Abstract
This paper develops a model of focal firm-stakeholder interactions incorporating the values of each party and the possible impact of incomplete contracts between them. The paper offers a values-based analysis of the forces driving the interaction between the parties. Firms exist in a web of perceived obligations and rights. We argue that entities in firm-stakeholder relationships have operational goals supported by terminal and instrumental values that affect the way that the parties behave and interact with others. Since various parties to an interaction may have different values and goals, this model allows for strategic interactions. While some relationships are bound by law or contract, others are not. Thus, the outcome cannot be prescribed with certainty, so an important question is whether the desired outcomes can be enforced. We draw upon contract theory to explore these issues, noting that performance under any contract is problematic since it cannot be assured in advance. We argue that the determinants of outcomes between the focal firm and its stakeholder groups are affected by the values and goals of each entity, while the nature of the contracts between them and the environment within which the interactions occur influence what can be achieved.
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Notes
We regard this assumption as foundational since no firm can be all things to itself. It seems inevitable to us that it must draw on resources from others since it cannot own everything and provide all it needs by drawing on what it has within it. Labor ultimately is supplied by parents having children. Firms cannot own all other kinds of material resources that they draw upon and therefore need financial resources to support them, with these financial resources generated by providing goods and services to those outside the firm both willing and able to pay for them. Aside from cash payments, suppliers may not be willing to deal with firms with bad reputations, e.g., ones openly selling products produced in the Chinese province of Xinjiang. The perceived moral ethical probity of the firm may, therefore, count as well.”
Labor’s ability to leave employment with a specific focal firm may depends on which labor component is under discussion. Highly skilled labor in a field with short supply may leave easily, aside from issues such as commutation to new jobs and family relocation. Labor that is less skilled or less mobile may be under greater pressure to accede to the focal organization’s demands. However, we cannot present all possible permutations for each stakeholder group.
Based on a social network theory approach, Batjargal et al. (2013), argue for the importance of institutional context in regard to the enforcement of contracts. They note that “Weak legal protections through court systems together with predatory inclinations of government bureaucracies often make informal channels of protection the primary and perhaps the only alternative available to entrepreneurs (citation omitted).” We acknowledge the importance of the strength of the court system in providing support for what we consider contract realism, that is, the ability of a party to enforce a contract in a suitable forum. We further acknowledge that this paper’ US context places the focal firm and stakeholders in one or more of 50 states, each with its own state legal system. Some of these legal systems may be more robust in terms of judicial efficiency and uniformity with respect to contract law enforcement than others. However, this paper is a modeling exercise that deals with such background variety at a very high level of abstraction. In effect, we assume it does not matter.
The idea of webs of stakeholders has been used in negotiation literature (e.g., Fells, Rogers, Prowse and Ott (2015), business ethics research on how organizational processes impact “the boundaries between the individual, organizational, and societal drivers of corporate philanthropy” (Eger, Miller and Scarles, 2019, p. 141), and in the study of open innovation ecosystems (e.g., Randhawa, West, Skellern and Josserand (2021). In all three instances, the term has been used to describe interactions between a focal firm and others in its environment, as we do here.
Subgroups within groups may exist, raising the question of how subgroups within a given group (e.g., labor) allocate the pain of necessary tradeoffs and whether they can categorize themselves as one stakeholder group. For example, an environmental group may contain factions promoting air quality over water quality and vice versa. Freedman et al. (2018) called this a “finer level of identification.” We argue that a group that is perceived by outsiders as a group and that commonly acts as a unified entity despite internal turmoil is indeed a unitary stakeholder group.
For example, Baggini (2018) discusses how different cultures and ethnic groups see themselves.
Commons (1924, cited by Spender, 2018) argues that there are at least five parties to every transaction: the two parties that are the buyer and the seller, at least two alternate parties to whom the seller (buyer) could have sold to (bought from), and the “instrument of legal power”, which may be conceived of as the regulator or the courts that are needed to enforce any lawful contracts. Contracts on illegal subject matters are not enforceable in US courts.
It may be argued as to whether reputation is a resource for firms since even reputedly bad organizations may survive, perhaps because that reputation is not known to many. That said, Eskerod and Jepson (2013, cited by Eden and Ackermann, 2021, p. 1009) state that a company’s goal systems “have the potential of being influenced by what others might think.” In other words, companies may fear the impact of having a bad reputation.
Of course, success may just mean arriving at a satisfactory enough solution, that is, satisficing, not optimizing (Simon, 1955).
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The authors wish to acknowledge the valuable contribution of Asokan Anandarajan, Ann Medinets, and Xinxin Wang. The insightful comments of the anonymous reviewers and coordinating editor are greatly appreciated.
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Appendix: ESD value group analysis
Appendix: ESD value group analysis
Value group | Terminal values | Instrumental values | Operational goals |
---|---|---|---|
Corporation (focal firm)* | Survival Maximized management wealth Maximized firm size High corporate reputation High growth | Behave smartly, as defined by need to achieve terminal values Justify management wealth accumulation Encourage efficiency and decision-making effectiveness Engage in effective public relations strategies Reinvest if acceptable markets provide opportunities | Have financial statements that appeal to stakeholders Attract new resources (labor, capital, prestige, credibility) Make best use of available resources to achieve terminal values Measure response to corporate behaviors Calculate meaningful ROI on investment opportunities |
Shareholders | Have best available returns from invested and investable capital Maximization of own wealth Have access to best information that helps self Be secured against others who misrepresent information Enjoy investment in company that pursues desired economic and social goals Maximum risk/return available for stockholdings decisions | Keep an open mind as to investment opportunities Avoid cognitive biases such as sunk cost fallacy Seek information helpful to oneself Define one’s own goals clearly (e.g., wealth maximization, fostering social good, however defined) Select investment and corporate voting strategies that maximize one’s own economic, social, or other goals | Read investment press Think critically about information and information sources Search out management self-dealing Measure desires against performance using valid metric(s), e.g., GRI reports, CDP (Carbon Data Project) reporting, Fortune 500 ranking Use software and other tools to evaluate risk/return status of existing and proposed investments |
Creditors | Have best available returns from lent capital Maximization of own wealth Have access to best information that helps self Be secured against others who misrepresent information Maximum interest income given credit risk | Keep an open mind as to investment opportunities Avoid cognitive biases such as sunk cost fallacy Seek information helpful to oneself Define one’s own goals clearly | Read investment press Employ debt covenants and required financial reporting to provide early warning system about debt sustainability Think critically about information and information sources Search out management self-dealing Monitor credit ratings by key rating organizations Monitor credibility of ratings by key rating organizations |
Labor (unionized) | Labor force living a “good life” Reduced anxiety about employment conditions and status Share in employer prosperity Share in corporate governance | Promote class solidarity Promote participation in union activities Promote financial literacy Promote awareness of corporate impact on membership | Evaluate members’ participation in union activities Measure members’ awareness of union activities Calculate quality of organizing activities Monitor and publicize employer profitability Take specific steps to identify union with public interest |
Community | Celebrate company participation in community Avoid imposing firm externalities (e.g., pollution) on region Have population employed fully at living wages Develop positive view of community Encourage development of community tax base and other resources | Make area palatable for firms Develop idea of corporate citizenship in local firms Provide local employers with skilled and responsible work force(s) Engage in image-building exercises/advertising Provide tax and other incentives to firms to locate in area, thereby generating tax resources | Calculate success in fostering corporate involvement in community Measure quality of school educational outputs Evaluate ability of community to attract highly skilled workers from other areas Do longitudinal evaluations of firms’ views of the community and desire to contribute to it |
Environmental Groups | Have a livable world Live in a sustainable economy Have corporations accept need to behave in a sustainable fashion | Act to prevent eco-catastrophe Encourage “green” solutions to business problems Change perceptions of role of corporation with respect to the environment | Foster group membership Track public awareness of environmental issues Educate corporate executives about pressing “green” issues Develop “green” partnership ideas or initiatives to promote with focal corporations |
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Kleinman, G., Palmon, D. A Values-based Approach to Understanding Corporate- Stakeholder Interactions. Group Decis Negot 32, 301–326 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-022-09808-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-022-09808-8