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Navya-nyāya in the Late Vijayanagara Period: Appaya Dīkṣita’s Revision of Gaṅgeśa’s īśvarānumāna

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Abstract

In his celebrated treatise of Navya-nyāya, the Tattvacintāmaṇi, Gaṅgeśa offers a detailed formulation of the inference of God’s existence (īśvarānumāna). Gaṅgeśa’s inference generated significant commentarial literature among Naiyāyikas in Mithilā, Navadvīpa and Vārāṇasī, but also attracted the attention of South Indian scholars, notably Vyāsatīrtha, who comments on it extensively in the Tarkatāṇḍava. In the wake of Vyāsatīrtha’s pioneering critique, the 16th-century Sanskrit polymath Appaya Dīkṣita (1520–1593) developed a revised version of Gaṅgeśa’s inference in his magnum opus of Śivādvaita Vedānta, the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā. This article highlights that Appaya was thoroughly acquainted with the technical idiom of Navya-nyāya and sufficiently conversant with its literature to address authoritatively one of its key problems. Appaya’s contribution sheds new light on how the Navya-nyāya tradition continued to flourish in South India during the late medieval period.

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Notes

  1. I wish to thank Diwakar Acharya, Somdev Vasudeva, Yuko Yukochi and Harunaga Isaacson for their help in reading some difficult passages. I am also grateful to Hugo David for his comments on an earlier draft of this article.

  2. For the claim that Vyāsatīrtha was the first South Indian scholar to engage with Navya-nyāya, see Bhattacharya (1958, p. 102) and Williams (2014, p. 124). See also Williams’ article in this volume.

  3. Udayana’s contribution to this problem was influenced by a number of predecessors (Chemparathy 1972, p. 183). Prior to Udayana, the problem of Īśvara was addressed by Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophers in their commentaries on the Nyāyasūtras (see especially 2.1.49–68 and 4.1.19–21) and on the doctrine of world creation formulated in Praśastapāda’s Padārthadharmasaṃgraha (6th cent.).

  4. This proof based on kāryatva is the first proof mentioned in Udayana’s list of proofs found at the beginning of the fifth and last section (stabaka) of the Nyāyakusumāñjali: kāryāyojanadhṛtyādeḥ padāt pratyayataḥ śruteḥ | vākyāt saṃkhyāviśeṣāc ca sādhyo viśvavid avyayaḥ || (“[The existence of] an omniscient [and] immutable [Īśvara] is proved based on effect, combination [of atoms, etc.], support [of created things], etc., [the conventional usage of] words, the authoritativeness [of scriptures], scriptures, [the connexion of words in a] sentence and particular numbers”). Support (dhṛti) refers to the fact that a conscious agent is needed to support the world given that the latter has weight but does not fall down. Words (pada) refer here to linguistic usages of the elders (vṛddhavyavahāra) who have a complete command of language; the idea is that the conventional usage of words ultimately rests on a first teacher who instructed all others, namely Īśvara. Udayana understands pratyaya here as referring to the authoritativeness (prāmāṇya) of scriptures insofar as they are accepted by the large majority of people (mahājanaparigraha); for Udayana, the authoritativeness of scriptures is explainable only if their author is omniscient. Sentence (vākya) refers here to the connexion (anvaya) of words in Vedic sentences, which is again explainable only if an omniscient being composed them. Udayana’s mention of particular numbers (saṃkhyāviśeṣa) refers here to the Vaiśeṣika idea that the quality (guṇa) of number (saṃkhyā) is responsible for the size of dyads (triads, etc.) of things in the world, and that only the cognition of an omniscient being can explain the origin of this quality. See Chemparathy (1972, pp. 86–109) for a detailed discussion of this first series of proofs.

  5. See Chemparathy (1972, pp. 86–90) for more details on this proof in Udayana’s work.

  6. For Śaśadhara’s date and the debate around the question of whether he precedes Gaṅgeśa or not, see Matilal (1976, pp. 9–11).

  7. It is generally held (e.g., Potter and Bhattacharyya 1993) that Pragalbha hailed from Mithilā, but Bhattacharya argued that he was from Bengal (Bhattacharya 1958, p. 162).

  8. I was able to consult editions of the following commentaries on the TCM: (a) the Prabhā by Yajñapati Upādhyāya, a commentary on the anumānakhaṇḍa, and also the earliest commentary on the TCM that has come down to us; (b) the Āloka by Pakṣadhara Miśra, a disciple of Yajñapati whose work greatly influenced Rucidatta Miśra as well as Bengali scholars such as Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma and Rāghunatha Śiromaṇi; and (c) the Prakāśa by Rucidatta Miśra. Unfortunately, the Prāgalbhī by Pragalbha Miśra, who comments elaborately on the īśvarānumāna, remains unpublished to this day and I could not get access to manuscripts. The anumānakhaṇḍa from Vāsudeva’s Tattvacintāmaṇiṭīkā was edited and published in the 1960s by Gopikamohan Bhattacharya for the Anvīkṣā, the research journal of the Department of Sanskrit from Jadavpur University. After consultation, I can confirm that the īśvaravāda is not included in this edition.

  9. I rely here and thereafter on the Chaukhamba edition of Gaṅgeśa’s TCM published in 1990 (see References).

  10. I partly rely here on Appaya Dīkṣita’s discussion in the ŚAMD, where he successively examines every qualifier for every member of the inference, in line with Vyāsatīrtha’s presentation of Gaṅgeśa’s īśvarānumāna in the Tarkatāṇḍava. This detailed explanation is not central to the argument developed in this article; it is meant to familiarise the interested reader with the terminology underlying the inference and incidentally to highlight the fact that Appaya was perfectly at ease with this terminology.

  11. dhvaṃsa here refers to dhvaṃsābhāva, one of three types of relational absence (saṃsargābhāva) together with prāgabhāva (the absence of a thing somewhere before it is created) and atyantābhāva (the absence of a thing somewhere when this absence is not limited to a portion of time). The term dhvaṃsābhāva refers to the absence of a thing somewhere after it has been destroyed.

  12. This view was held early on by Yajñapati: samavetānīti dhvaṃsavāraṇārtham (“[The qualifier] samavetāni aims to exclude posterior absence”; Prabhā, p. 175). Also by Pakṣadhara: agretanaṃ janyapadaṃ samavetapadañ cākāśādau dhvaṃse cātivyāptivāraṇāya, tatpakṣatāyām aṃśato bādhāpatter iti bhāvaḥ (“The words janya and samaveta which follow [are introduced] in order to avoid over-extension [of the definition of the inferential subject] with reference to space (ākāśa), etc., and posterior absence (dhvaṃsa), because if the latter were part of the inferential subject, [the fallacy of a] contradiction (bādha) would follow for a part [of the inferential subject]; this is the point”; Āloka, p. 16). See also Appaya: atra janyamātrapakṣīkaraṇe dhvaṃsasyāpi pakṣatvena tasminn upādānaghaṭitasakartṛkatvarahite sādhyasya bādhaḥ syād iti tannivṛttyarthaṃ samavetānīti viśeṣaṇam (“In this [inference], the qualifier samavetāni [is introduced] in order to avoid the following [problem]: since only things produced are included in the inferential subject, posterior absence too should be included in the inferential subject; as a result, there is contradiction of the inferred property with reference to [posterior absence] since it does not have an agent connected with a material cause”; ŚAMD, p. 138).

  13. See Appaya: evam api pakṣatāvacchedakasya ghaṭādisādhāraṇyena tadaṃśe siddhasādhanaṃ syāt, tannivṛttyarthaṃ janyabhinnānīti viśeṣanam. tāvaty ukte kṣityāder api janyatvenāśrayāsiddhiḥ syāt, tannivṛttyarthaṃ janyakṛtīti (“The qualifier janyabhinnāni [is introduced] in order to avoid the following [problem]: in this case too, there would be the [fallacy] that what is established has already been established in relation to a part of the [inferential subject], because the limitor of subjectness (pakṣatāvacchedaka) would be co-occurrent with pots, etc. The qualifier janyakṛti aims to avoid the following [problem]: if this much is stated, there would then be [the fallacy of a] lack of a proper inferential subject (āśrayāsiddhi) since earth, etc. too are produced”; ŚAMD, pp. 138–139). Rucidatta: atropādānapadaṃ svopādānaparaṃ, tathā ca svopādānagocarajanyakṛtijanyā ghaṭādayaḥ prasiddhāḥ. tadanyatve sati janyatvaṃ pakṣatāvacchedakam (“In [this inference], the word ‘material cause’ (upādāna) means the material cause of [the things produced through such an effort], and so pots, etc. are [also] established, it being the case that they are produced through an effort that is itself produced, [an effort] which has as its scope the material cause of [pots, etc.]. The limitor of subjectness [thus] means ‘to be produced while being characterized by otherness from [pots, etc.]’ “; Prakāśa, p. 1951).

  14. Gaṅgeśa: evaṃ ca śabdaphūtkārādīnāṃ pakṣataiva (“And in this way [i.e., by defining the inferential subject as such], sounds, acts of blowing, etc. are included in the inferential subject”; TCM, p. 20). Yajñapati: atropādānapadaṃ svopādānaparam, tena saṃyogādyupādānabhūtamṛdaṅgādigocarādṛṣṭadvārakajanyakṛtijanyānāṃ śabdaphūtkārādīnāṃ pakṣatāsambhavāt. evaṃ ca śabdaphūtkārādīnām api pakṣataiveti (“In this [inference], the word ‘material cause’ (upādāna) means the material cause of [the things produced through such an effort], because [otherwise] it would not be possible to include sounds, acts of blowing, etc. in the inferential subject, it being the case that they are produced [by people like us] through an effort that is [itself] produced, not by means of invisible merit, [an effort which] has as its scope drums, etc. which function as the material cause of contact, etc. And thus, sounds, acts of blowing, etc. are also included in the inferential subject”; Prabhā, p. 175). Rucidatta closely follows Yajñapati: etenopādānapadaṃ yatkiñcidupādānaparaṃ, tadādṛṣṭādvārakarūpādyupādānamṛdaṅgādigocarāsmadādikṛtijanyānāṃ śabdādīnāṃ pakṣatā na syāt…iti parāstam (“By this, the following [argument] is rejected: [If] the word ‘material cause’ (upādāna) means any material cause whatsoever, then sounds, etc. would not be included in the inferential subject, it being the case that they are produced through an effort [that is produced] by people like us, [an effort which] has as its scope drums, etc. which function as the material cause of shape, etc., [which things produced] are not produced by means of invisible merit”; Prakāśa, p. 1951). Pakṣadhara: ata upādānapadaṃ na svopādānaparam aprasiddher, na sāmānyaparaṃ…śabdādāv avyāptir ityādidūṣaṇam alagnakaṃ bhavati (“Therefore, the following fault does not hold: the word ‘material cause’ does not mean the material cause of [the things produced through such an effort], because it is not well established; nor does it mean any material cause in general, as a consequence of which there is insufficient extension (avyāpti) with reference to sounds…”; Āloka, page not available). Appaya: evam api śabdaphūtkārādeḥ pakṣatā na syāt, tasya śabdānimittabhūtaṃṛdaṅgatālvādigocarāsmadādiniṣṭhajanyakṛtijanyatvāt. tasyāpi pakṣatvena saṃgrahaḥ kārya eva…tatsaṃgrahārthaṃ svopādānagocareti (“[The qualifier] svopādānagocara [is introduced in order] to take the following into account—in this case too, sounds, acts of blowing, etc. are not [included in] the inferential subject, because they are produced through an effort which is [itself] produced, which resides in people like us and has as its scope drums, palate, etc., [all of which] function as instrumental causes for [the uttering of] sounds, etc. [However, sounds, acts of blowing, etc.] too should absolutely be included in the inferential subject”; ŚAMD, p. 139).

  15. Appaya: evam api kṣityaṅkurādiṣu pakṣatāvacchedakaṃ saṃdigdhaṃ syāt, yāgadānādyupayuktahavirdeyādīnām api daivād yāgadānādiprabhavādṛṣṭajanyakṣityaṅkurādyupādānānupraveśasambhavena havirdeyādigocarakṛtīnām upādānagocaratvasambhavāt…tatsaṃgrahārtham adṛṣṭādvāraketi (“[The qualifier] adṛṣṭādvāraka [is introduced in order] to take the following into account—in this case too, the limitor of subjectness [remains] doubtful in relation to earth, sprouts, etc., because efforts which have as their scope oblations, gifts, etc. can have as their scope the material cause [of earth, sprouts, etc.]. [This is the case] since the oblations, gifts, etc. that are used in sacrifices, donations, etc. [respectively], can also accidentally be the material causes of earth, sprouts, etc. in that the latter are produced through the invisible merit originating from these sacrifices, donations, etc.”; ŚAMD, p. 139).

  16. I do not consider here the third formulation of the sādhya in Gaṅgeśa’s inference because Appaya does not address it.

  17. As a rule, an entity X is pervaded by an entity Y if wherever X is present, Y is also present. For example, smoke is pervaded by fire because wherever there is smoke there is also fire. Here we are told that the prior absence of effort, etc. is pervaded by the prior absence of invisible merit, which means that wherever there is the prior absence of effort, etc. there should also be the prior absence of invisible merit.

  18. Appaya: evam api siddhasādhanam, kṣityāder api svajanakādṛṣṭajanakayatkiñcidupādānabhūtayāgīyahavirādigocarāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtimadasmadādijanyatvāt. tadvāraṇāya svajanakādṛṣṭottareti jñānādiviśeṣaṇam (“[The expression] svajanakādṛṣṭottara qualifies [the agent’s] knowledge, etc. in order to avoid the following [problem]—In this case too, there is the [fallacy of] establishing something that is already proved [in our own experience] because earth, etc. too are produced by people like us who make efforts, have a desire to act and the direct knowledge of some particular sacrificial oblations, etc. which function as the material cause [of earth, etc.] through producing an invisible merit that [itself eventually] produces [earth, etc.]”; ŚAMD, p. 139).

  19. As defined, for instance, in the Tarkasaṃgraha: kāryaṃ prāgabhāvapratiyogi.

  20. On Śivādvaita Vedānta, see Duquette (2015, 2016a, 2021) and McCrea (2016).

  21. See Duquette (2016a) for an argument displaying how Appaya strategically reinterprets Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary along the lines of the pure non-dualist doctrine of Advaita Vedānta.

  22. atra ca bhāṣyādau sakartṛkatvaniruktāv upādānapadaprakṣepād dhvaṃsavyāvṛttasakartṛkatvasiddhyarthaṃ pakṣasādhyahetuṣu samavetopādānabhāvapadāni prayuktāni (TT, p. 293). Appaya rephrases this comment as follows: nyāyabhāṣyādiṣu sakartṛkatvaniruktāv upādānavaddarśanāt dhvaṃsavyāvṛttaṃ sakartṛkatvam abhimatam iti tadanurodhena pakṣasādhyahetuṣu samavetopādānagocarabhāvapadānīti (“Since [entities] that have a material cause (upādānavat) are covered in the definition of agency in the Nyāyabhāṣya, etc., agency is intended to be incompatible with posterior absence. In accordance with this, the words samaveta, upādānagocara [and] bhāva [are respectively used] in the inferential subject, the inferred property and the inferential mark”; ŚAMD, p. 139).

  23. samavetatva iti atra dhvaṃse vyabhicāravāraṇāya satyantaviśeṣaṇam (Prabhā, p. 177).

  24. yad vā, pakṣe hetau ca na samavetatvaṃ viśeṣaṇam. tena dhvaṃso ‘pi pakṣaḥ. sādhye ca upādānapadaṃ kāraṇamātraparam, anupādeyam eva vā (TCM, p. 20). The implication here is that we should keep these terms in the inference in order to exclude posterior absence.

  25. upādānagocaratvapraveśena kathaṃ sādhyasya dhvaṃsād vyāvṛttiḥ? dhvaṃsasyāpi rūpādyupādānaghaṭādigocarāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtibhir mudgarapātādihetubhir janyatvāt (ŚAMD, p. 139). I choose to read the first part of the compound rūpādyupādānaghaṭādi, namely rūpādyupādāna, not as a bahuvrīhi compound meaning “[pots, etc.] of which the material cause is shape, etc.,” but as a ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa compound meaning “[pots, etc.] which are material causes of shape, etc.” Rucidatta makes use of a similar compound in the Prakāśa (adṛṣṭādvārakarūpādyupādānamṛdaṅgādigocarāsmadādikṛtijanyānām; Prakāśa, p. 1951), following Yajñapati (saṃyogādyupādānabhūtamṛdaṅgādigocarādṛṣṭadvārakajanyakṛtijanyānām; Prabhā, p. 175), who adds bhūta after upādāna to make clear that clay functions as the material cause of contact, etc. In my view, this parallel supports my reading above. From a strictly logical point of view, it also makes sense that the pot be the material cause of the pot’s shape.

  26. mudgarapatanānukūlā kṛtir eva dhvaṃsajanikā na tu jñānaṃ cikīrṣā vā, jñānādīnāṃ trayāṇāṃ svaviṣayasamavetakāryaṃ praty eva janakatvaniyamāt (ŚAMD, p. 139).

  27. Yajñapati: nanūktasādhyasya dhvaṃse bādha eva, jñānādīnāṃ trayāṇāṃ svaviṣayakāryaṃ praty eva janakatvasya vakṣyamāṇatvāt…iti cet (Prabhā, p. 177); Rucidatta: na caivam uktasya sādhyasya dhvaṃse bādha eva syāt…jñānādīnāṃ [ca] svaviṣayasamavetakāryaṃ praty eva janakatvād iti vācyam (Prakāśa, p. 1954).

  28. ghaṭataddhvaṃsajananayoḥ kulālaghaṭadhvaṃsagatāparokṣajñānacikīrṣākṛtīnām anvayavyatirekataulyenoktaniyamasyāprāmāṇikatvāt (ŚAMD, p. 139).

  29. prāmāṇikatve vā jñānāditrayajanyatvābhāvād eva dhvaṃsavyāvṛttasakartṛkatvalābhena tadvyāvṛttyarthopādānagocaratvaviśeṣaṇavaiyarthyāt (ŚAMD, p. 139).

  30. dhvaṃsasādhāraṇam evātra sakartṛkatvaṃ sādhyam. anyathā jagajjanmasthitilayakāraṇatvaśruter anumānasiddhārthānuvādakatvapūrvapakṣānirvāhāt (ŚAMD, p. 141).

  31. tribhir asyopādānatvaṃ sūcyate. utpattimātraṃ tu nimittakāraṇasādhāraṇam iti nopādānaṃ sūcayet (“The three [actions of Brahman] indicate that [Brahman] is the material cause [of the world], but origination alone applies [also] to efficient causes. [Origination] does not indicate [on its own] a material cause”; Parimala, pp. 87–88).

  32. yady apy ekaikam api lakṣaṇam bhavitum arhati…tathāpi janmasthitibhaṅgānām anyatamakāraṇatvasya lakṣaṇatayoktau taditarakāraṇavastvantarasattvaśaṅkayā vastuparicchedāl lakṣaṇīyabrahmaṇo niratiśayabṛhattvaṃ na sidhyet (“Even if the definition [of Brahman] can also be [understood] individually [i.e., Brahman is defined by every action individually], nevertheless, given that [in this case Brahman would be] defined as either the cause of the creation, maintenance or dissolution [of the world], there could be the doubt that another entity exists that is the cause of the other [two actions]. Since the Brahman defined in this case [would be] limited as an entity, its unsurpassed greatness could not be established”; Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi, p. 11).

  33. See ŚAMD, p. 113 for the passage in question. Śrīkaṇṭha says ad BS 1.1.2 that the compound janmādi refers to the five actions of Brahman/Śiva: janmādikaṃ janmasthitipralayatirobhāvānugraharūpaṃ kṛtyam (ŚAMD, pp. 109, 115). Unlike Śaṅkara and other Advaitins, he does not elaborate on the grammatical features of the compound or on the ontological implications of Brahman/Śiva’s actions. Appaya, as Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentator, is in an interesting position as he has to prove, in contrast with the position he upholds in the Parimala and the Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi, that the sūtrakāra intended a Śaiva interpretation of the compound. Most of his sub-commentary is therefore spent on explaining why tirobhāva and anugraha are meaningful attributes (dharma) of Brahman/Śiva from a Vedāntic perspective. Notwithstanding their different takes on the nature of Brahman, both Advaita and Śivādvaita share the view that Brahman governs the dissolution of the world. This is, I argue, the background of Appaya’s argument on posterior absence in his commentary on the īśvarānumāna.

  34. Rucidatta, for instance, merely says that the alternative view put forward by Gaṅgeśa aims at including posterior absence: nanu yady uktānyatamatvam eva sakartṛkatvaṃ tadā dhvaṃsaḥ sakartṛko na syāt, tathā cānumānāj jagannirmāṇakartṛsiddhir ity api na syād ity ata āha yad veti (“[Thinking that the following objection should] also not be [raised], [namely] ‘If the property of having an agent is defined in any of the ways just described, then posterior absence does not have an agent, and thus [only] an agent creating the world is established through the inference’, [Gaṅgeśa formulates the following view beginning with] yad vā”; Prakāśa, p. 1954).

  35. Gaṅgeśa: see above, fn. 24, sādhye ca upādānapadaṃ….anupādeyam eva vā. Vyāsatīrtha: yadā tu dhvaṃsasādhāraṇasakartṛkatvamātreṇeśvarasiddhes tanmātraṃ siṣādhayiṣitaṃ tadā pakṣādau samavetādipadāny anapekṣitāny eva (“However, if one wishes to establish a little bit of the proof of Īśvara’s [existence] merely by [saying] that the property of having an agent is applicable to posterior absence, then the words samaveta, etc. in the inferential subject, etc. must be discarded”). Rāghavendra, Vyāsatīrtha’s commentator, clarifies: pakṣādāv iti pakṣasādhyahetuṣu samavetopādānabhāvapadāny anapekṣitānīty arthaḥ (TT, pp. 293–294). Vyāsatīrtha’s wording also shows that he does not believe that the proof that posterior absence can have an agent is crucial to establishing Īśvara’s existence. It is merely a triffle (tanmātra) in this regard.

  36. tathaiva svajanakādṛṣṭottareti viśeṣaṇam apy ayuktam, arthāntaravāraṇaikaprayojanakasya tasya vyāptigrahānaupayikatvāt bījasāmānyena vyāpake ‘pi vyarthaviśeṣaṇatvasya doṣatvāt (“In exactly the same way, the qualifier svajanakādṛṣṭottara [in the expression of the inferred property] too is inappropriate: since it has as its single purpose to avoid [the fallacy] of proving something other than what must be proved (arthāntara), this [qualifier] does not lead to the apprehension of pervasion (vyāptigraha). As a result, there is the problem [that this qualifier] too is a useless qualifier with regard to the pervader [i.e., the inferred property] on the same basis [as before]” (ŚAMD, p. 140). The idea that qualifiers are useless if they do not lead to the apprehension of pervasion precedes Appaya: the exact same compound used by Appaya, namely vyāptigrahānaupayika, is used in the īśvarasyānumānikatvabhaṅga section of Vyāsatīrtha’s Tarkatāṇḍava precisely in order to justify why a particular qualifier is useless: ajanyatvasyaiva hetutvasambhavena vyāptigrahānaupayikaviśeṣaṇāntaravaiyarthyāc ca.

  37. ata eva vyāpake vyāptigrahānaupayikāny arthāntaravāraṇena svābhimatasādhyasiddhiprayojanāni viśeṣaṇāni kathakasampradāye sarve ‘pi vādino niveśayanti (ŚAMD, p. 142).

  38. nanu tarhi svajanakādṛṣṭottarety asya sthāne adṛṣṭaprāgabhāvavyāpyaprāgabhāvapratiyogibhinneti viśeṣaṇaṃ kriyate […] iti cen na. kulālādigataghaṭādijanakajñānādīnām api tanniṣṭhavihitaniṣiddhakriyājanyādṛṣṭaprāgabhāvavyāpyaprāgabhāvapratiyogitvena dṛṣṭāntatvābhāvaprasaṅgāt (“If it is objected—But surely in this case, the qualifier adṛṣṭaprāgabhāvavyāpyaprāgabhāvapratiyogibhinna should replace [the qualifier] svajanakādṛṣṭottara [in the expression of the inferred property] […]—[we say:] no. Because [in this case] there would be the undesirable consequence [that this inference] has no example [to support it], since the knowledge, etc. of the potter, etc., [knowledge, etc.] which produces pots, etc., are also the counter-positive of a prior absence pervaded by the prior absence of invisible merit produced through the enjoined and prohibited actions of the [potter, etc.]”; ŚAMD, pp. 140–141).

  39. There is no evidence that Appaya undertook any formal training in Nyāya/Navya-nyāya. As far as I know, he did not compose any Nyāya work. Dasgupta (1932, p. 218) mentions that he wrote a commentary on the Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī by Jānakīnātha, but the New Catalogus Catalogorum ascribes this commentary to “Avadhāni Yajvan, son of Rāyamakhin” who is not to be identified with Appaya Dīkṣita and probably lived after him.

  40. According to Somanātha Kavi, the main biographer of Vyāsatīrtha, the latter did not spend time in Mithilā (Williams 2014, p. 132). Sharma suggested, without however providing solid evidence, that Vyāsatīrtha could have learnt Navya-nyāya in Kāñcipuram where, his biographer tells us, he studied “classical philosophy” (Sharma 1981, p. 287). More recently, Bronkhorst et al. have suggested that Vyāsatīrtha could have been exposed to Navya-nyāya in the court of Vijayanagara under the influence of Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma (ca. 1480), known to have introduced these techniques in Bengal (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, p. 80). However, this hypothesis also rests on too thin evidence to be taken for granted.

  41. See Bronkhorst et al. (2013) for the hypothesis that patronage by Vijayanagara kings and the vibrant intellectual milieu of Vijayanagara were potentially factors that contributed to the appropriation of Navya-nyāya techniques by South Indian scholars. Note, however, that it is not necessary to assume that a scholar’s acquaintance with Navya-nyāya techniques of analysis required a formal training with a Navya-nyāya teacher. Any good scholar with a fairly advanced knowledge of Sanskrit and a basic knowledge of Nyāya would have been in a good position, I assume, to acquire this expertise on his own.

Abbreviations

BS:

Brahmasūtras

ŚAMD:

Śivārkamaṇidīpikā

TCM:

Tattvacintāmaṇi

TT:

Tarkatāṇḍava

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Duquette, J. Navya-nyāya in the Late Vijayanagara Period: Appaya Dīkṣita’s Revision of Gaṅgeśa’s īśvarānumāna. J Indian Philos 49, 233–255 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-020-09441-2

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