Abstract
It is the contention of this paper that the majority of scholars deal with a simplified notion of Schutz’s understanding of social science. Specifically they tend to view Schutz’s understanding of social science as containing only three postulates: logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and adequacy. However, such considerations tend to focus primarily upon “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action” (1953) and only engage with Schutz’s other essays in a tertiary manner. This paper argues that only by giving due attention to Schutz’s other work does it become clear what his full understanding social science is. A full picture must necessarily take into account the postulate of relevance or disinterestedness, postulate of clarity, and postulate of compatibility or tested observation. This paper will clarify the relationship of all these postulates which will necessarily require a number of amendments in order to achieve the greatest clarity possible.
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Notes
Referred to hereafter as “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation”.
Referred to hereafter as “The Problem of Rationality”.
This essay was originally published under the title “Science and Technology in a Democratic order” in the Journal of Political Sociology (1942).
Referred to hereafter as “Social World and Social Action”.
Though published posthumously and later to all these other essays it existed in an unpublished format as early as 1940. Originally this paper was meant to be the third part to a large review of Talcott Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action (1937). However, the part published as “Social World and Social Action” is a positive explication of Schutz’s own positions and, lacking almost any reference to Parsons, sits independently of the other two sections (in Schutz 1964:x–xi).
Referred to hereafter as “Concept and Theory Formation”.
This is a variation upon Schutz’s use of “I can do it again” which he garners from Husserl’s Logical Investigations (1970). I have not used this phrase because to my mind it implies too much activity on the part of the person. While it makes sense for much of Schutz’s discussions which are focused on action and projects, this is not the focus of the current discussion. I would regard “this is known” as more fundamental for being entailed by the “again” of “I can do it again”.
According to Sebald “province of meaning” is a more elaborate version of Weber’s “spheres of value” though I have found no textual reference from Schutz to confirm this (2011:342).
This is similar to Heidegger’s distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. That is, in the practical attitude the object is ready-to-hand and in contemplative attitude it is present-at-hand (1962:98).
Whether the world of working is indeed the paramount reality is a debatable matter. One can see that the emphasis on work was itself a product of Schutz’s own life. As commented upon by Wagner, most of Schutz’s early academic writings were completed in his spare time while he worked as a banker (1984:111).
In “On Multiple Realities” only the provinces of work, phantasy, dreaming, and social science are mentioned.
Schutz does not suggest if there is a difference between “leap” and “shock,” but I would infer there is. Specifically, “leaps” refer to those instances where the person enters a province by their own volition whereas “shocks” occur when they are forced into a province.
The capitalisation of is to indicate when I am speaking of “social science” as a province of meaning.
The idea of the scientific situation is found in Felix Kaufmann’s Methodology of the social sciences (1944) whom Schutz has drawn from in part in his own understanding of science. In Chp. IV Kaufmann lays out his own rules for scientific procedure.
Note, by the logical placing of natural and social science on the same level of meaning-context this necessarily entails that they are incompatible with one another. I.e., natural science cannot be reduced to social science and vice versa. Schutz nevertheless hints at this in “The Problem of Rationality” when he points out that we cannot deal with social phenomena from the social world in the same way that we deal with natural objects: “We shall never understand why the mercury in the thermometer rises if the sun shines on it. We can only interpret this phenomenon as compatible with the laws we have deduced from some basic assumptions about the physical world” (1964:85).
While this certainly holds true in such branches of natural science as Physics, such branches as Zoography and Ethology whose attention is the behaviour and habits of animals might be considered to be dealing with experience and interpretation. For example, how can we describe the mating dances of birds as “mating dances” if the opposite sex does not interpret the associated behaviours as such?
Note that this last qualification distances Schutz from a monolithic conception of science as a cumulative process, a single progressive stream that can only build upon itself. So long as the scientist can make explicit why, science is open to revision.
Technically we should regard the scientific community as an in-group. Indeed, we must for the purpose of certain other postulates below. Rather, the point here is that in terms of approaching his topic of study the scientist has no in-group in the sense that neither the people under study or some other group benefit from his research in terms of their ability to further practical interests.
See Knudsen’s description of the difference between natural and social science for example (2004:49).
As insightfully suggested by one of the reviewers there is an incredibly strong link between the postulate of adequacy and Schutz’s theory of the pragmatic constitution of the life-world. Considered from this angle it may be possible to suggest that the postulates are not just mere methodological guidelines but the results of his theorising as a whole. Unfortunately there is not here space here to pursue this relation.
Dennis also suggests that clarity as an end in itself is a further component of rationality but I can find no warrant for this (2004). Garfinkel also makes a similar claim when he speaks of clarity and distinctness “for its own sake,” he too claims this point from Schutz but without adequate reference (1967:267).
The connection between ideal types and rationality is first presented in PSW where Schutz develops the thought of Weber and Mises (see Chp.5). This earlier text, however, lacks any treatment of Parsons who gave Schutz’s thinking sharper focus.
While framed in this way, “problem” is an acceptable way to describe the scientist’s work. However, in certain situations the use of “problem” may inclines use to think of some practical interest that needs resolving. Take the following comment from Kalleberg: “When we define something as a ‘problem,’ we not only assume a given state of affairs, but also that the situation is not as it ought to be” (2010:189). In this respect it may be less confusing to speak of “question” instead.
We may for example describe clarity in a similar fashion to Garfinkel and think that clarity is rationally achieved insofar as it is “sufficient for present purposes” (1967:268). Beyond clarity for sufficient purposes we may then think of complete or apodictic clarity. In the case of science “apodictic” and “sufficient from present purposes” are one and the same.
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Tuckett, J. Alfred Schutz’s Postulates of Social Science: Clarification and Ammendments. Hum Stud 37, 469–488 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-014-9321-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10746-014-9321-5