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The jāti in the Mādhyamika – Different Approaches between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti

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Abstract

Kajiyama has argued that the basis for the concept of jāti (false rejoinder) as described in the Nyāyasūtra is the concept xiang ying (相応) as found in the Fangbian xin lun (方便心論). Kajiyama has also shown that the sophistic arguments called xiang ying are very similar to the prasaṅga arguments of Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school. It thus seems worthwhile to investigate how later Mādhyamika philosophers treated the concept of jāti that originally appeared as the result of the Nyāyasūtra’s criticism of the concept xiang ying and was later accepted by Buddhist logicians such as Dignāga. This paper shows that there were two entirely opposite Mādhyamika positions regarding the concept of jāti. In order to demonstrate this difference, this paper examines in detail statements about jātis that appear in various treatises, especially two works by Bhāviveka and three works by Candrakīrti. As the result, it becomes clear that the differences in the two positions correspond essentially to the differences in how Dignāgaʼs logic was evaluated by the so-called Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika within the Madhyamaka school.

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Notes

  1. Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 15–42; Kajiyama 1991.

  2. Cf. FL 27c11–12: 答曰: 問答相應有二十種. 若人能以此二十義助發正理, 是人則名解眞實論. 若不如是, 不名通達議論之法. [= [The proponent] answers: There are twenty kinds of prasaṅga argument (相應). If any person can support his logical argument by means of those twenty kinds [of prasaṅga argument], then this person is designated as understanding true arguments. If not, [he] is not designated as proficient in the manner of discussion.]

  3. Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 32–39; the corresponding English description is given in Kajiyama 1991: 110–112.

  4. Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 14; Ishitobi 2006; Muroya 2016: 22–24.

  5. Regarding the periodization of the Mādhyamika school in Indian Buddhism, I follow the view of Saitō (cf. Saitō 2012: 30-33)

  6. Cf. Pind 2001.

  7. Cf. Kajiyama 1974: 226–227; cf. VP(D)109a6–b1; (P)125a5–b1: smras pa | gang la brgya 'am stong du lan btab pas ltag chod du thal bar 'gyur ba nges pa'i don de (em., Kajiyama 1974: note 87 : de lacking in PD) la ltag chod ces bya ba tshig gi don yod do zhe na brjod par bya ste | skyes pa dang ma skyes pa gnyi ga med pa'i phyir ltag chod ni med do || ltag chod ces brjod pa gang yin pa de gang las she na | skyes pa 'am ma skyes pa 'am | skye bzhin pa (P : pa lacking in D) skye ba yin grang | re zhig skyes pa ma yin te | skyes zin pa nyid kyi phyir ro || ma skyes pa 'ang ma yin te | ma skyes pa nyid kyi phyir ro || gnyi ga med pa'i phyir skye bzhin pa yod pa ma yin te skyes pa dang ma skyes pa las ma gtogs pa'i skye bzhin pa zhes (em., Kajiyama 1974: note 88 : zhes lacking in PD) bya ba ni yod pa ma yin no |

  8. Cf. FL 28a24–27: 復次汝立我常言非根覺. 爲是現在過去未來. 若言過去, 過去已滅. 若言未來, 未來未有. 若言現在, 則不爲因. 如二角並生, 則不得相因. 是名時同(/時因). [= Further, you state [the logical reason] “not an object of the sense organs” to establish that the self is permanent. [This reason is considered as] belonging to the present, the past, or the future. If [you] say [that it belongs to] the past, what is past is already extinguished; if [you] say [that it belongs to] the future, what is future is still non-existent; if [you] say [that it belongs to] the present, it does not become the cause, since [two things belonging to the present] cannot mutually become a cause, like two horns standing side by side. Such [a refutation] is called “the balancing in terms of time” (時同/時因)]; NMu 5a15–18: 若能立因在所立前, 未有所立此是誰因. 若言在後, 所立已成復何須因. 若倶時者, 因與有因皆不成就, 如牛兩角. 如是名爲無因相似. [= If the reason/cause [occurs] before the object to be proven, whose is this reason/cause if the object to be proven is not [yet] existent? If (on the other hand) [the reason/cause occurs] after [the object to be proven], there is no need of the reason/cause, since the object to be proven is (already) established. If [both occur] simultaneously, the relationship between cause and cause-possessor is not established, as in the case of the left and right horns of a cow. Such [a false rejoinder] is called the ahetusama.]

  9. Although the portion in question is unfortunately missing in the recently discovered Sanskrit manuscript (cf. Ye 2011: 110), one can safely assume that the Sanskrit equivalent of ltag chod is jāti in this case as well.

  10. Cf. MMV (D)187b6–188a2; (P) 211b2–6 : smras pa | 'dus pa dag ni mtshan nyid yin no || bshad pa | 'dus pa yin na yang | gcig la dus gcig ji ltar rung (=MMK 7.2ʼcd: samastāḥ syur ekatra katham ekadā ||) | so so ba gang dag mtshan nyid ma yin pa de dag 'dus pa phan tshun 'gal ba dag 'dus byas kyi dngos po gcig la dus gcig tu ji ltar rung | 'di ltar gang gi tshe na skye ba de'i tshe na gnas pa dang 'jig pa med la | gang gi tshe gnas pa de'i tshe na skye ba dang 'jig pa med cing | gang gi tshe 'jig pa de'i tshe na yang skye ba dang gnas pa med pa de'i phyir skye ba dang gnas pa dang 'jig pa so so ba dang 'dus pa dag kyang 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid du mi 'thad do || mtshan nyid mi 'thad pa'i phyir 'dus byas yod pa ma yin no || smras pa | ltag chod de lta bu 'ba' zhig gis ci bya | yod ni gang gi (D : gi lacking in P) skye ba dang | gnas pa dang | 'jig pa de 'dus byas yin no || bshad pa | kho bo ltag chod kyi phyir mi rtsom gyi (em. : gyis PD) kho bo ni de kho na shes par bya ba'i phyir rtsom mo ||

  11. A similar argument has also been treated by Dharmapāla (cf. GBLSh 239b9–24: 復次, 生住滅相前後同時. 理倶不成. 故不應執, 所以者何. 故次頌曰: 生住滅三相 同時有不成 前後亦爲無 如何執爲有. 論曰: 一體一時有衆多相, 互相違反理必不成. 若執同時體應各異, 既執體一, 應不同時. 執不同時. 亦不應理. 所相體一, 如何異時. 法體生時住滅未有. 至住滅位生相已無. 而言體同. 極爲迷謬. 若言前後相異體同, 善惡色心體應是一. 然捨前相後相起時, 體與相同, 應有捨得. 如何可執前後體同. 三體不同, 亦不應理. 以生住滅遍諸有爲. 三體如何各唯一相. 許各一相, 理亦不然. 滅體無生應非因起. 生體無滅應性是常. 住無滅生應非蘊攝. 若許一一復有三相, 有如前過, 或復無窮. 同時前後, 三相不成, 更無異途. 如何執有.).

  12. In the dialectical portion of the Spitzer manuscript, several arguments similar to the FLʼs 相応 and the NSūʼs jātis are found described as false rejoinders against the Buddhist syllogism “anityaḥ śabdaḥ, aindriyikatvāt, ghaṭādivat [= Sound is impermanent, since it is an object of sense organs, like a pot.]” (cf. Franco 2004: 498; Ono 2020b: 35).

  13. Cf. Ono 2017a.

  14. Regarding the 24 jātis in the NSū and the 16 jātis in the Rushi lun as well, Matilal gives a nice summary and concise explanation of their contents (cf. Matilal 1998: 60–80). His description can be helpful for the readers who are not steeped in the concept of jāti to understand this paper.

  15. Incidentally, the origin of this threefold classification is not clear. It relates possibly to the sevenfold classification of satya (諦) appearing in the Sidi lun (四諦論) translated by Paramārtha (真諦) (cf. T1647; 377a13–19: 諦義有七. 一不倒是諦義, 譬如火相. 二實有是諦義, 如經中説. 三無變異是諦義. 四無二行是諦義, 譬如樹提伽蛇耶達多行. 五不更起是諦義, 從此智不更起, 不同火輪智. 六不相違是諦義, 譬如業及聖戒. 七文義相稱是諦義, 何以故, 言苦者必苦爲義. 由此七義故名爲諦.). Three of the seven classifications of the meaning of truth in this treatise (不倒, 實有 and 不相違) correspond to the three classes of fallacy in the RL (顛倒, 不実義 and 相違).

  16. Cf. Kajiyama 1984: 95; Ono 2020b: 30–32.

  17. Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 27; Katsura 1984: 45–46.

  18. Cf. NMu k.19ab: 能破闕等言 似破謂諸類 (*dūṣaṇaṃ nyūnatādyuktiḥ tadābhāsās tu jātayaḥ ||) [= The refutation is an indication of the lack [of necessary members in the syllogism], etc. Jātis, however, are pseudo ones.] Regarding a corresponding statement in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (=PS), cf. Ono 2020a: 293, 295.

  19. Cf. NMu kk. 20–28; Ono 2017b: 455.

  20. Cf. Ejima 1980: 91–144.

  21. Cf. Ejima 1980: 16.

  22. ZhL 268b21: 眞性有爲空 如幻縁生故.

  23. Cf. Ejima 1980: 92.

  24. La Vallée Poussin has adopted the reading 異焦慧 as lectio difficilior, which is attested in the Song edition Tripiṭaka preserved in the archives of the imperial household in Japan (=S), rather than the variant reading 異空慧 attested in many other editions. He has presumed the word vidagdha meaning “mature/clever” as the Sanskrit equivalent of the word 異焦 (cf. La Vallée Poussin 1933: 89, note 2). I think his choice is correct. The former reading is attested also in the citation from the ZhL found in the treatise 成唯識論本文抄 that was composed in the Kamakura period (13th–14th cent.) in Japan (cf. T 2262; 532a14–26). In the above context, the word appears to be used ironically, as La Vallée Poussin suggested. Interestingly, the word 異焦慧徒 is found in the大乘三論大義鈔 composed by the Japanese monk 玄叡 (Genʼei 9th cent.) (cf. T 2296; 147c17–19: 答. 宗義圓成因縁喩具正顯以悟他是眞比量. 異焦慧徒於其初量邪設僞過謬謗眞量.).

  25. With regard to the passage “非汝等立離前所説眼等有爲別有眼等, 堪審觀察待彼説, 此眼等性空可令信受”, I presume, following the interpretation of La Vallée Poussin (cf. La Vallée Poussin 1933: 90), the structure of Sanskrit sentences such as “na ... , yena ... abhyupagamyeta”.

  26. The sentence “分別法喩別” is difficult to interpret. Fong has tried to translate it by replacing the characters 法 and 喩 (cf. Fong 2015: 185). I tentatively interpret it as above.

  27. I follow Tucciʼs English translation “balancing” for the Sanskrit word sama (cf. Tucci 1930: 53–70) in this case. Matilal, on the other hand, uses the rendering “rejoinder by alternation” for the vikalpasama (cf. Matilal 1998: 66). The translation “balancing” for the word sama is, in my opinion, certainly valid in the case of several jātis including the vikalpasama, but not appropriate in the case of other jātis including the arthāpattisama.

  28. ZhL 271a27–b17: 復有諸餘異焦(S : 空)慧者別顯喩過: 雖諸幻士非實士故説名爲空, 然彼幻士自性不空, 有虚妄現士相體故. 由此道理, 如先所立句義不成, 喩不成故. 今應詰彼: 此虚妄現幻士相體從縁生不. 彼作是答: 此從縁生. 若爾何故復名虚妄. 以如所顯現不如是有故. 豈非眼等亦從縁生, 如所顯現不如是有. 同喩成故, 性空義成. 汝應信受. 彼作是言: 不應信受, 以諸幻士非如實士. 堪審觀察待彼實士, 此虚妄故説名爲空. 非汝等立離前所説眼等有爲別有眼等, 堪審觀察待彼説, 此眼等性空可令信受. 雖無離此所説眼等別有眼等, 然有如是性空縁生, 所立能立二法成就. 但由此喩足能證成所喩義故. 汝今分別法喩別故, 便成分別相似過類. 顯敵論者自慧輕微. 如勝論者説: 聲無常. 所作性故. 譬如瓶等. 不應難言: 瓶等泥團輪等所成可燒可見棒所撃破可是無常, 聲既不爾應非無常. 此亦分別法喩別故, 亦(S : 故)成分別相似過類. 故應信受眼等性空. 性空不離縁生因故; cf. ZhL(J) 111,16–112,15; La Vallée Poussin 1933: 88–91; Hsu 2013: 202–204; Kim 2014: I 47–49, II 34–35; Fong 2015: 183–188; He 2020: 238–239.

  29. The rejoinder against the Vaiśeṣikas that Bhāviveka uses as an example corresponds well to the example of vikalpasama presented in the VVi (cf. PSṬ VI 17,2–6: jātivādy āha – saty etasmin sādharmye ghaṭa eva pākyaś cākṣuṣaś ca. tena ghaṭa eva cākṣuṣatvāt pākyatvāc cānityo bhaviṣyati, na śabdaḥ. śabda evācākṣuṣo ’pākyaḥ śrāvaṇaś ca, na ghaṭaḥ. tena śabda evācākṣuṣatvāditvān nityo bhaviṣyati, na ghaṭa iti. (Ffrg. 14a; cf. Ono 2020a: 311) = The Jātivādin states (as follows): “Although there is a similarity (between sound and a pot) in this case, only the pot is burnable (pākya) and visible. Therefore, only the pot can be impermanent since it is visible and burnable; sound (however) is not. Only sound is invisible, unburnable and audible; the pot (however) is not. As a result, only sound can be permanent since it has invisibility, etc.; the pot (however) is not.”; cf. also NMu 4a22–27; La Vallée Poussin 1933: 90, note 2).

  30. ZhL 268b22: 無爲無有實 不起似空華.

  31. The Chinese translation 審定 is attested also in the NMu 3a4. By investigating Tibetan translation of PSVʼs corresponding part, this word can be regarded as Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit ava√so (nges par gzung/bzung ba) in the NMu.

  32. ZhL 274a3–9: 自部他部有作是言: 若就眞性虚空無實, 以不起故, 此言義准: 起者皆實. 若言: 起者亦無有實, 是則此因不遍同品因性不成, 此是義准相似過類似不成過. 此審定言: 諸不起者皆無有實, 非審定言: 諸無實者悉皆不起. 雖復勤勇無間所發不遍同品亦許爲因. 故此無過; cf. ZhL(J) 122,16–123,2; La Vallée Poussin 1933: 107–108; Hsu 2013: 243–244; Kim 2014: II 44–45.

  33. In the Buddhist explanation of the arthāpattisama from the RL up to the PS, the opponent, i.e., the jātivādin, presumes from the proposition “whatever is produced immediately after an endeavor is impermanent”, as implied in the Buddhistʼs syllogism, the proposition “whatever is not produced immediately after an endeavor is permanent”, by means of mere obversion, and insists that the initial proposition is false due to the existence of counterexamples, such as lightening (cf. NMu 4b27–c1: 若以勤勇無間所發説無常者, 義准則應若非勤勇無間所發諸電光等皆應是常. 如是名爲義准相似; cf. Tucci 1930: 59; Katsura 1984: 62–63; PSV ad PS 6.19ab: tad yathā yadi prayatnānantarīyakam anityam, aprayatnānantarīyakānāṃ vidyudādīnāṃ nityatvam arthād āpannam ity etad arthāpattisamam).

    Incidentally, the usage in which the word arthāpatti means a presumption based only on mere obversion appears in the Nyāyabhāṣya (cf. NBh ad NSū 5.1.22: na ceyaṃ viparyayamātrād ekāntenārthāpattiḥ. na khalu vai ghanasya grāvṇaḥ patanam ity arthād āpadyate dravāṇām apāṃ patanābhāva iti. [= There is, however, no such one-sided inference of the meaning by means of mere obversion (viparyaya). Indeed, it is not inferred from [the proposition] “solid rocks fall down” that “fluid water does not fall down”.]). This can go further back to the Arthaśāstraʼs Tantrayukti-section and the Carakasaṃhitāʼs Vādamārga portion. In the former, arthāpatti is defined as follows: “The arthāpatti means the presumption of what is not stated [in the initial sentence] on the basis of implication. [For example, from the principle] “who knows worldly customs should seek refuge with a king endowed with [good] spirit, wealth and nature by means of gaining his favor and satisfying him”, the meaning “he should not seek refuge [with a king] by means of not gaining his favor and not satisfying him” is presumed by implication (AŚ 15.1.29–31: yad anuktam arthād āpadyate sārthāpattiḥ. lokayātrāvid rājānam ātmadravyaprakṛtisampannaṃ priyahitadvāreṇāśrayeta. nāpriyahitadvāreṇāśrayetety arthād āpannaṃ bhavatīti; cf. Kamimura 1984: 330; Olivelle 2013: 436). In the latter, it is explained as follows: “The arthāpatti is an understanding of the meaning in which another unstated meaning is established by a stated meaning. For example, when it is stated that ‘this disease cannot be cured with nutrition’, one infers [from this statement] the meaning that ‘this [disease] can be cured with fasting’, or when it is stated that ‘he should not eat at noon’, one infers [from this statement] the meaning that ‘he should eat at night’.” (Vādamārga Sūtra 27: arthāpattir arthaprāptir nāma yatraikenārthenoktenāparasyārthasyānuktasya siddhiḥ, yathā nāyaṃ sautarpaṇasādhyo vyādhir ity ukte bhavaty arthaprāptir apatarpaṇasādhyo ʼyam iti, nānena divā bhoktavyam iti ukte bhavaty arthaprāptir niśi bhoktavyam iti; cf. Ui 1925: 435–436; 592–593). In short, the arthāpatti can be, although it is logically not correct, a kind of valid inference in cases of experiential knowledge such as politics or medicine. With regard to the concept of arthāpatti, Oberhammer 1991: 88–92 gives a comprehensive description.

  34. The VVi explains why the arthāpattisama is a false rejoinder as follows: “With regard to the syllogism ‘the ātman is not existent, because it is not perceived, like a son of a barren woman (vandhyā)’, the jātivādin responds as follows: ‘[From this syllogism], it is inferred by implication that what is being perceived is existent. Something like a wheel of fire, however, is not existent, although it is perceived.’ In the VVi, it is said that this [refutation] is called “unreal” (abhūta), because [the jātivādin] fabricates [the assertion] that the existence [of something] is resulted on the basis of its perception” (cf. PSṬ VI 41,11–42,1: nāsty ātmānupalabdher vandhyāputravad iti kṛte jātivādinoktam – arthād āpannam upalabhyamānānāṃ sattvam, upalabhyamānam api kiñcin nāsty evālātacakrādīti. abhūtam etad iti vādavidhau. upalabdheḥ sattvāpattir ity adhyāropād iti; Ffrg. 21a; Ono 2020a: 315).

  35. It is notable that in this passage, Bhāviveka seems also to indicate the inappropriateness of deduction through mere conversion (cf. ZhL 274a7: 非審定言: 諸無實者悉皆不起). Such an explanation is not found in any description of arthāpattisama in Buddhist logic up to Dignāga. Bhāviveka may thus be seen as truly aware of the principle of contraposition, in that he explicitly indicates the inappropriateness of deduction through both mere conversion and mere obversion.

  36. Cf. NMu 5a4–5: 義准相似, 謂以顛倒不定爲難, 故似不定. [= If the arthāpattisama means the refutation on the basis of inconclusiveness in terms of the opposite [reason from the initial reason], i.e., aprayatnānantarīyakatva, then [such a refutation] is one that falsely indicates the inconclusiveness [of the initial reason] ]; cf. Tucci 1930: 69–70; Katsura 1987: 59–61. Eventually, in the case of propositions such as “whatever is arisen is real” or “whatever is not produced immediately after an endeavor is permanent”, which result from the initial proposition through mere obversion, fabricated logical reasons such as “what is arisen” or “what is not produced immediately after an endeavor” are inconclusive (anaikāntika). It is because they also exist in dissimilar cases (vipakṣa) such as “what is unreal” or “what is impermanent”.

  37. We are thus apt to presume the word 似不定 instead of 似不成 as having been its original form. As far as I have investigated, however, the reading 似不定 is not attested in any of the old manuscripts of the ZhL preserved in Japan.

  38. On the other hand, in the Chinese translation of the PP, i.e., 般若燈論釋 (=PP[Ch]), almost all the passages where Bhāvaviveka mentions jātis seem to be rendered inappropriately. Therefore, in the following I shall examine the mentions of jātis in the PP only on the basis of the Tibetan translation. For the sake of comparison, however, I will give the Chinese translation in the footnotes as far as possible.

  39. PP(D) 49b4; (P)59a7–8: don dam par nang gi skye mched rnams de dag gi rkyen gzhan dag las skye ba med de | gzhan yin pa'i phyir | dper na bum pa bzhin no ||

  40. PP(D) 50a3–4; (P)60a1–3: chos mngon pa pa dag (P : gzhan dag D) na re | gzhan nyid ces bya ba gal te 'bras bu'i nus pas stong pa nyid la bya na ni gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do || gal te des mi stong pa nyid la bya na ni dpe sgrub pa'i chos dang mi (D : ma P) ldan par 'gyur ro zhes zer ro || gzhi gzhan la ltos pa gzhan nyid kyi blo bskyed pa spyi'i chos spyir brjod pa'i phyir | ltag chod de ni ma grub pa ltar snang ba dang | sgrub pa dang mi ldan pa ltar snang ba yin no || (cf. Kajiyama 1963: 52–53; Nōnin 1992: 60); PP(Ch) 53a15–22: 復次阿毘曇人言: 汝言他者爲以果功能空説爲他耶, 爲當彼能不空説爲他耶.二倶有過. 何以故. 若以果功能空説爲他者, 因義不成故. 若彼能不空者, 彼能成法空譬喩壞故. 論者言: 總説聚法故, 物邊觀故, 生他覺故, 汝言因義不成及能成法空譬喩壞者無此過失, 似光影耳. The word 似光影 might correspond to the Sanskrit ābhāsa (ltar snang ba in Tibetan).

  41. Cf. Nōnin 1992: 60. This ma grub pa ltar snang ba can be regarded as rendering asiddhābhāsa.

  42. Kajiyamaʼs interpretation of “sgrub pa dang mi ldan pa ltar snang ba” as ahetusama (cf. Kajiyama 1963: 53) should be corrected.

  43. Cf. Nōnin 1992: note 38.

  44. Cf. NMu 5b27–c2: 所作相似乃有三種. 若難瓶等所作性於聲上無, 此似不成. 若難聲所作性於瓶等無, 此似相違. 若難即此常上亦無, 是不共故便似不定. 或似喩過, 引同法故. 何以故. 唯取總法建立比量不取別故. 若取別義, 決定異故比量應無. [= There are three kinds of kāryasama. If [it] refutes that the effect-ness of a pot does not exist in sound, [then this refutation is that which] falsely indicates that the logical reason is not established (似不成). If [it] refutes that the effect-ness of sound does not exist in [impermanent] beings such as a pot, [then this refutation is that which] falsely indicates that the logical reason is contradictory. If [it] refutes that this [effect-ness of sound] does not exist in permanent beings [i.e., the dissimilar class], [then this refutation is that which] either falsely indicates that the logical reason is inconclusive due to its uncommonness, or falsely indicates that the example is incorrect (似喩過 *dṛṣṭāntadoṣābhāsa), since [a pot] is shown as the similar instance. Why? It is because the inference is done only by grasping the common property, but not the specific [property]. If the specific property is grasped, the inference is impossible, since [the properties of the reason and the object to be proven] are completely different.]; cf. Tucci 1930: 69–70; Katsura 1987: 59–61.

    Incidentally, in Dignāgaʼs theory of jāti, both kāryasama and prasaṅgasama are explained also as rejoinders which falsely indicate that the example is incorrect (dṛṣṭāntadoṣābhāsa). Of these two cases, however, the latter is regarded as that which falsely indicates that the object to be proven is not established in the example (所立法不成), while the former is regarded as that which falsely indicates that the logical reason is not established in the example (能立法不成). Cf. PSṬ VI 29,16–30,1: dṛṣṭāntābhāsavat tv etad iti sādhyānvitatvena siddhasyāpi ghaṭasya sādhyavaikalyacodanāt. kaḥ punaḥ kāryasamād asya viśeṣaḥ, yāvatā tatrāpi śabdakāryatvaṃ ghaṭe nāstīti codanād dṛṣṭāntadoṣābhāsatvam uktam evety ata āha – pūrvaṃ tv ityādi. tatra hi śabdakāryatvaṃ ghaṭe nāstīti hetvananvayena dṛṣṭāntadoṣābhāsatvam uktam, iha tu sādhyānanvayena tadābhāsatvam iti viśeṣaḥ.

  45. PP(D)52b4–6; (P)63b1–4: gtso bo ni chen po la sogs pa de kho na'i rgyu ma yin te | mi gsal ba'i phyir dper na skyes bu bzhin pas rang bzhin rgyur 'dod pa (D : pa lacking in P) dag gi rang gi rjes su dpag pa la gnod do || ji ste mi gsal ba'i phyir zhes bya ba gtan tshigs kyi don gal te gsal ba'i sngon rol gyi gnas skabs la bya na ni dpe sgrub pa'i chos dang mi ldan pa'i skyon du 'gyur la | gal te shes pa yod pa nyid la bya na ni gtan tshigs kyi don mi 'grub bo zhe na | de ni bzang po ma yin te | gtan tshigs spyir brjod pa'i phyir ram | bye brag tu brjod na yang mjug sdud pa'i phyir gcig tu byed pa'i phyir ltag chod de ni ma grub pa ltar snang ba yin no || (cf. Kajiyama 1963: 60; Nōnin 1996: 93–94); PP[Ch] 54b12–16: 彼藏不爲大等諦因, 由不了故, 譬如丈夫. 汝若欲説自性爲因者, 自驗破故. 外人言: 我立丈夫與思相應, 則得明了而言由不了故者此因不成. 又能成法不具故亦譬喩過故. 論者言: 彼語無義. 此復云何. 總説因故, 立別義故處處不了. 總一不成.

  46. Cf. Nōnin 1996: 94, note 46.

  47. Cf. PP (D) 59a5–59b1; (P)71a4–8: da (P : de D) ni dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi rkyen nyid kyang ji ltar mi rigs pa de ltar dpyad par bya ste | yin pa'i chos 'di dmigs pa ni || med pa kho nar nye bar bstan || (MMK 1.8ab) zhes bya ba la | yin pa'i zhes bya ba ni gyur pa'i zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go || chos zhes (D : zhes lacking in P) bya ba ni rang gi mtshan nyid 'dzin pa'i phyir ro || 'di zhes bya ba ni mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa blo la bzhag pa bstan pa'o || dmigs pa zhes bya ba ni de dag dmigs par bya ba yin pa (D : pa lacking in P) ste | dmigs pa ni gzung ba zhes bya ba'i don gang yin pa'o || dmigs pa med pa kho na zhes bya ba ni | dmigs pa med pa nyid du'o || ji ltar dmigs pa med ce na | don dam par de dag skye ba bkag pa'i phyir ro || skye bzhin pa la yang dmigs pa med de | skye bzhin pa'i phyir gzugs bzhin no ||; cf. PP(Ch) 57c22–23: 亦非能縁. 何以故. 由欲起故. 譬如色法.

  48. Cf. PP (D) 59b4–7; (P)71b3–8: gzhan dag yang rnam par brtag pa mtshungs par (P : mtshungs par lacking in D) ltag chod sbyor bar byed de | gzugs ni dmigs pa med pa yin te | gzugs kyi phung por gtogs pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba gang yin pa de (PPṬ: de lacking in PD) ni bstan bcos las kyang dmigs pa med pa'i chos rnams gang zhe na | gzugs dang mya ngan las 'das pa'o zhes 'byung bar rigs na sems dang sems las byung ba rnams la dmigs pa med pa nyid du khas len pa gang yin pas (D : pa P) ni dmigs pa dang bcas pa'i chos rnams gang zhe na | 'di lta ste | sems dang sems las byung ba rnams so zhes 'byung ba de khas len pas mi rigs so zhe na | de ni rigs pa ma yin te | dpe bsgrub pa'i phyir ro || 'byung ba las gyur pa ma yin pa nyid gtan tshigs su brjod na yang dpe med pa'i phyir ro || gal te bzung (P : gzung D) ba ni dmigs pa'o zhes de dag gi don la rtog na yang sems dang sems las byung ba'i bzung ba (P : gzung pa D) nyid 'gog par 'gyur ba'i phyir te | ji (D : de P) skad gsungs pa'i tshul nyid kyis don dam par rnam par shes pa dmigs par byed pa nyid du khas ma blangs pa'i phyir ro || (cf. Kajiyama 1964: 118–119; Nōnin 2006: 23); PP(Ch) 57c29–58a8: 復有異人言: 若色陰所攝色不能縁者, 是義相應. 諸部論師亦作是説: 何等無所縁法. 謂色及涅槃. 若汝意謂心心數法無所縁者, 汝先所欲則爲自破. 何等有所縁法. 謂心及心數法. 論者言: 汝語不善. 我所立喩今更明顯. 外人言: 心心數法定有所縁非如造色者, 無譬喩故. 復次所取者爲所縁, 論者言: 如彼分別心心數法有所取者後當更破.

  49. Cf. Nōnin 2006: note 23.

  50. PP(D)175b3–5, (P)218a7–b2: phyogs dang po pa'i phyir phyogs gnyis pa las gal te | khyod kyi sa bon gyi rgyun dang chos mthun pa'i mtshan nyid kyi brtag pa de ltar gyur na nyes pa'i skyon chen po mang du 'byung bar 'gyur te (=MMK 17.12ab: bahavaś ca mahāntaś ca doṣāḥ syur yadi kalpanā | syād eṣā) zhes gang smras pa | de yang rigs pa ma yin te | rgyu dang 'bras bu'i rgyun rjes su 'jug pa nyid kyis 'brel pa med na mi 'byung ba nyid dang | rtag pa ma yin pa dang | chad pa ma yin pa nyid med na mi 'byung ba nyid kyis (D : kyi P) sa bon gyi rgyun dpe nyid du 'dod pa'i phyir ro || de'i khyad par dag bsgrub par bya ba la rnam par rtog par (D : pa P) byed pa yang | rnam par rtog pa 'dra (P : pa'i dra D) ba'i ltag chod du 'gyur te | (cf. PPṬ(D)[Za]39b4ff.; Kajiyama 1979: 334); PP(Ch)100b25–c8: 論者言: 汝説業果有相續故. 而以種子爲喩者則有大過. 如論偈説: 作此分別者 得大及多過 是如汝所説 於義則不然. 釋曰: 云何不然. 此謂如汝向分別有種子相續相似法體者不然. 何以故. 種子有形有色有對. 是可見法得有相續. 今思惟是事尚不可得. 何況心之與業無形無色無對不可見. 刹那刹那生滅不住. 欲與爲驗者是驗不成. 又從種至芽者. 爲滅已相續至芽. 爲不滅相續至芽. 若滅已至芽者. 芽則無因. 若不滅而至芽者. 應從初種子常生於芽. 若爾者一種子中則生一切衆芽. 是事不然, 有大過故.

  51. Cf. Kajiyama 1979: 314. Kajiyama notes the fact that Bhāviveka was regarded as being a member of the so-called Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school in the later Tibetan doxography.

  52. Incidentally, Avalokitavrataʼs explanation of vikalpasama regarding this passage also seems to have deviated somewhat from the explanations of Buddhist logicians (cf. PPṬ(D)[Za] 40a7–b6; (P)[Za] 231a3–8; Kajiyama 1979: note 26).

  53. PP(D)72b3–5, (P)87a7–b2: 'dir gzhan dag na re | 'gro ba med do zhes bya ba'i skabs bor nas 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba gcig pa nyid dang | gzhan pa nyid ma yin no zhes dam 'cha' bar byed pa de ni skabs bor ba dang | ltag chod yin no zhes zer ro || 'dir bshad pa | gang dag dngos po gcig pa dang || dngos po gzhan pa nyid du ni || (MMK 2.21ab: ekībhāvena vā siddhir nānābhāvena vā yayoḥ) 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba gcig pa nyid dang | gzhan pa nyid du grub par gyur na de gnyis yod pa nyid du shes par 'gyur ba zhig na | gang gi tshe ji skad bshad pa'i rnam pas gcig pa nyid dang | gzhan pa nyid du | grub par gyur pa yod min pa || de gnyis grub pa ji ltar yod || (21cd: na vidyate tayoḥ siddhiḥ kathaṃ nu khalu vidyate ||) de'i phyir de ltar de'i dngos po nyid dgag par 'dod pa'i phyir skabs bor ba yang ma yin la | gcig pa nyid la sogs par yongs su brtag (PPṬ : rtog PD) pa nyid bkag pa'i phyir ltag chod kyang ma yin no || (cf. Tachikawa 1985: 51–53); PP(Ch) 64b18–26: 復有人云: 汝先遮去今則棄捨, 乃更論餘若一若異去及去者二皆不成, 此非善説者不然. 如偈曰: 去者及去二爲一異故成. 釋曰: 去者去二爲一爲異, 有彼二故, 可領受耶. 若方便説: 或一或異者, 如偈曰: 彼二無有成云何當有去. 釋曰: 彼去已遮非欲捨故. 由如此義一等分別亦如是遮.

  54. MMK 2.18–20: yad eva gamanaṃ gantā sa eveti na yujyate | anya eva punar gantā gater iti na yujyate || yad eva gamanaṃ gantā sa eva hi bhaved yadi | ekībhāvaḥ prasajyeta kartuḥ karmaṇa eva ca || anya eva punar gantā gater yadi vikalpyate | gamanaṃ syād ṛte gantur gantā syād gamanād ṛte ||

  55. Cf. PPṬ(D)271b4–7: yang na khyed dbu ma pa dag gang gi tshe 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba med par ma grub pa de'i tshe 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba gcig pa nyid dam gzhan pa nyid yin zhes rnam par rtog pa brjod pa ltag chod yin te | dper na ltag chod smra ba dag la sgra ni mi rtag ste | brtsal ma thag tu 'byung ba'i phyir | dper na bum pa bzhin no zhes sgra mi rtag pa nyid du bsgrubs pa na de dag pham par gyur pa de'i tshe | 'di skad ces ji mi rtag pa dang | sgra gcig pa nyid dam gzhan pa nyid yin zhes zer ba de'i ltag chod yin pa de bzhin du 'dir khyed dbu ma pa yang 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba med pa nyid du ma grub pas pham par gyur pa'i tshe 'gro ba po dang 'gro ba gcig pa nyid dam | gzhan pa nyid ce rtog pa byed pa de ni ltag chod yin no zhes zer ba yin no || [= Or, for you, the Mādhyamika, if a goer and the going are not existent and not established, the statement of differentiation “a goer and the going are either identical or distinct” is a false rejoinder. For example, those who state false rejoinders (jātivādin) when the impermanence of sound is established [by the syllogism] “sound is impermanent, since it is produced immediately after an endeavor, like a pot” refute this. In this case, if they state that impermanence and sound are either identical or distinct, [this statement] is a false rejoinder. Likewise, if you, the Mādhyamika, determine that a goer and the going are either identical or distinct when [you refute that] a goer and the going are not existent and not established, [your argument] is a false rejoinder.]; cf. Tachikawa 1985: 52.

  56. PP(D)89b2–4, (P)108b3–5: don dam par sa la sogs pa khams rnams yod pa kho na yin te | de dag gi mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro || 'di la bcom ldan 'das kyis (D : kyi P) gang don dam par med do zhes gsungs pa de la ni mtshan nyid med de | dper na nam mkha'i me tog bzhin no || sa la sogs pa dag la (D : la lacking in P) ni sra ba nyid la sogs pa'i mtshan nyid dag yod pas de ltar de dag gi mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir sa la sogs pa khams rnams yod pa kho na yin no zhes zer ro || (cf. Ames 1999: 74); PP(Ch) 71a8–11: 復次毘婆沙師言: 第一義中有地等界. 何以故. 彼相有故. 此地等界若實無者如來不應説有彼相.如虚空花.今有堅等爲地等相. 以相有故. 地等非無.

  57. MMK 5.1: nākāśaṃ vidyate kiṃcit pūrvam ākāśalakṣaṇāt | alakṣaṇaṃ prasajyeta syāt pūrvaṃ yadi lakṣaṇāt ||; cf. Siderits/Katsura 2013: 60.

  58. PP(D)91b6–92a4; (P)111b1–8: 'dir mkhas su re ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal can kha cig rang gi phyogs kyi skyon brjod pa brnags par mi bzod pa na 'di skad ces nam mkha' yod pa yin te | mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro zhes smra ba na | khyed kyi mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid dag snga phyir sgro btags nas gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid du brjod pa ni dper na sgra ni mi rtag ste | byas pa'i phyir ro zhes smras pa la | gal te sgra skyes pa'i snga rol na | byas pa nyid yod na ni sgra la 'khrul (D : byas P) pa yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs su mi (P : mi lacking in D) rung ngo || 'on te sgra skyes pa'i sngon rol na byas pa nyid med de | phyis yod na ni gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do zhes zer ba de'i tshig de rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin te | ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid du brjod pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba de bzhin du khyed kyis | nam mkha'i mtshan nyid snga rol na || nam mkha' cung zad yod ma yin || (1ab) zhes bya ba la sogs pas gtan tshigs ji skad smras pa sun 'byin par 'dod pas mtshan nyid yod pa 'gog par byed pa'i tshig de yang legs par smras pa ma yin no zhes zer ro || 'dir bshad pa | mtshan nyid kyang de nyid dang | gzhan la sogs pa'i khyad par gyis (P : gyi D) mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i khongs su gtogs pa yin la | mtshan nyid kyi gzhi'i skye mched de dag gi don dam pa ba'i (D : don dam par P) yod pa nyid ni don dam par brtsal pas (D : bas P) de'i phyir mtshan nyid kyi gzhi mi 'thad na mtshan nyid kyang mi srid pas de dgag pa'i phyir ni 'bad pa mi rtsom mo || 'di skad ces mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang | mtshan nyid dag snga phyir sgro btags nas zhes bya ba la sogs pa gang smras pa de la yang nyon cig dang | snga phyi (D : phyir P) mi srid par bstan pa kho nas gzhan nyid dgag pa bstan pa'i phyir ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid ma yin no ||; Ames 1999: 82–83. Incidentally, there is no section in the Chinese translation of the PP corresponding to this passage (cf. PP(Ch) 71c13–21).

  59. PPṬ[Sha](D)72b6–73a1; (P)[Sha] 82a3–5: snga gal te mtshan las snga gyur na || mtshan nyid med par thal bar 'gyur (MMK 5.1cd) zhes bya ba la sogs pas mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid dag snga phyi med par bstan pa kho nas bye brag pa la sogs pa dag mtshan nyid kyi gzhi dang mtshan nyid dag gzhan nyid du 'dod pa dgag pa bstan pa'i phyir khyed kyi gtan tshigs kyi don mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba de ma grub pa ltar snang ba nyid ma yin no || [= Because [we], just by having previously indicated that there is no anteroposterior relation between the substratum of characteristic and characteristic by [statements] such as “if it existed prior to its defining characteristic, it would follows that something exists without a defining characteristic”, state the negation of difference between a substratum and a characteristic, which is recognized by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., [Our refutation of] the meaning of your logical reason “since their defining characteristics do exist” is not that which falsely indicates that the logical reason is not established.]; cf. Ames 1999: note 45.

  60. Incidentally, at the end of the commentary on this passage, Avalokitavrata states the following: PPṬ[Sha](D) 73a4–7; (P)[Sha] 82b1–5: ... gang dag gal te sgra skyes pa'i sngon rol na byas pa nyid yod na ni sgra la 'khrul pa yod pa'i phyir gtan tshigs su mi rung ngo || 'on te sgra skyes pa'i snga (D : sngon P) rol na byas pa nyid med de phyis yod na ni gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid do zhes zer ba de'i tshig de rigs pa dang ldan pa ma yin pa ni bden te (D : no P) || kho bo cag dbu ma pa'i gtan tshigs mtshan nyid kyi sngon (D : snga P) rol na mtshan nyid kyi gzhi med pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni de ltar rigs pa dang mi ldan pa ma yin te | legs pa yin pas (D : ma yin te P) khyed kyi gtan tshigs mtshan nyid yod pa'i phyir zhes bya ba de ma grub pa nyid yin no || de ltar mkhas su re ba'i mngon pa'i nga rgyal can de dag dbu ma'i tshig le'ur byas pa brgyad pa (D : bzhi brgya pa P) las 'byung ba'i lan tsam yang 'debs mi nus bzhin du dbu ma'i rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma lta bu la ltag chod du rgol bar byed pa de dag gis ni bdag nyid rigs pa'i sgo tsam yang mi shes par bstan pa yin no || [= If somebody [states:] “If the property ‘being produced’ exists before sound arises, the logical reason [‘being produced’] is not appropriate, since it is [still] uncertain whether [the property ‘being produced’] is related to sound; or [on the other hand] if the property ‘being produced’ does not exist before sound arises [and therefore] exists [only] after [sound arises], the meaning of the logical reason is not established,” the statement of the [opponent] is not correct”, [this] is true. However, because the logical reason of our Mādhyamika “because the substratum of defining characteristic does not exist prior to the defining characteristic” is not incorrect as such and [is rather] appropriate, your logical reason “because the characteristic exists” is not established. Thus, it has been shown in [this] commentary on the Mūlamadhyamaka[kārikā] to be compared with the lamp of wisdom (prajñāpradīpa) that someone who is too confident of [his own] cleverness, and who cannot refute the descriptions of the eight verses [of the fifth chapter] of the Madhyamakakārikā and criticizes them as false rejoinders, does not know even the entrance gate into logic.] The expression “the entrance gate into logic” (rigs pa'i sgo; *nyāyamukha) appearing at the end of this passage reminds us of Dignāgaʼs treatise. Avalokitavrata may be ridiculing his opponentʼs ignorance of Dignāgaʼs Nyāyamukha, in which jātis are explained in detail.

  61. Cf. above note 8. As a matter of fact, Dignāga explains the ahetusama in various ways. One of them is the explanation that the refutation falsely indicates that the reason is not established (cf. NMu 5a24–25: 於義因中有似不成. 非理誹撥諸法因故.) Incidentally, Dharmapāla seems to utilize an argument similar to the ahetusama as a correct rejoinder (cf. GBLSh 238b19–c2: 復次能生所生同時前後. 倶不應理, 故定無生. 所以者何. 故次頌曰: 前後及同時 二倶不可説 故生與瓶等 唯假有非眞. 論曰: 若所生法在能生前, 既離能生所生何有. 此所生法設離能生, 是則能生便爲無用. 若所生法在能生後, 無所依止何有能生. 設離所生能生何用. 又此二法若不同時, 能是誰能所爲何所. 若所生法與能生倶, 生既同時, 應不相待, 如牛兩角互不相依. 應無能生所生差別. 所生未有能生亦無, 所生有時能生何用. 如是二法前後同時理倶不成. 故生非有).

  62. Besides the above-mentioned passages, Bhāviveka applies the expression “falsely indicating that” also in the following passages: PP ad MMK 6.2 (Rāgaraktaparīkṣā), in which Bhāviveka regards the opponentʼs refutation to his syllogism as falsely indicating the non-existence of the example (cf. PP[D]96b5, PPṬ[D][Sha] 97a5ff.); PP ad MMK chapter 13 (Saṃskāraparīkṣā), in which Bhāviveka regards the opponentʼs refutation to his syllogism as falsely indicating a contradiction of the reason ('gal ba ltar snang ba) (cf. PP[D)]48a1–2; PP[D] 150a6; Mochizuki 1990: 75); PP ad MMK 22.6 (Tathāgataparīkṣā), in which Bhāviveka regards the opponentʼs refutation to his syllogism as falsely indicating that the reason is not established (ma grub par ltar snang ba) (cf. PP[D]212a5–b1: Nozawa 2015: 244); and PP ad MMK chapter 27 (Dṛṣṭiparīkṣā), in which Bhāviveka regards the refutation as falsely indicating the proponentʼs logical fallacy (sun ʼbyin ltar snang ba) (cf. PP[D]258b4). Incidentally, Bhāviveka also uses the expression “incorrect refutation” (lan gdab dkaʼ; *duruttara) four times (cf. PP[D]110a1 ad MMK 7.25; PP[D]117b7 ad MMK 8.12; PP[D]208a3 ad MMK 21.17; PP[D]220a5 ad MMK 23.2).

  63. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika II k.14 (cf. Watanabe 2010). In the Vādanyāya, the names of sādharmyasama and vaidharmyasama are mentioned (cf. VN 23,16). Incidentally, Prajñākaragupta mentions certain jātis (kāryasama and vikalpasama) six times in his Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (cf. PVA 72,18; Franco 1997: 249, n.30), and consequently Yamāri mentions them at least eight times.

  64. Here, I would like to bring the readerʼs attention to the fact that in the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, the Tarkajvālā and the Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, texts ascribed to Bhāviveka, we do not find any passages in which expressions such as jāti (ltag chod) or “x-ābhāsa” (x- ltar snang ba) are attested.

  65. With regard to Candrakīrtiʼs critical stance on Dignāgaʼs logic and epistemology in general, see MacDonald 2015: Sanskrit Text 138,4-276,1, translation 49-294 (cf. PrP 13,1-75,13 ad MMK 1.1).

  66. The sādhyasama jāti is a false rejoinder in which the opponent, i.e., the jātivādin, requires the proponent to prove that the sādhyadharma is established in the example (cf. NBh ad NSū 5.1.4: hetvādyavayavasāmarthyayogī dharmaḥ sādhyaḥ. taṃ dṛṣṭānte prasañjayataḥ sādhyasamaḥ; Mimaki 1984: 572). However, the example (e.g., a kitchen) is, to begin with, that where the existence of sādhyadharma (e.g., fire) has already been accepted by both proponent and opponent. Thus it is no longer necessary to prove that the sādhyadharma is established in the example. The sādhyasama is therefore regarded as a false rejoinder.

  67. Cf. Mimaki 1984: 576. Mimaki’s conclusion suggests that in general, the early Mādhyamika evaluated jāti arguments positively, which is consistent with Kajiyamaʼs assumption regarding the relationship between xiang ying (相応) in the FL and jāti in the NSū, to which this paper refers at the beginning. However, Mimaki examined statements from early Mādhyamika literature and the PrP without any distinction. The author of this paper has given attention to the fact that Candrakīrti, who certainly knew Dignāgaʼs jāti theory, nonetheless adopted this refutation from the early Mādhyamika and moreover, frequently used it in his PrP.

  68. Cf. Bhattacharya 1974; Mimaki 1984: 574.

  69. Incidentally, the last passage of the NMu mentions, in addition to the fourteen jātis that Dignāga himself enumerates as jāti, seven of the NSū’s twenty-four jātis, namely, utkarṣasama, apakarṣasama, varṇyasama, avarṇyasama, upapattisama, pratidṛṣṭāntasama and prakaraṇasama (NMu 5b22–24: 如即此中諸有所説増益損減有顯無顯生理別喩品類相似等由此方隅皆應諦察及應遮遣). The names of the three remaining jātis – sādhyasama, anupalabdhisama and anityasama – are not explicitly mentioned in the NMu.

  70. Cf. NMu 5c6–7: 倶許而求因名生過相似者. 謂有難言如前所立: 瓶等無常復何因證. [Regarding [the statement:] “If [the opponent] seeks the reason also in terms of an example which is admitted by both [proponent and opponent], [his refutation] is called prasaṅgasama.” It means: Someone states with regard to the same [subject] to be proven as follows: To begin with, what is the reason why a pot is impermanent?]; cf. Tucci 1930: 69–70; Katsura 1987: 59–61; PSV ad PS 6.20ab: tad yathā pūrvavat kṛte ghaṭa eva tāvad anitya ity atra ko hetur iti. The description of this jāti in the VVi is the same (cf. Ono 2020a: 314-315). The RL calls this jāti 顕不許義難 (cf. RL 33a8–15). It is not clear why the jāti called sādhyasama in the NSū came to be designated by Buddhist logicians as prasaṅgasama in their classification. They may have possibly intended to designate the typical prasaṅga argument of early Mādhyamika as prasaṅgasama (cf. Katsura 1987: 61). Originally, prasaṅgasama and sādhyasama were two of the twenty-four kinds of jāti in the NBh. Despite their similarity, in the NBh they are described as being different. The former is defined as follows: “Prasaṅgasama means ‘balancing by means of infinite regression’ that the logical reason should be stated also with regard to the logical reason [itself]” (cf. NBh ad NSū 5.1.9: sādhanasyāpi sādhanaṃ vācyam iti prasaṅgena pratyavasthānaṃ prasaṅgasamaḥ). Incidentally, Uddyotakara replaces, possibly under the influence of Dignāga, the meaning of sādhyasama with that of prasaṅgasama and vice versa (cf. NV ad NS 5.1.9: yathā tasminn eva hetau ghaṭādisādharmyena kṛta itthaṃ ghaṭa eva tāvad anitya ity atra ko hetur iti prasaṅgasamaḥ. [= When the same logical reason is applied through the similarity to a pot, etc., in the same way, [an opponent refutes as follows:] “To begin with, what is the reason why a pot itself is impermanent?” [This refutation is] prasaṅgasama.]

  71. However, the word jāti in the meaning of “birth”, as part of the group of concepts jāti, jarā, maraṇa, and the same word meaning “arising”, as part of the group of concepts jāti, sthiti, nirodha, are used frequently.

  72. CŚṬ (D)104a5–b5; (P)114b3–115a4: gang dag kha (D : kha lacking in P) cig ni rang gi lhag par mos pas dbul ba nyid kyis sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mthu bsam gyis mi khyab pa mnga' ba de de ltar mi rtogs pa 'ba' zhig tu ma zad kyi | 'on kyang skur pa (D : bskur ba P)'debs par yang byed de | de skad du yang | de bzhin gshegs pa ni thams cad mkhyen pa ma yin te | skyes bu nyid yin pa'i phyir mi gzhan bzhin no || zhes smra'o || de'i phyir 'dir de bzhin gshegs pa ni thams cad mkhyen pa ma yin te | zhes smra ba 'di la 'di skad dri bar bya ste | gang dam bca' ba'i tshig gnyis nye bar bkod (D : bgod P) pa de ci don gcig pa zhig gam | 'on te don tha dad pa zhig yin grang || don gcig go zhe na ni | zlos pa'i nyes par (D : nye bar P) 'gyur ro || don tha dad do zhe na brjod par 'dod pa'i don go bar byed pa ma yin no || brjod du med pa yin no zhe na | brjod du med pa nyid 'di ci zhig | gal te brjod pa nyid med pa nyid yin na ni || de'i phyir tshig 'di gnyis ma smras pa nyid kyi phyir don ci yang go bar mi byed do | ci ste de nyid dang gzhan nyid du brjod du med pa nyid kyi phyir brjod du med pa yin no zhe na 'o na ni ji skad du brjod par bya ba de skad du brjod par gyis shig | gang gcig ma yin zhing gcig ma (D : pa P) yin pa yang ma yin pa'i dngos po de lta bu ni srid par bya ba yang mi nus so || de'i phyir de ltar rang gis (D : gi P) dam bcas pa'i (D : bcaʼ ba'i P) ngag gi don khong du chud par mi nus pas ko rtsod pa ga la rnyed | gtan tshigs 'di yang dam bca' ba las tha dad pa zhig bsgrub bya'i don go bar byed dam | tha mi dad pa zhig yin grang | gal te tha dad na ni de tha dad pa nyid kyi phyir go bar mi byed de | tha dad pa gzhan bzhin no || ci ste tha mi dad na | de lta na yang dam bca' ba'i rang gi bdag nyid ltar go bar mi byed do || gal te 'di ni ltag chod zhig go zhe na | lan yod na ni ltag chod du 'gyur ba zhig na de yang nga la gdab par mi nus te | gang dang gang smras pa de dang de gnyi ga la grub pa med pa'i phyir ro || gang zhig gnyi ga la 'grub par 'gyur ba bdag gis ni ci yang khas ma blangs so ||; cf. Ueda 1994: 84.

  73. Cf. Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā 9.16cd: asarvajñāś ca saṃbuddhaḥ puruṣatvāt tadanyavat ||; Kawasaki 1992: 377, 411.

  74. “That (i.e., a debate) which is not endowed with the establishment of a counter-thesis” is the Naiyāyika definition of a “destructive debate” (vitaṇḍā) (cf. NSū 1.2.3: sa pratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā.). It is different from the jāti, which is a kind of jalpa. Regarding the criticism that the Mādhyamika way of debate is a kind of vitaṇḍā, cf. Ejima 1980: 99–100.

  75. Cf. Ogawa 1976: 312–324; Tauscher 1981: 53–65, notes 20–110; Ruegg 1991: 298–299.

  76. Cf. Li 2015. In the following, I present the Sanskrit text of Liʼs edition, with some improvements based on information from the manuscript provided to me by Dr. MacDonald.

  77. MA 6.169–170: janayati yadi hetuḥ prāpya kāryaṃ tadā te na janakaphalabhedaḥ syāt tayor aikyaśakteḥ | pṛthag ayam aviśiṣṭo ’hetubhiḥ syāc ca hetur dvayam idam avadhūyānyāsatī kalpanā ca ||169|| phalam atha tava hetur no karotīty ato ’sat phalam iti phalahīno ’hetuko san na hetuḥ | dvayam idam api māyāsaṃnibhaṃ yena tasmād bhavati na mama doṣo laukikāḥ santi cārthāḥ ||170||; cf. Tauscher 1981: 53–55.

  78. FL 28a27–b2: 復次汝立我常以非根覺. 到故爲因爲不到乎. 若不到則不成因, 如火不到則不能燒,如刀不到則不能割. 不到於我云何爲因. 是名不到. 復次若到因者. 到便即是無有因義. 是名爲到. [= Further, you set forth a syllogism: “A soul is permanent since it is not perceived by the sense organs.” [In this case], does [a property], after having reached [the effect], become a cause, or without having reached [it]? If it has not reached [the effect], then it cannot become a cause, just like a fire cannot burn [something] without having reached [it], or a sword cannot cut [something] without having reached [it]. How [can the property] “being perceived by the sense organs” become a logical reason without having reached the soul? This [argument] is called the “disconnection-based [rejoinder]” (不到). If, however, [a property] becomes a cause [only] after having reached [the effect], [the property] that has already reached [the effect] does not have the meaning as its cause. This [argument] is called the “connection-based [rejoinder]” (到).]

  79. Cf. NSū 5.1.7–8.

  80. Cf. VP(P) 115a2–115b6; Kajiyama 1984: 37–38.

  81. Cf. Ono 2020a: 293, 312; NMu 5a10–14: 若能立因至所立宗而成立者, 無差別故, 應非所立, 如池海水相合無異. 又若不成, 應非相至. 所立若成, 此是誰因. 若能立因不至所立, 不至非因無差別故, 應不成因. 是名爲至非至相似 (cf. Tucci 1930: 63–64; Katsura 1987: 46–48); PSV ad PS 6.3: yadi hetuḥ prāpya sādhyaṃ sādhayati, aviśiṣṭaḥ sādhyena prāpnoti, prāptasaritsāgarajalāviśeṣavat. na cāsiddhena prāptiḥ. sādhyaṃ cet siddhaṃ kasyāyaṃ hetuḥ. athāprāpya, aprāptair aviśiṣṭatvād ahetubhir asādhanam ity eṣā prāptyaprāptisamā. [= If the logical reason, after having reached the object to be proven, establishes [it], [the logical reason] would not be different from the object to be proven, just like the water of a river and of the ocean that reach [each other] have no difference. On the other hand, [the object to be proven] is not reached by the unestablished [reason]. If the object to be proven is [already] established, what is the purpose of this reason? If, however, [the logical reason] establishes [the object to be proven] without having reached [it], it would not be a logical reason, since it is not different from that which is not the reason [i.e., a pseudo-reason such as an unestablished reason (asiddhahetu)] having not reached [the object to be proven]. This argument is [the false rejoinder] called prāptyaprāptisama.]

  82. Cf. Tauscher 1981: 110, note 21.

  83. Cf. NSū 5.1.20: pratiṣedhānupapatteś ca pratiṣeddhavyāpratiṣedhaḥ; Kajiyama 1984: 36. In the NSū, this objection appears in the explanation of the ahetusama. Dignāga, however, regarded it as a valid objection to both the prāptyaprāptisama and the ahetusama. See below, note 85.

  84. MA 6.171–172: dūṣyaṃ vidūṣayati dūṣaṇam āpya caitad aprāpya ceti nanu caiṣa tavāpi doṣaḥ | svaṃ pakṣam eva vinihaṃsi vadan yadaivaṃ dūṣyaṃ tadāsi na vidūṣayituṃ (em. : hi dūṣayituṃ Li) samarthaḥ ||171|| jātyuttaraiḥ (Ms, cf. ltag chod T : jātyantaraiḥ Li) svavacane ’pi samaprasaṅgair nyāyaṃ vināpavadase sakalān padārthān | yasmāt tato na khalu sajjanasaṃmato ’si vaitaṇḍiko ’si ca yato ’sti na te svapakṣaḥ ||172||; cf. Tauscher 1981: 56.

  85. PSV ad PS 6.3: ete ’pi hetunyūnatvarūpike. kasmāt. anyāyena sarvahetvapavādāt. kā hy atra yuktiḥ – aprāptimātrasādharmyād dhetulakṣaṇayuktenāpy ahetunā bhavitavyam iti, tathā prāk sādhyād dhetuvyapadeśamātrasyālabdhatvād asādhanam iti. svaghātitvadoṣaś cātra, pratiṣedhe tulyatvāt; cf. NMu 5a19–23: 由倶説名似因闕故. 所以者何. 非理誹撥一切因故. 此中何理, 唯不至同故, 雖因相相應亦不名因, 如是何理. 唯在所立前不得因名故, 即非能立. 又於此中有自害過, 遮遣同故; Tucci 1930: 64–65; Katsura 1987: 48–50.

  86. PSṬ VI 5,8–14: na kevalam ayuktyā sarvahetvapavādadoṣaḥ, kiṃ tarhi svaghātitvadoṣaś ca. … kasmād ayaṃ ca doṣa ity āha – pratiṣedhe tulyatvād iti. yady etad dūṣaṇaṃ dūṣyaṃ prāpya dūṣayati dūṣyeṇāviśiṣṭaṃ prāpnotītyādi sarvaṃ vācyam. tathā yady etad dūṣaṇaṃ prāg dūṣyād asati dūṣye kasyaitad dūṣaṇam ityādi sarvam atrāpi vācyam.

  87. PSV ad PS 6.20d: samaśabdaḥ punar jātiṣu sarvopasaṃhāreṣu samaprasaṅgato veditavyaḥ; cf. PSṬ VI 32,6– 8: sarvopasaṃhāreṣu samaprasaṅgata iti yathaivedaṃ tava sādhanam | mamāpi tathaivedamuttaram ity evaṃ sarvapūrvottarapakṣeṣu tulyatvāpādanataḥ. [= “Since [this conclusion] is equally accompanied in every cases” means: Since the sameness is accompanied in the way that this is the refutation for us, just as this is established for you.] Further, it is possible that the sentence 一切攝立中相似過類故 in the NMu 4a8–9 is a Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit sarvopasaṃhāreṣu samaprasaṅgataḥ. Incidentally, the expression samaprasaṅgitā is attested in PrP 173,7 ad MMK 7.32 (cf. Muroya 2020: 107, note 25). I imagine that this samaprasaṅga can be regarded as the Sanskrit equivalent of the Chinese word xiang ying (相応) in the FL, to which I refer at the beginning of this paper (cf. Ono 2020b: 30, note 43).

  88. Cf. NMu 5a19–20; PSV ad PS 6.3: ete ’pi hetunyūnatvarūpike. kasmāt. anyāyena sarvahetvapavādāt.

  89. MA6.173: aprāpya dūṣayati dūṣaṇam eva yasya prāpyātha dūṣyam iti vā niyamena pakṣaḥ | syāt tasya doṣa udito ’yam ayaṃ tu pakṣo nāstīti naiṣa mama sambhavati prasaṅgaḥ ||173||; cf. Tauscher 1981: 57–58.

Abbreviations

AŚ:

Arthaśāstra (Kauṭilya): The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. Part I. Ed. r. p. Kangle. Bombay University 21969.

GBLSh:

Dacheng Guang bai lun shi (大乗廣百論釋) (護法 Dharmapāla) Taishō vol. 30 (T 1571).

CŚṬ(P)(D):

Catuḥśatakaṭīkā (Tibetan) (Candrakīrti): P 5266, Vol. 98, Ya 33b4–273b3; D 3865, Vol.8, Ya 30b6–239a7.

T:

Catalogue number of the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō.

NBh:

Nyāyabhāṣya (Pakṣilasvāmin). s. NV.

NMu:

Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論本) (陳那 Dignāga) Taishō vol. 32 (T1628)

NV:

Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara): Nyāyavārttikam. A Critical Gloss on Nyaya Darshana Vatsyayana’s Bhashya. Eds. Vindhyeswari Prasad Dwivedi and Laksmana Sastri Dravida. Kashi Sanskrit Series 33. Varanasi 1916.

NSū:

Nyāyasūtra. s. NV.

PP(P)(D):

Prajñāpradīpa (Tibetan) (Bhāviveka) P 5253, Vol. 95, Tsha 53b3–325b6; D 3853. Vol. 2, Tsha 45b4–259b3.

PP(Ch):

Banruo deng lun shi (般若燈論釋) (分別明=清辯 Bhāviveka) Taishō vol. 30 (T1566).

PPṬ(P)(D):

Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā (Tibetan) (Avalokitavrata): P 5259, Vols. 96–97, Wa 1–317b6, Sha 1–383a6, Za 1–405b7; D 3859, Vols. 4–6, Wa 1b1–287a7, Sha 1b1–338a7, Za 1b1–341a7.

PrP:

Prasannapadā (Candrakīrti): Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti. Ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin. St.-Pétersbourg 1913.

PVA:

Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (Prajñākaragupta): Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam). Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 1. Ed. by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana. Patna 1953.

PSV ad PS 6:

Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti VI (Sanskrit Reconstruction) (Dignāga): Ed. by M. Ono, Y. Muroya, T. Watanabe. http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/Mat/dignaga_PS_6.pdf (forthcoming).

PSṬ I:

Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1 Part 1: Critical Edition. Ed. by E. Steinkellner, H. Krasser and H. Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005.

PSṬ VI:

Jinendrabuddhi’s Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 6. Critical and Diplomatic Editions. Ed. by M. Ono, Y. Muroya and T. Watanabe. Beijing/Vienna (forthcoming).

MA:

Madhyamakāvatāra (Candrakīrti): s. Li 2015.

MMK:

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. s. PrP.

MMV(P)(D):

Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti (Tibetan) (Buddhapālita): P 5242, Vol. 95, Tsa 178b2–317a4; D 3842. Vol. 1, Tsa 158b1–281a4.

RL:

Rushi lun fanzhinan pin (如実論反質難品 *Tarkaśāstra) Taishō vol. 32 (T 1633).

VN:

Vādanyāya (Dharmakīrti): M.T. Much, Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil I. Wien 1991.

VP(P)(D):

Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (Tibetan): P 5230, Vol. 95, Tsa 114a8–126a5; D 3830. Vol.1, Tsa 99b1–110a4.

S:

Song (宋) edition Tripiṭaka preserved in the archives of the imperial household in Japan.

Ffrg.:

Fragments of Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhi according to Frauwallner 1957: Anhang I.

FL:

Fangbian xin lun (方便心論 *Upāyahṛdaya) Taishō vol.32 (T 1632).

ZhL:

Dacheng zhangzhen lun (大乗掌珍論 *Hastaratna) (清辯 Bhāviveka) Taishō vol. 30 (T1578)

Ames 1999:

W.L. Aimes, Bhāvavivekaʼs Prajñāpradīpa: A Translation of Chapters Three, Four, and Five, Examining the āyatanas, Aggregates, and Elements. Buddhist Literature 1 (1999) 1–119.

Bhattacharya 1974:

K. Bhattacharya, A Note on the Interpretation of the Term Sādhyasama in Madhyamaka Texts. Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1974) 225–230.

Ejima1980:

Y. Ejima, Chūgan Shisō no Tenkai [The Development of Madhyamaka Thought]. Tokyo 1980.

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Franco 2004:

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Frauwallner 1957:

E. Frauwallner, Vasubandhuʼs Vādavidhiḥ. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie 1 (1957) 104–146.

He 2020:

H. He, Bhāvivekaʼs *Hastaratna on the Vaiśeṣika Argument of Śabda Being Impermanent – Once Again on Bhāviveka vs. Candrānanda. In: Transmission and Transformation of Buddhist Logic and Epistemology in East Asia. Ed. by Sh. Moriyama. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde (WSTB). Heft 97. Vienna 2020, 235–260.

Hsu 2013:

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Ishitobi 2006:

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Y. Kajiyama, Bhāvavivekaʼs Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel). Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie 7 (1963) 37–62.

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Y. Kajiyama, Bhāvavivekaʼs Prajñāpradīpaḥ (1. Kapitel) (Fortsetzung). Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd und Ostasiens und Archiv für Indische Philosophie 8 (1964) 100–130.

Kajiyama 1974:

Vaidalya Ron [The Vaidalyaprakaraṇa]. Translated into Japanese by Y. Kajiyama. In: Daijō Butten 14. Ryūju Ronshū. Tokyo 1974, 185–229.

Kajiyama 1979:

Y. Kajiyama, Bhāvaviveka no Gō shisō. “Hanʼnya Tōron” Dai 17 Shō no Wayaku [Bhāvavivekaʼs Doctrine of karman. Japanese Translation of the seventeenth Chapter of the Prajñāpradīpa]. In: Gō Shisō Kenkyū. Ed. by Sh. Kumoi. Kyoto 1979, 305–357.

Kajiyama 1984:

Y. Kajiyama, Bukkyō Chishikiron no Keisei [The Formation of the Buddhist Logic and Epistemology]. In: Kōza Daijō Bukkyō 9. Ninshikiron to Ronrigaku. Tokyo 1984, 1–101.

Kajiyama 1991:

Y. Kajiyama, On the Authorship of the Upāyahṛdaya. In: Studies in the Buddhist Epistomological Tradition. Proceedings of the Second Internatianal Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, June 11–16, 1989. Ed. by E. Steinkellner. Wien 1991, 107–117.

Kamimura 1984:

Kauṭilya Jitsuriro. Kodai Indo no Teiōgaku. Ge. [Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra. Second volume] Translated into Japanese by K. Kamimura. Tokyo 1984.

Katsura 1984; 1987:

Sh. Katsura, Inmyōshōrimonron Kenkyū (6); (7) [A Study on the Nyāyamukha (6); (7)]. Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō 44 (1984) 43–75; 46 (1987) 46–67.

Kawasaki 1992:

Sh. Kawasaki, Issaichi Shisō no Kenkyū [A Study of the Omniscient Being (sarvajña) in Buddhism], Tokyo 1992.

Kim 2014:

K. Sh. Kim, Daijō Shōchin Ron ni okeru Issaihō Mujishō Ronshō no Kenkyū [A Study on the proof of non-substantiality of everything in the Dacheng zhangzhen lun]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Otani University. Kyoto 2014.

La Vallée Poussin 1933:

L. de La Vallée Poussin: Madhyamaka, III. Le Joyau dans la main. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 2 (1933) 1–146.

Li 2015:

Xuezhu Li, Madhyamakāvatāra-kārikā Chapter 6. Journal of Indian Philosophy 43 (2015) 1–30.

MacDonald 2015:

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Acknowledgment

This paper which has been read at the occasion of the Online Workshop “Reading Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka” (hosted by Prof. Lin Chen-kuo of National Chengchi University in Taipei at 8-9. January 2022) is a revised and expanded English version of a paper that was presented in Japanese at the 69th conference of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies held at Tōyō University from 1 to 2 September 2018. The Japanese proceedings of that conference have already been published (cf. Ono 2019). My deepest gratitude goes to Prof. Yasutaka Muroya of the Kobe Womenʼs University, who gave me many valuable suggestions, and to Dr. Anne MacDonald of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, who kindly gave me precious information about readings of certain parts of the Sanskrit manuscript of the Madhyamakāvatāra. I am also grateful to Dr. Arihiro Kosaka, who gave me a great deal of information about research that has been done on Bhāviveka, and to Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Prof. Brendan Gillon for correcting my English in the penultimate and in the final versions of the paper respectively. This research was supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) KAKENHI Grant Number 18H00609.

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Ono, M. The jāti in the Mādhyamika – Different Approaches between Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti. J Indian Philos 51, 97–131 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-022-09528-y

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