Abstract
A mahāvidyā inference is used for establishing another inference. Its Reason (hetu) is normally an omnipresent (kevalānvayin) property. Its Target (sādhya) is defined in terms of a general feature that is satisfied by different properties in different cases. It assumes that there is no (relevant) case that has the absence of its Target. The main defect of a mahāvidyā inference μ is a counterbalancing inference (satpratipakṣa) that can be formed by a little modification of μ. The discovery of its counterbalancing inference can invalidate such an inference. This paper will argue that Cantor’s diagonal argument too shares some features of the mahāvidyā inference. A diagonal argument has a counterbalanced statement. Its main defect is its counterbalancing inference. Apart from presenting an epistemological perspective that explains the disquiet over Cantor’s proof, this paper would show that both the mahāvidyā and diagonal argument formally contain their own invalidators.
Similar content being viewed by others
Abbreviations
- DM :
-
Daśaślokīmahāvidyāsūtram by Kulārka Paṇḍita (eleventh century)
- MV :
-
Mahāvidyāvivaraṇam, a commentary on DM by an unknown author
- MVT :
-
Mahāvidyāvivaraṇaṭippanam, a commentary on MV by Bhuvanasundarasūri (fifteenth century)
- MVD :
-
Mahāvidyāviḍambanam by Mahādeva Bhaṭṭavādīndra (thirteenth century)
- MVDV :
-
Mahāvidyāviḍambanavṛtti, a commentary on MVD by Bhuvanasundarasūri
- LMV :
-
Laghumahāvidyāviḍambanam, a summary of MVD by Bhuvanasundarasūri
References
Bhattacharya, S., & Bhattacharya, D. C. (Eds.). (1981). Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa (Vol 3, Part I). Calcutta: Sanskrit College.
Floyd, J. (2012). Wittgenstein’s diagonal argument: A variation on Cantor and Turing. In P. Dybjer, S. Lindström, E. Palmgren, & G. Sundholm (Eds.), Epistemology versus ontology: Essays on the philosophy and foundations of mathematics in honour of Per Martin-Löf. Dordrecht: Springer.
Giri, S. V. S. (1993). Pratyaktattwapradipika (Citsukhi) (Vol. II). Rishikesh: Kalidas Vidya Prakashan.
Hodges, W. (1998). An editor recalls some hopeless papers. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 4(1), 1–16.
Lipton, R. J., & Regan, K. W. (2013). People, problems, and proofs. Berlin: Springer.
Matilal, B. K. (1977). Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
Matilal, B. K. (1998). In J. Ganeri & H. Tiwari (Eds.), The character of logic in India. Albany: State University of New York.
Phillips, S., & Tatacharya, R. N. (2002). Gaṅgeśa on the Upādhi: The “inferential undercutting condition”. Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research.
Poincaré, H. (2009). Science and method (F. Maitland, Trans.). New York: Cosimo, Inc.
Potter, K. H. (Ed.). (1977). Encyclopedia of indian philosophies (Vol. II). Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas.
Russell, B. (1920). Introduction to mathematical philosophy. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Śāstrī, A., & Pansikar, V. L. S. (Eds.). (1982). Brahmasūtra Śāṅkara Bhāṣya with the commentaries Bhāmatī, Kalpataru and Parimala. Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy.
Telang, M. R. (Ed.). (1920). Mahávidyá-vidambana of Bhatta Vâdîndra. Baroda: Central Library.
Wittgenstein, L. (1956). Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Guha, N. A Monstrous Inference called Mahāvidyānumāna and Cantor’s Diagonal Argument. J Indian Philos 44, 557–579 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-015-9276-5
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10781-015-9276-5