problem of pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s philosophy. The fourth section revisits Candrakīrti’s theory of perception. The last section or the concluding section shows the textual inconsistencies and philosophical tensions between Candrakīrti’s philosophical corpus and Jamyang Zhepa’s interpretation through at least five arguments.
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Notes
In the present paper, the word “Madhyamaka” is used for the Madhyamaka system of thought and the word “Mādhyamika” is referred to an exponent of this school of thought.
Apart from Nāgārjuna, Ᾱryadeva and Candrakīrti, there are other Prāsaṅgikas like Buddhapālita, Śāntideva, and Atīśa Dīpaṅkara, who are unanimously accepted as Prāsaṅgikas by the Tibetans.
Candrakīrti writes, “atra kecit pavicodayanti anutpannā bhāvā iti kiṃ ayaṃpramāṇajo niścaya utāpramāṇajaḥ / tatra yadi pramṇāja iṣyate tadedaṃ vatavyaṃ kati pramāṇani kiṃlakṣaṇāni kiṃviṣayāni kiṃsvatautpannāni kiṃparata ubhayato ahetuto veti / athāpramāṇajaḥ sa na yutaḥpramāṇādhīnatvāt prameyādhigamasya / anadhigato ekārtho na vinā pramāṇōr adhigantuṃ śakyata iti pramāṇābhāvādarthādhigamābhāve sati kuto bhāvāto ayaṃ samyagniścaya iti na yutvametad anutpannā bhāvā iti (MacDonald, 2015a, 2015b, pp. 238–239).
Jamyang Zhepa writes, “’jig rten la grags rung gi ’thad pa gang yin pa de rang lugs thun mong ma yin par tha snyad du zhal bzhes mdzad nas thabs de nyid kyis rtogs par mdzad pa’i phyir (Having accepted the feasible things which are tenable to be prevailed in the world as one’s own extraordinary position at the conventional level, for [Candrakīrti] makes [people] realized [the two truths] through this very method)” (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, pp. 363–364).
Nāgārjuna writes, “prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 137).
Jamyang Zhepa claims that Staktsang Lotsawa rejects pramāṇa theory in Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka just for the sake of name and fame and to make please his patrons (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 356).
The first level of analysis is devoid of any ontological analysis, and it is literally in accordance with the commonsensical view of ordinary beings as prevailed in the customary practice of everyday experience. At the first stage of analysis, according to Staktsang Lotsawa, Candrakīrti just imitates the commonsensical view of the worldly conventions and causality like “this is because of that is” or “that is because of this is” that all composite phenomena depend on causes and conditions (Candrakīrti 2011b, p. 117). At the second level of analysis, the distinction between the conventional truth and the ultimate truth is made, and the conventional things including conventional pramāṇa are proved to be illusory from the ultimate point of view having declared sensory cognition to be unwarranted ultimately. At the final level of analysis, even the ultimate truth does not hold because any position like “existence” or “non-existence” cannot be held under thorough analysis and in ārya’s (realized being’s) non-dual meditative equipoise (samāhitajñāna, mnyam bzhag ye shes) (Candrakīrti, 2011b, p. 118). Consequently, according to Staktsang Lotsawa, Candrakīrti makes the statements like “whatever is accepted in the world is accepted by me” and “whatever is not accepted in the world is also rejected by me”, in accordance with the first level of analysis (Candrakīrti, 2011b, p. 114). Similarly, Candrakīrti states in MA VI 30 that if the worldly convention is reliable, then what would be the use of ārya’s (realized being’s) path to the enlightenment (Candrakīrti, 2011a, p. 107).
Candrakīrti writes in MA VI 30: “gal te ’jig rten tshad ma yin na ni // ’jig rten de nyid mthong bas ’phags gzhan gyis // ci dgos ’phags pa’i lam gyis ci zhig bya // blun po tshad mar rigs pa’ng ma yin no” (Candrakīrti, 2011a, p. 107). C.W. Huntington and Geshe Namyal Wangchen translate that “If everyday experience were authoritative, then common would perceive the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning]. What necessity would there be for those others, the saints? And what would be accomplished by following their path? It is unreasonable for such foolishness to be accepted as entirely authoritative” (Huntington & Wangchen, 1992, p. 161).
Nāgārjuna writes in VV 51, “naiva svataḥprasiddhirna parasparataḥ parapramāṇairvā / na bhavati na ca prameyairna cāpyakasmāt pramāṇām” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 72).
Jamyang Zhepa writes, “skabs ’dir tshad ma’i skad dod pramāṇa’i pra dang po’m gsar du dang māṇa ’jal bar bsgyur nas bshad mi rung ste…..de’i phyir ’dir pramāṇa rab tu ’jal bas na tshad ma zhes bshad rigs te / rab tu’m ji lta ba bzhin ’jal bas na tshad ma dang / yang gzhal bya’i rab ste gtso bo ’jal bas tshad ma zhes bshad dgos pa’i phyir” (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, pp. 417–418).
Nāgārjuna states VV 32, “nādeḥ siddhistatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 63).
Nāgārjuna writes, “yaśca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti sā proktā” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 55).
Candrakīrti writes in CŚT XIII 1, “mi bslu ba’i shes pa ni ’jig rten na tshad ma nyid du mthong (non-deceptive cognition is seen as the valid cognition in the world)” (Candrakīrti, 2001, p. 515). Jamyang Zhepa writes, “tshad ma’i mtshan nyid yod de / mi slu ba’i shes pa de de yin pa’i phyir (There is the definition of valid cognition because it is the non-deceptive cognition)” (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 417).
Dignāga does not establish cittamātra in PS I 10 and in its auto-commentary, rather he shows the non-dual nature of pramāṇa, prameya and pramāṇaphala in that verse. So, it is not feasible to say that his notion of pramāṇa is rooted in the notion of cittamātra.
Candrakīrti writes, “tadevam pramāṇacatuṣṭayāl lokasyārthādhigamo vyavasthāpyate” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 275). Similarly, Jamyang Zhepa states, “yul mngon gyur pa ’jal ba’i mngon sum dang / yul lkog gyur ba la cung zad lkog gyur dang / shin tu lkog gyur gnyis kyi dang po ’jal ba’i rjes dpag dang / gnyis pa ’jal ba’i lung gi tshad ma dang yul mngon gyur pa’i dpe’i steng nas lkog gyur pa gzhal ba’i nyer ’jal gyi tshad ma bzhi yod cing (There are four types of valid cognition which cognize different types of object, and apparent objects are cognized by perception. Hidden object is of two types, a little bit hidden and the extremely hidden. The former is cognized by inference and the latter is apprehended by verbal testimony. Comparison cognizes hidden objects through apparent examples)” (Jamyang Zhepa 2006, p. 419).
Dignāga writes that “yid ches tshig kyang mi bslu bar // mtshung phyir rjes su dpag pa nyid (The trustworthy word or valid testimony is also inference because it is non-deceptive like inference” (Dignāga, 2016a, p. 37).
Candrakīrti states that “tāni ca parasparāpekṣayā sidhyanti” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 275).
Jamyang Zhepa writes that “bsdus na phyi ma gsum rjes dpag tu ’du ba’i phyir” (if they are subsumed, then the last three types of pramāṇa [inference, verbal testimony, and comparison] are subsumed into inference) (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 419).
Nāgārjuna writes in VV 30, “yadi kiṃcidupalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvānme ’nupālambhaḥ” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 62).
Jamyang Zhepa states that “tshad ma bzhi’i tha snyad rang rgyud pa man chad kyis gtso bor ma bshad kyang ’phags pa yab sras kyi dgongs pa yin te / rtsod zlog rtsa ’grel las tshad ma bzhi’i tha snyad dang grangs dang tshad mas ’jal tshul dang / tshad ma de gang gis grub sogs la brten nas grub pa’i phyir” (Although the fourfold typology of pramāṇa is not ascertained by the Buddhist schools up to Svātantrika, it is accepted by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti because the names of the four types of pramāṇa, the fourfold typology, the cognitive function of pramāṇas, and its validity are propounded in VV and its auto-commentary) (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, pp. 419–420).
Contemporary scholars of Buddhist philosophy like Georges Dreyfus, Mark Siderits, and Jay L. Garfield hold that Candrakīrti adopts Nyāya’s typology of pramāṇa because he embraces Nyāya’s pramāṇa theory according to these interpreters. But Anne MacDonald, a prominent scholar of Candrakīrti, does not agree with the above-mentioned contemporary scholars of Buddhist philosophy (MacDonald, 2015b, pp. 289–291, n. 541).
Candrakīrti writes that “api cāparokṣārthavācitvāt pratyakṣaśabdasyākṣābhimukho arthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 269).
Dignāga states that “mngon sum gyi sgra ni gsum la ’jug ste / tshad ma dang / shes pa dang / yul rnams la’o” (Dignāga, 2016b, p. 130). Masaaki Hattori translates, “The word ‘pratyakṣa’ (perception) may be applied to a means of cognition (pramāṇa), to a cognition (jñāna), and to an object (viṣaya)” (Hattori 1968, p. 68).
Candrakīrti writes, “kalpanāpoḍhasyēva ca jñānasya pratyakṣarvābhyupagamāt tena ca lokasya saṁvyavahārābhāvād lōkikasya ca pramāṇaprameyavyavahārasya vyākhyātumiṣṭatvād vyarthēva pratyakṣa pramāṇakalpanāsañjāyate” MacDonald, 2015a, p. 273).
Jamyang Zhepa writes, “mngon sum tshad ma’i mtshad nyid yod de / rang gi rten rtags yang dag la dngos su ma brten par rang gi ’dzin stangs kyi yul gyi gzhal bya mngon sum pa la mi slu ba’i shes pa de de yin pa’i phyir” (There is the definition of perceptual valid cognition, the cognition which is non-deceptive to its object and does not depend on valid reasoning directly) (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 421).
Candrakīrti, in PPMMK, refutes Dignāga’s notion of kalpanāpoḍham, “cakṣurjñānasamaṅgī nīlam jānāti no tu nīlamiti cāgamasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇābhidhānārthasyāprastutatvat pañcānāmindṛiyavijñānām jadatvapratipādakatvāc ca nāgamādapi kalpanāpoḍhasyēva vijñānasya pratyakṣatvamiti na yuktametat” (MacDonald 2015a, p. 274). Though Candrakīrti rejects kalpanāpoḍham, he accepts the non-conceptual feature of sense and sensory cognition. Similarly, Candrakīrti, in CŚT, negates Dignāga’s notion of kalpanāpoḍham, “smras pa / shes pa mngon sum yin no / shes pa ci ’dra ba zhig / gang rtog pa dang bral ba’o / rtog pa yang ci zhig gang don la ming dang digs su lhag par sgro ’dogs par bzhugs pa’i ’du shes gyer po ste de dang bral ba’i phyir dbang po’i rnam par shes pa lnga ni yul gyi rang gi mtshan nyid brjod du med pa tsam zhig la ’jug pa’i phyir mngon sum gyi sgras brjod par bya ba ste / dbang po dang dbang po la gnas pa’i phyir ro / ’o na dbang po’i rnam par shes pa’i skad cig ma gcig ji ltar mngon sum yin / te ni dbang po dang dbang po brten nas ’jug pa ma yin te / thun mong ma yin pa’i phyir dang / dbang po dang rnam par shes pa skad cig dag skyes ma thag tu ’jig pa nyid kyi phyir ro” (Candrakīrti, 2001, p. 512). In this paragraph, Candrakīrti analyzes Dignāga’s notion of perception from the ontological point of view, but Dignāga’s agenda is solely epistemological.
Candrakīrti writes, “dvicandrādīnāṃ tvatēmirikajñānāpekṣāpratyakṣatvaṃ tēmirikādyapekṣayā tu pratyakṣatvaṃ eva” (MacDonald, 2015a, pp. 274–275).
Candrakīrti writes, “vistareṇa madhyamakāvatāre svasaṁvittiniṣedhāt” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 251).
Nāgārjuna writes, “yadi ca pramāṇataste teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhirarthānām / teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi kathaṃ te pramāṇānām” (Nāgārjuna & Bhattacharya, 2002, p. 63).
Candrakīrti writes, “jñānāntarasya karaṇabhāvaparikalpanāyām aniṣṭādoṣaś cāpadyate” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 250).
Jamyang Zhepa writes, “’dis rang rig ’dod pa’i rang rgyud pa yang bkag go” (This negates Svātantrika which accepts self-cognition) (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 367).
Candrakīrti argues that if characteristics and characterized exist in the first place, then they must be either identical or different, but there is problem in both sides. So, showing the problem in characteristics and characterized, Candrakīrti writes, “na ca vina tatvānyatvena lakṣyalakṣaṇasiddhāv anyā gatir asti” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 256).
According to Sautrāntika, svalakṣaṇa is causally efficacious things like a chair and a feeling of joy, and it is finally subsumed into part-less particle (rdul phran cha med) and moment-less cognition (shes pa skad cig cha med) (Pema Karpo, 2008, p. 44). According to Yogācāra, only consciousness is real, and the rest is illusory in truth, though the external world appears as real (Anacker 2005, p. 161). Moreover, gross consciousness, like sensory consciousness, are not considered to be real because they come under the domain of subject-object duality and such duality is not accepted by this school of thought ultimately. So, the non-dual or subject-object-less consciousness alone is the ultimate svalakṣaṇa according to Yogācāra system of thought (Pema Karpo, 2008, pp. 47–48).
Dignāga writes, “dbang po rnam par rig pa’i rgyu // phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi // der mi snang phyir de’i yul ni // rdul phran ma yin dbang po bzhin // gang ltar snang de de las min // rdzas su med phyir lza gnyis bzhin // de ltar phyi rol gnyis ka yang // blo yi yul du mi rung ngo” (Dignāga, 2016c, p. 531).
According to antarjñeyavāda (a Buddhist epistemological theory according to which, the object of cognition is mere an appearance of cognition), the external object is nothing but the projection of cognition (Dignāga, 2016a, p. 32). In truth, to cognize external object is to cognize cognition itself because external object is nothing other than cognition. Antarjñeyavāda does not deal with the ontological question of cognition – whether cognition is truly established or not. Similarly, Vijñānavāda is a Buddhist philosophical theory which accepts antarjñeyavāda’s view and in addition to this, it also holds cognition as truly established entity (Anacker, 2005, p. 161). Antarjñeyavāda is epistemological which deals with how knowledge is possible, whereas Vijñānavāda is epistemological as well as ontological which deals with the ontological standing of cognition in addition to how knowledge is possible. Consequently, antarjñeyavāda is a broader theoretical domain which comprises the epistemological views of Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and some sub-school of Madhyamaka, whereas Vijñānavāda is only limited to Cittamātra system of thought. One point to be noted here is the term “Yogācāra” is also used for Madhyamaka, Āryadeva has used it in the title of Catuḥśataka, Bodhisattvayogācāracatuḥśataka (Āryadeva, 2001, p. 1). But “Yogācāra”, in its narrow sense, is used only for one of the four Buddhist philosophical schools, namely, Cittamātra school of thought.
Candrakīrti writes, “parokṣaviṣayam tu jñānam sādhyāvyabhicāriliṅgotpannam anumānam” (MacDonald, 2015a, p. 275).
Candrakīrti uses Madhyamaka logical reasoning in the sixth chapter of MA and its auto-commentary.
In Dignāga tradition, inference for oneself is applied for gaining inferential knowledge about an object by oneself, whereas inference for others is applied to produce inferential knowledge about an object in others. In other words, inference for oneself is inferential cognition and inference for others is logical argument. Similarly, Madhyamaka reasoning can be applied to produce inferential knowledge of emptiness in oneself as well as in others. Therefore, the distinction between inference for oneself and inference for others is tenable in Madhyamaka’s theory of inference.
Jamyang Zhepa writes, “rang gi rten gtan tshigs la brten cing rang gi ’dzin stangs yul gyi gzhal bya lkog gyur la mi slu ba’i shes pa rjes su dpag pa’i tshad ma’i mtshan nyid” (The definition of valid inferential cognition is that which depends on reasoning as its base and is non-deceptive to its object of hidden knowable) (Jamyang Zhepa, 2006, p. 432).
Dignāga writes in his Nyāyapraveśa, “ma grub pa dang / ma nges pa dang / ’gal ba ste gsum po rnams ni gtan tshigs ltar snang rnams so” (non-established, uncertain, and contradictory reasoning are the three types of invalid reasoning) (Dignāga, 2016e, p. 512).
What is the difference between prasaṅga and svatantra reasoning? In Dignāgian syllogistic argument or svatantra reasoning, the proponent not only refutes the opponent’s view, but he proves his thesis. In Madhyamaka reductio ad absurdum or prasaṅga reasoning, the proponent does not attempt to establish his thesis, but rather the opponent’s argument is shown as contradictory. There are four types of prasaṅga reasoning: prasaṅga that shows contradiction (’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur), prasaṅga that disproves the opponent’s position through an example (rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa’i mgo snyoms), prasaṅga that disproves evidence through falsity of thesis (sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i ma grub pa), and inference known to others (gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag) (Candrakīrti, 2011b, pp. 85, 88, 93). Though Candrakīrti advocates inference known to others, he refutes svatantra reasoning because a common subject is not possible between a proponent and an opponent according to him (Yotsuya 1999, pp. 73–74).
Candrakīrti writes, “na khalv āryā lokasaṁvyavahāreṇopapattiṃ varṇayanti / kim tu lokata eva yā prasiddhopapattiḥ / tām parāvabodhārtham abhyupetya tayēva lokam bodhayanti” (Macdonald 2015a, p. 242).
Candrakīrti writes, “paramārtho hy āryas tūṣnībhāvaḥ / tataḥ kutas tatva prapañcasaṁbhavo yata upapattir anupapattir vā syāt / yadi hy āryā upapattim na varṇayanti kena khalvidānīm paramartham lokam bodhayiṣyanti / na khalv āryā lokasaṁvyavahāreṇopapattiṃ varṇayanti / kim tu lokata eva yā prasiddhopapattiḥ / tām parāvabodhārtham abhyupetya tayēva lokam bodhayanti” (MacDonald 2015a, pp. 241–242).
Candrakīrti writes, “idampratyayatāmātreṇa saṁvṛteḥ siddhir abhyupagamyate na tu pakṣacatuṣṭ ayābhyupagamena sasvabhāvavādaprasaṅgāt tasya cāyutatvāt” (Macdonald 2015a, p. 236).
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Nurboo, T. Candrakīrti’s Epistemology: A Re-examination of Jamyang Zhepa’s Interpretation. J Indian Philos 51, 515–537 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09547-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-023-09547-3