Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of informal recruitment channels on university enrolment decisions. A widespread diffusion of personal connections as an entry channel to the labour market may signal that social ties to well-off people are necessary to get a good job, thereby convincing students from poorly connected families that getting a tertiary education degree does not enhance their future socio-economic opportunities. By applying estimation techniques with instrumental variables to Italian microdata, I found that upper-secondary students coming from lower social classes are less likely to participate in tertiary education when they live in provinces where the percentage of newly tertiary graduates who found a job through informal channels is higher. My results are consistent with the hypothesis that the wide diffusion of ‘favouritism’ in local labour markets engenders a sense of ‘economic despair’ among poorly connected students, thereby worsening inequality of access to education and local socio-economic development.literature and the hypothesis
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Notes
See this article for a brief history of the Italian university system. For its more recent evolution, see Cattaneo et al. 2017.
‘Favouritism’ is intended as ‘the action of offering jobs, contracts and resources to members of one’s own social group to the detriment of others outside the group’ (Bramoullé and Goyal 2016).
The utility of not paying tuition fees, as well as the disutility of not having time to work in the current period, are greater for low socio-economic status individuals.
A recent study by Abbiati and Barone (2016) provides fresh data on Italian students’ expectations and claims that students from low-status groups are more pessimistic about the economic returns to the investment in education, even after allowing for the objective disadvantages they face.
Data are drawn from the Tertiary Graduates Employment Survey 2015, ISTAT. The survey covers a sample of individuals who attained their tertiary degree in 2011 (interviewed in 2015).
The same procedure has been applied with regard to university quality indexes (see Table A1 for details).
Students who graduated in a province other than that of residence have been assigned the housing cost of the province in which they graduated. For students who graduated in the same province of residence, housing costs are set to zero (see Table A1 for details).
This is the oldest referendum for which data at provincial level are available. Following De Blasio and Nuzzo (2009), figures for the provinces created after 1992 (Biella, Verbania-Cusio-Ossola, Lodi, Lecco, Rimini, Prato, Crotone and Vibo Valentia) are singled out from those to which they previously belonged: respectively Vercelli, Novara, Milan, Como-Bergamo, Forlì, Florence and Catanzaro.
More precisely, in the F&F equation, the partial R squared and F statistic on the excluded instruments are 0.1055 and 74.554, respectively, suggesting that the instruments make a relevant jointly contribution in explaining the diffusion of informal recruitment channels at local level. The first stage regression is presented in Table 6 in the Appendix.
In the Italian school system, students attending high school in private institutions generally perform worse than students attending public schools (OECD 2011).
Available upon request.
In order to reduce the number of variables included in the empirical models, I tried to aggregate the provincial-related variables through a principal component analysis. Estimation results, presented in Table 8 in the Appendix, do not change.
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Appendix
Appendix
Factor analysis
In order to reduce the number of variables in the regression analysis, I applied a principal component analysis (PCA). In particular, as I think that it is important to single out the effect of the individual and university-related characteristics, I aggregated through a PCA all the provincial variables except those related to university costs and quality. All these variables show a weak impact on the probability of enrolling and can be easily aggregated without much loss of information
The PCA retained two factors, explaining more than 55% of total variability. After a varimax rotation, the interpretation of the two factors became clearer (see Table 7). The first rotated factor seems to be related more to the economic conditions of the province of residence (employment rates, migration rate, and added value) whereas the second one is associated to cultural and social conditions (No. of degree courses, percentage of population with a tertiary degree and youth crime rate)
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Ghignoni, E. Informal recruitment channels, family background and university enrolments in Italy. High Educ 81, 815–841 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-020-00578-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-020-00578-3